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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Federal Statutes and Government
Regulation
FEDERAL COURTS - IMPLIED FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION -
DIRECTORS' VIOLATION OF THE EXPENDITURE PROHIBITION OF THE
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971 GIvEs RISE TO A SHARE-
HOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION.
Ash v. Cort (1974) (rez/d, U.S. 1975)
Plaintiff, a stockholder in Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Bethlehem)
and registered to vote in federal elections, brought suit for injunctive
relief and compensatory damages' against Bethlehem's directors, alleging
that an advertisement 2 placed by Bethlehem prior to the 1972 elections
was in violation of section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
19713 (1971 Act). Plaintiff contended that a federal private cause of
action was to be implied for a violation of the statute's provisions, not-
withstanding that only penal sanctions were expressly provided therein.4
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
finding that no material factual dispute existed and that defendants were
not liable to plaintiff for the alleged statutory violation. 5 On appeal, the
1. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S.
June 17, 1975)
Plaintiff earlier had sought a preliminary injunction. Ash v. Cort, 350 F.
Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd 471 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1973). The district court
therein denied relief finding that: (1) plaintiff had no private right of action under
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended (Supp. III 1973); (2) there was no violation
of that provision; and (3) denial of the request would not irreparably harm plaintiff.
350 F. Supp. at 232. In affirming this denial, the Third Circuit stated that it was
narrowly holding that the district court's finding that plaintiff would not be irre-
parably harmed by denial of the request was not clearly erroneous. The holding was
limited to the request for preliminary relief, and plaintiff was not foreclosed at a
final hearing from asserting any contention regarding standing and statutory construc-
tion. 471 F.2d at 812.
2. The advertisement, entitled "I say, let's keep the campaign honest. Mobilize
'Truth Squads' . . . ." appeared in various national and local media. 350 F. Supp.
at 229. It also had been mailed to stockholders. The placement and mailing costs for
the advertisement were paid from the general corporate funds. Id. A reproduction
of the advertisement appears in the earlier district court opinion. 350 F. Supp. at 233.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended (Supp. I 1973). The Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (1971 Act) provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for.., any corporation. . . to make a contribution or expendi-
ture in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential
electors ... are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election ....
Every corporation ... which makes any contribution or expenditure in viola-
tion of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or
director of any corporation . . . who consents to any contribution or expenditure
by the corporation shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
Id.
4. 496 F.2d at 418. The relevant text of the statute appears in note 3 supra.
5. Id. The district court opinion was unreported, and the Third Circuit pre-
sumed that the lower court's holding was based upon the same findings and conclusions
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Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the statutory provision
prohibiting corporate expenditures in federal campaigns implicitly afforded
a private cause of action for its violation, if such action is brought either
by a citizen seeking injunctive relief, or by a stockholder requesting in-
junctive relief or damages; and that the question of whether section 610
had been violated created a material factual issue which precluded the
granting of summary judgment.( Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974),
rez'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 17, 1975).
Traditionally, courts have advanced two theories to justify the pro-
priety of finding a private cause of action implicit within a statute. The
first, founded in tort law, applies a negligence per se analysis,7 while the
second is grounded upon finding of a specific legislative intent to provide
a private action independent of any preexisting cause of action in tort.,
The Supreme Court of the United States first enunciated the concept
of an implied federal cause of action in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rigsby,9 which involved a suit for damages by a railroad switchman for
the violation of a federal statute requiring that secure grab irons or holds
be installed upon railroad cars used in interstate commerce. 10 Although
the statute did not expressly confer a private right of action, the Court
determined that the principal purpose of the enactment was the safety of
employees and travelers." Therefore,
[a] disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from
the party in default is implied .... 12
it gave as the basis for its earlier denial of the preliminary injunction. Id. See
note 1 supra.
6. Before reaching its decision concerning section 610, the circuit court dealt with
the issue of mootness. The mootness problem arose because the plaintiff sought to enjoin
expenditures for the 1972 presidential election, which had been concluded before this
appeal was heard. However, the court held that the dispute as to damages for previous
expenditures rendered the controversy justiciable regardless of the presence of the
claim to injunctive relief. 496 F.2d at 419. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
495-500 (1969). Although a claim for injunctive relief would not be moot if the basis
of the controversy remained after the election and the dispute was likely to recur, see
Moore v. Ogilve, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969), the claim for damages relieved the court
from having to make a determination as to whether the bare allegation of intended
future expenditures would be sufficient to allow for court review. 496 F.2d at 419.
7. See note 27 infra for an enumeration of the requisite elements of negli-
gence per se.
8. For a discussion and analysis of both approaches, see notes 61-77 and accom-
panying text infra.
9. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
10. Federal Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
11. 241 U.S. at 39.
12. Id. The Court based this conclusion upon the common law as expressed by
Chief Justice Holt:
So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a
person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his
advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.
Id., quoting Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (K.B. 1704).
The Federal Safety Appliance acts are no longer thought to provide an
implied federal cause of action. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205
[VOL. 20
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Securities legislation has been a fertile source of implied rights of
action.13 The seminal case from the Supreme Court in this area is J.1.
Case Co. v. Borak,14 wherein the plaintiff alleged that he had been de-
prived of preemptive rights by reason of a merger effectuated through a
false and misleading proxy statement circulated by those proposing the
merger. 15 Despite the fact that a state tort action for the breach of the
directors' fiduciary duty could have been maintained, Borak held that
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193416 (1934 Act)
authorized a federal private right of action for damages.' 7 The Court
noted that section 14(a), while prohibiting proxy solicitations in contraven-
tion of SEC rules,'8 made no reference to a private right of action.19 How-
ever, because the protection of investors was among the primary purposes
of the 1934 Act, the Court concluded that the availability of judicial relief
was "certainly" implicit "where necessary to achieve that result. ' 20 The
Borak Court failed to articulate why the finding of a "purpose," a fortiori,
gave rise to a right to private relief, but such a conclusion is consistent
with the importance of the purpose factor in the application of the doc-
trine of negligence per se as a basis for relief.21 The Court in this instance
determined that the proper judicial relief would be furnished by recog-
nizing a private remedy based upon violation of the 1934 Act.2 2 Again
(1934); Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HtAv. L. REV. 289,
297-98 (1969) ; Comment, Implied Federal Rights of Action and the Migrant Farm-
worker, 44 U. CoLo. L. REv. 237, 249-50 (1972).
13. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1947). See Comment, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 286 (1963).
14. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
15. Id. at 429-30.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person by the use of . . . any facility of a national
securities exchange . . . to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security .. . registered on
any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the [Securities & Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17. 377 U.S. at 430-31.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). SEC rule 14a-9 prohibits proxy solicitation
through the use of false and misleading proxy statements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974).
19. 377 U.S. at 432.
20. Id.
21. See note 27 infra.
22. Id. The Court's analysis in Borak is more easily understood if viewed as a
two-step process which distinguished the component parts of any cause of action,
1) the right and 2) the remedy. Initially, the Court had to find some basis for in-
1974-1975]
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showing a concern for effectuating the purpose underlying congressional
action, the Court in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States23
found a private cause of action based upon a violation of the Rivers and
Harbors Act.24 There the Court rejected the defendant's contention that
the express penal sanctions provided in section 16 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act were intended by Congress to be exclusive.2 5 Since criminal
penalties alone were inadequate to insure the full effectiveness of the
statute,26 the Court determined that the decision to permit civil actions
would effect a cogent and proper supplement thereto which would accord
with the general tort rule recognizing civil liability for the violation of a
penal statute.2 7 The Court, therefore, would not ascribe to the enactment
of criminal sanctions a legislative intent to withhold a remedy which in-
sured efficacious realization of the statute's objectives.2 8
More recently, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 29 the
Supreme Court broadened the use of the implied cause of action in hold-
ferring a shareholder's right to some form of judicial relief; therefore, it concluded
that Congress through section 14(a) so intended. Only after the plaintiff's right to
be free from the proscribed conduct was established did the Court find the federal
courts' power to provide a specific remedy - damages - under section 27 of the 1934
Act, which on its face conferred only exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. This
explains why the Borak Court phrased the substantive issue as being whether a
federal cause of action for damages was authorized by section 27, which provides
in pertinent part:
The district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). In answering in the affirmative, the Court rejected the
assertion that plaintiff was limited to obtaining a declaratory judgment in federal
court. 377 U.S. at 434-35. For a further discussion of the right-remedy distinction,
see text following note 64 infra.
23. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
24. Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 409 et seq. (1970).
25. 389 U.S. at 204. The Rivers & Harbors Act provides in pertinent part:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall know-
ingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions of section . . .
409 of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall
be punished by a fine . . . or by imprisonment ....
33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970). Section 409 makes it unlawful to carelessly sink a vessel in
navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970).
26. 389 U.S. at 202.
27. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part; (A) to protect a class of persons
which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (B) to protect the particular
interest which is invaded, and (C) to protect that interest against the kind of
harm which has resulted, and (D) to protect that interest against the particular
hazard from which the harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, at 190-204 (4th ed. 1971).
28. 389 U.S. at 204. The purpose of the Rivers & Harbors Act was to maintain
navigable waterways. The implied civil cause of action would allow the Government
to recover the cost of removing negligently sunken or abandoned vessels. Id. at 199-200.
29. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
[VOL. 20
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ing that a violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution by federal narcotics agents acting under color of federal authority,
gave rise to a federal cause of action against the agents.3 0 In that case,
the right itself did not have to be found; it was expressed in the amend-
ment.3 1 What the court inferred was the existence of a remedy for the
invasion of that right by federal agents.32 As in Borak, the Court rejected
the contention that the proper remedy was redress in a state tort action.
Rather, the Bivens Court said that the amendment was a limitation upon
the exercise of federal power regardless of a state's power to prohibit or
penalize identical conduct by a private citizen.33 Therefore, by allowing
an action for damages, federal courts would provide the necessary remedy
for the invasion of this federal right.3 4
Beginning its analysis with Borak and Wyandotte, the District of
Columbia Circuit in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.3 5 considered the
merits of allowing an implied private right of action to enforce provisions
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 0 The court noted that, in general,
the judicial implication of compensatory remedies furthers the objectives
of statutory prohibitions. 37 However, this generality was overridden in
Holloway by a legislative history that revealed a congressional rejection
of efforts to "hold business accountable to judicially imposed liability. '38
The court stressed the incompatibility of concurrent private and public
enforcement3 9 since Congress desired coordinated enforcement by an
30. Id. at 397.
31. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a discussion of the right-remedy distinction, see text
following note 64 infra.
32. 403 U.S. at 389.
33. Id. at 392. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borack, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964).
34. The Court noted that historically damages have been regarded as the ordinary
remedy for an invasion of a person's interests in liberty. 403 U.S. at 395.
35. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 54 (1970). For a list of federal statutes from which causes
of action have been implied, see 485 F.2d at 989 n.7.
37. 485 F.2d at 999.
38. Id. at 996-97 & n.49. See 83 CONG. REc. 392, 406 (1938) (remarks by Rep.
Lea) ; H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937). The Holloway Court
found five factors necessary to warrant the finding of an implied private cause of
action: (1) a statutory or constitutional prohibition of the conduct or actions com-
plained of; (2) the defendant's inclusion in the class upon which the duty of statutory
compliance has been imposed; (3) a legislative intent either to place the party claim-
ing injury within the statute's protection, or to confer a substantive benefit or immunity
upon him; (4) an injury or threatened harm proximately having resulted from the
defendant's breach of duty; (5) the unavailability or ineffectiveness of alternative
avenues of redress. Id. at 989. However, while the court found these conditions neces-
sary, they were not sufficient "automatically [to] warrant the implication of a private
cause of action." Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 997-99.
1974-1975]
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agency employing various means, not piecemeal litigation reflecting dispa-
rate private concerns. 40 Therefore, fearing that private enforcement would
interfere with the FTC's discretionary yet effective administration of the
Act, the court denied the existence of an implied federal cause of action.41
Finally and most recently, the Supreme Court in National Rail-
road Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers42
(Amtrak) similarly refused to find that Congress had intended to imply
a right of private enforcement where it was evident that private lawsuits
would not effectuate the purpose of the legislative enactment and would,
in fact, interfere with agency enforcement.4 3
Against this background, the Third Circuit in the instant case, after
determining that the plaintiff had standing to bring suit,44 considered the
propriety of inferring a cause of action. In making such a determination,
40. Id. at 997-98.
41. The unstated premise in the court's argument appears to have been that
Congress would not imply something which would undermine the effectiveness of what
was expressly created.
42. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). Suit was brought under the Rail Passenger Service Act
of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (1970) (Amtrak Act).
43. 414 U.S. at 461-62. Plaintiff contended that although the Amtrak Act
expressly authorized some private suits, such as those involving labor agreements, the
inference of other private actions was not precluded. Id. at 457. In rejecting this
argument and denying the existence of a cause of action the Court relied upon specific
statutory language, a clear legislative history indicating congressional intent, to with-
hold private redress and the potentially disruptive effect private litigation could have
upon the agency's enforcement of the Act. Id. at 458--62.
44. 496 F.2d at 420. The court concluded that plaintiff had standing to sue in two
capacities, that of citizen and that of stockholder. Id. This conclusion is distinguishable
from its resolution of the issue of whether a cause of action existed since standing
focuses upon determining whether a plaintiff is a proper party to request adjudication.
The Third Circuit noted that, as a constitutional requirement, plaintiff needed
only to show an injury in fact to himself or a threat of such injury; and a direct rela-
tionship between that injury and the legal claim. Id. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962). But see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
While a corporate expenditure would give a shareholder the requisite "per-
sonal stake," a potential problem might arise when a future plaintiff asserts only
citizenship as a basis of standing. (The Ash court did limit a citizen's standing to
the issue of injunctive relief. 496 F.2d at 420 (dictum).) The difficulty arises
because although standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer
the same injury, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973), there is still the constitutional requirement that
a plaintiff bear the burden of proving that he suffered injury in fact - economic or
otherwise - and individualized harm. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the necessity for individualized
injury in fact. See Schlesinger v. Reservists' Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In both these cases,
taxpayer actions were dismissed for lack of standing. In Richardson, Justice Powell
noted that despite the diminution of the standing requirements, "a plaintiff must allege
some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street." Id. at 194
(Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). In the context of a Federal Election
Campaign Act suit, the relevant question is whether the citizen-voter is sufficiently
set apart from the general public to have standing; and while the Ash court believed
so, its standing analysis was not directed toward this concern. 6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 9
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the court looked to legislative intent,45 but stated that when a legislative
history did not indicate any consideration of the creation of a civil action
for enforcement purposes, it was the court's function to ascertain whether
affording litigants a particular remedy would effectuate the policies under-
lying the statute.46 The court followed Borak and Bivens and focused
upon the two issues of the congressional purpose behind the 1971 Act
prohibition and the appropriateness of an implied federal cause of action
as a means of effectuating that purpose.
In determining the congressional purpose underlying the 1971 Act,
the Third Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's earlier determination
in United States v. CI0 47 that the passage of section 610 had been moti-
vated by two considerations: the destruction of corporate influence over
federal elections and the feeling that corporate officers had no moral right
to use corporate funds for contributions to political parties without the
consent of the stockholders. 48 The Ash court concluded that the principal
purpose of the expenditure prohibition was the protection of plaintiff's
ability to secure a government responsive to the voters, and only secondarily
the protection of shareholders. 49 However, the court stated that while
it may be improper to infer a cause of action from a statute only "inci-
dentally" protecting a plaintiff, the Supreme Court had indicated that the
secondary protection of stockholders was not merely "incidental" to the
primary objective of prohibiting the contributions and expenditures ;5o thus
45. 496 F.2d at 421. The court was referring to the Amtrak case and other situa-
tions wherein the legislature had clearly indicated its intent to grant or withhold a
cause of action. In interpreting Amtrak, the Third Circuit found that the rule of
statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another) merely assisted a court in determining when legislative
intent to preclude a remedy could be fairly inferred. 496 F.2d at 421 & n.3. See
generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.24-25 (4th ed. C.
Sands 1973).
46. 496 F.2d at 421, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
395-97 (1971).
47. 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). This case sets forth the historical development of
the corporate expenditure prohibition from the initial congressional action in 1907 up
through 1947. See id. at 113-20. Subsequently, the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 redefined "expenditure" as "a purchase, payment:.. made for the purpose
of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal
office .... " 18 U.S.C. § 591(f) (1) (Supp. III 1973).
48. 335 U.S. at 113.
49. 496 F.2d at 422. The defendant argued that section 610 was' to protect the
public in general and that a cause of action should be inferred only to protect members
of a specific class. Relying upon Bivens, the court disagreed and said that a provision
designed for the public's protection could give rise to implied private actions. Id. at 423.
While Bivens may support this proposition, it should be noted that in that case a
particular plaintiff had had his individual right invaded and therefore could be dis-
tinguished from the general public. Thus a harm suffered by the public as a whole,
such as an unresponsive government, may raise a standing problem. See note 44 supra.
50. 496 F.2d at 422-23. See 117 CONG. REc. 43384-85 (1971) (remarks of Rep.
Thompson) ; id. at 43379-81 (remarks of Rep. Hansen).
The Supreme Court's reversal of Ash and denial of a federal right to damages
to corporate shareholders was based upon its determination that, at best, there was only
a secondary intent to protect the shareholder, and that it was dubious that Congress
"intended to vest in the plaintiff class rights broader than those Drovided bv state
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stockholder protection was established as a goal mandated by congres-
sional intent.
Having found a legislative intent to protect the plaintiff,5 x the court
considered whether the proposed implied remedy would effectuate that
purpose, citing five factors in favor of this implication: 1) allowing a
private suit to enjoin such an expenditure was consistent with section
610's objective of preventing these campaign expenditures ;52 2) the chal-
lenged actions were more likely to be covert than notorious and the viola-
tions potentially so numerous that governmental enforcement alone might
prove insufficient ;53 3) if stockholders could recover damages on behalf of
the corporation and thereby protect their investments, they could be ex-
pected to be particularly vigilant in detecting violations ;54 4) politicians
whose elections were facilitated by violations might be in charge of the
statute's enforcement;55 and 5) because the challenged expenditure would
usually be made very close to the election, the expeditiousness of civil, in
contrast to criminal, proceedings would favor the former in effectuating
the Act's goal.5" These factors had to be analyzed in light of collateral
considerations5 7 such as the interference with a regulatory agency's dis-
cretionary enforcement and policy determinations which Amtrak and
Holloway had said were barriers to the creation of a private remedy. 5
However, the Third Circuit found no such countervailing reasons which
regulation of corporations. . . ." 43 U.S.L.W. 4773, 4778 (U.S. June 17, 1975).
Moreover, the Court concluded that the Act's primary goal - to prevent corporate
wealth from influencing federal elections - would not be furthered by creating a
shareholder private cause of action. Id. at 4779.
The Supreme Court's reversal was also based in part upon the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263 §§ 310(a) & (b), 314, 315, 410,
which was enacted subsequent to the Third Circuit's ruling and which precluded,
at least, initial private suits for injunctive relief under this Act. 43 U.S.L.W. 4773,
4775-76 (U.S. June 17, 1975).
51. Early in the Ash opinion, the court said that legislative intent was relevant
but not crucial. See text accompanying note 45 supra. As noted, the court was refer-
ring to Amtrak and intent was being used to denote the situation where there had
been a clear legislative indication, either by express statutory wording or by the
legislative history of that particular piece of legislation, reflected in committee reports
or debates, of an intent to grant or withhold a cause of action. Id.
However, in the context of the court's analysis of the campaign law, intent
was used synonomously with congressional purpose. The phrase is merely used to
denote an intent to protect, and not an intent to provide a cause of action. As will be
discussed below, this intent to protect may be manifested without thereby specifically
implying a federal cause of action. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
52. 496 F.2d at 423.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. It is submitted that this factor involves the same considerations as those
underlying the provision of a stockholder's derivative action, since one of the
primary reasons for allowing a derivative suit is that the corporate officer involved
in the unlawful conduct could not be expected to enforce the corporation's rights
against himself. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 186, at 358 (2d ed. 1970); 3 H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1597 (1965).
56. 496 F.2d at 423-24.
57. 496 F.2d at 423.
58. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 20
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would necessitate withholding the proposed remedy. Indeed, the court
said the favorable factors suggested that the remedy would provide an
effective supplement to governmental enforcement. 9 Accordingly, satisfied
that the requisites of its test-
to find a cause of action "implied" in a statute, we must determine
(1) that the provision violated was designed to protect a class of
persons including the plaintiff from the harm of which plaintiff
complains and (2) that it is appropriate, in light of the statute's
purposes, to afford plaintiff the remedy sought 6Q-
had been met, the court decided that in the context of the alleged section
610 violation there existed implicitly a private cause of action under
federal law.
The analysis adopted by the Third Circuit in Ash should be viewed
in light of the two traditional analytical approaches, negligence per se and
implied legislative intent.61 The former uses a relevant statute to estab-
lish the standard of conduct required under a preexisting cause of
action ;62 in effect, a legislative determination is substituted for the jury's
in a tort action.63 The latter is based upon the judicial conclusion that
the legislature, without expressing such, intended that there be a private
cause of action within the relevant statute declaring certain conduct illegal.6 4
Often, in cases involving the latter approach, the effectuation of an enact-
ment's policies is the prime consideration in determining whether an
action is implied.
It is important to note that in the discussion and application of either
approach, courts often fail to make clear what it is that has been implied.
They speak of inferring a cause of action; yet, a cause of action must
be based upon both a right and a remedy. Most often, one of the two is
either preexisting at common law or expressly created by statute; there-
59. 496 F.2d at 423-24. Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964).
60. 496 F.2d at 421 (citations omitted).
61. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra and note 27 supra.
62. See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N.W. 541, 543 (1889);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285, 286 (1965). See Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914). Professor Thayer was the leading
advocate of the superiority of the negligence per se rationale over the implied legisla-
tive intent approach.
Proper regard for the legislature includes the duty both to give full effect to its
expressed purpose, and also to go no further . . . . The legislature is to be
credited with meaning just what it said - that the conduct forbidden is an
offense against the public, and that the offender shall suffer certain specified
penalties for his offense. Whether his offense shall have any other legal conse-
quence has not been passed on one way or the other as a question of legislative
intent, but is left to be determined by [common law principles].
Id. at 320.
Dean Prosser believed that ordinarily a finding of implied intent was con-
cocted for that purpose and therefore was purely fiction. If a legislature did not say
anything about a civil suit, the obvious conclusion, Prosser contended, was that it
did not have such a suit in mind or deliberately did not provide for it. PROSSER, Supra
note 27, at 191. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 286.
63. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 200.
64. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967).
See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 289-90.
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fore, only the other element need be found. For this reason, although both
analytical theories authorize the maintenance of a private action, there
are significant differences.
As previously stated, the negligence per se analysis does not lead to
the creation of a new cause of action; it establishes a right in the injured
party to bring suit based upon the violation of the statute under an exist-
ing cause of action, most commonly a state tort action.65 For example,
the violation of a state criminal statute constitutes unreasonable conduct
toward the plaintiff's interest for which a state negligence action will
provide a remedy. This is in contrast to the situations in which violation
of a federal statute is held to create a new cause of action. In that situa-
tion, the court may imply the right,66 remedy, 67 or both.68 This approach
provides greater judicial freedom because courts need not rely upon ex-
tended logic to rationalize the placement of a right within an existing
cause of action. The court, believing a violation of the statute to be a
wrong in and of itself, will use the created cause of action to increase
the likelihood of compliance by giving victims an incentive to assist en-
forcement and confronting potential violators with an additional penalty.6 9
Although often couched in terms of merely implementing legislative in-
tent, this approach is dependent upon the recognition of a concept of
inherent judicial power and of the propriety of courts' performing a
limited lawmaking function. 70
The federal courts are not constrained to recognize a new cause of
action only when there is a congressional purpose to protect a specific
class of which plaintiff is a member. However, this criterion of purpose
is the sine qua non of the negligence per se approach. 71 The concept of
an implied cause of action does not suffer this limitation, but in an effort
to restrain the potential for excessive use of the implied cause of action de-
vice, courts have repeatedly stressed the importance of effectuating the en-
forcement of an act. 72 The Amtrak decision underscores the overriding
65. The state cases allowing a state tort action are legion. See PROSSER, supra
note 27, at 192-200. The negligence cause of action itself provides the plaintiff's
remedy. Because "actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another" is a
requisite element of the negligence action, id. at 143, courts have made compensation
the measure of recovery. See Standard Oil Co. v. South Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146,
155 (1925).
66. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967).
67. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). See text
accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
68. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432, 435 (1964). See note 22 supra.
It is submitted that Ash v. Cort involved the creation of both a federal right and remedy.
The creation of a right does not necessitate a concomitant creation of a
remedy, because one is usually extant. See Greene, supra note 12, at 296-97, 315-19;
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
69. Comment, supra note 13, at 291.
70. Id.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See note 27 supra.
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consideration this factor is given when the creation of a new cause of
action will hinder enforcement of the enactment, notwithstanding the fact
that there may be an intent to protect a specified class. Courts have also
chosen to consider the purpose or motivation for the prohibition. This
factor has been used, as in Borak, to justify initially the need for judicial
relief, followed by a consideration of effectuating the statute's purpose by
means of an implied action.73 In other federal decisions, purpose alone
has formed the basis of the federal cause of action.74
As to which traditional approach will form the basis for finding an
implied cause of action, courts most often create a new cause of action
only after an existing cause of action is declared infeasible. 75 Generally,
the nationwide availability of effective state remedies for the conduct pro-
scribed by a federal statute removes any need to afford a new cause of
action.7 6 With the availability of these remedies, the policies favoring
private relief are satisfied, and the economical use of federal and state
judicial resources is furthered by granting all pertinent remedies in one
action.77 Thus, it is after a determination that a state remedy is unavailable
or undesirable - for example, for its failure to assure desired national
uniformity - that a newly created federal action is considered appropriate.
In Ash, the Third Circuit failed to discuss the availability of effec-
tive state remedies. 78 However, the federal prohibition of corporate
campaign expenditures presented problems of the adequacy of an exist-
ing state remedy. If the Third Circuit had opted to apply the traditional
negligence per se approach, which ultimately would leave the individual
states to their own devices in providing the necessary remedy, the success
of stockholder recovery would have been at best uncertain, as the state
courts have available various options when applying a federal statute to
a negligence action. They can (1) accept the statute as a standard pro-
73. See note 22 supra.
74. See, e.g., Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.).
75. See Comment, supra note 13, at 292.
76. Id. at 292-96.. In determining whether the state remedy was effective, the
commentator outlined various factors. Most pertinent to Ash v. Cort were the follow-
ing: First, is there a basis for recovery for such a corporate expenditure throughout
the states? If this recovery did not exist, the congressional policy favoring nation-
wide uniformity might be frustrated. Second, are the state remedies, although
formally equivalent to the federal remedy, effective in practice? This issue focuses
upon the reality that state procedural requirements often thwart plaintiff's efforts to
avail himself of the state remedy. An example of such devices relevant to Ash is that
of the difference between state and federal requirements regarding security deposits
in shareholders' derivative actions. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 with N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney 1965). Third, does the federal statute impose a more
demanding standard of conduct than the state standard? For a consideration of other
factors which bear in the determination of the adequacy of state remedies see
Comment, supra note 13, at 292-96.
77. Comment, supra note 13, at 292; Greene, supra note 12, at 296-305.
78. The omission is interesting because this factor was considered in the cases
cited by the court. See J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964) ; Holloway
v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The availability of state
relief should have been analyzed because it clarifies and underscores the need to
imply a new federal cause of action.
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vided by Congress (negligence per se) ;79 (2) admit its violation as mere
evidence of negligence ;80 or (3) reject completely its violation as evidence
of a breach of a duty under state tort law.8' If either of the last two alter-
natives is chosen, the effectiveness of the state remedy becomes doubtful.
Withouf the violation of the federal statute being negligence per se or at
least prima facie evidence of a breach by management of the state-imposed
duty to exercise due care,82 the stockholder-plaintiff might be without any
basis upon which to allege conduct which contravenes state law. Indeed,
an expenditure or contribution which is made in violation of section 610,
yet which benefits the corporation, might therefore be found to be rea-
sonable managerial conduct, as well as intra vires.8 3 With recovery thus
dependent upon the vagaries of state law, the uniform protection Congress
sought for stockholders would become illusory. 4
The Borak decision clearly indicated the Supreme Court's concern
with the problem of effective remedies. The Court specifically rejected
the contention that proper federal relief was limited to the declaratory
79. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 216 (1934) (recovery for
injury received while working in intrastate commerce might be based upon Federal
Safety Appliance Acts if state had adopted them as the standard of due care).
80. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. Rv.
361 (1932). Professor Lowndes was a leading proponent of the use of the violation as
evidence of negligence in a civil action based upon violation of a penal statute. He
explained the rationale of this approach as being:
If a court holds that the violation of a criminal enactment is negligence per se,
it is simply taking the roundabout route to the conclusion that the violation of the
statute creates a civil liability. This is, perhaps, less arrogant than reaching the
same result by construction, but it is also a shade less honest. If the violation
of a criminal statute has any bearing on negligence, it is, at most, simply evidence
of negligence.
Id. at 369.
See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Novick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916, 923
(4th Cir. 1960).
81. Greene, supra note 12, at 294; PRossa, supra note 27, at 200-04.
82. See HENN, supra note 55, at 450. "An equitable rule has evolved that direc-
tors shall exercise such diligent care and skill as ordinary prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in like positions." OLECK, supra note 55, at 734 (cita-
tions omitted).
83. A corporate expenditure which violates state or federal law is not necessarily
ultra vires. In some situations, a corporation is authorized by its charter to do an act
which is illegal under state or federal law. W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 52 (4th ed. 1969).
Professor Cary uses as an example underscoring the distinction between ultra vires
and illegality, a corporate contribution to a candidate for federal office which, although
beneficial to the corporation, violates federal law. Id.
84. Justice Clark, speaking for the Supreme Court in Borak, said that despite the
provisions of state corporation law, federal law controlled the appropriateness of re-
dress; that, although questions of state law had to be decided, the right was federal;
and that it was not uncommon, where federal rights were concerned, for federal courts
to fashion federal law. 377 U.S. at 434. He further noted that the purpose of the
federal statute might be frustrated if a plaintiff were obliged to go into state court
for relief and the state law attached no legal responsibility for the conduct which
allegedly violated federal law. Id. at 434-35 (dictum). This suggests that state
law, whether procedural or substantive, should not be allowed to impede an action
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judgment, 5 because such a limitation would compel a plaintiff to seek
relief in a state court where the purpose of the federal statute might be
frustrated.8 6 Therefore, the Borak Court concluded that the federal courts
had the power to grant all relief necessary to redress the violation of a
federal statute.8 7
Given both the assumption provided by the Supreme Court that sec-
tion 610 was motivated by a concern for stockholder protection,88 and the
substantial doubt as to the effectiveness of alternative state actions, the
Third Circuit's recognition of an implied federal cause of action appears
to have been necessary. The propriety of this conclusion is underscored
when the implication of a private cause of action is deemed essential to
effectuate the enforcement of the 1971 Act.89 If one of the Act's motiva-
ting concerns was shareholder protection, then it would seem that the
court's reasoning and the type of illegal conduct alleged in Ash together
suggest a stronger argument for the necessity of recognizing a new
federal private cause of action than that presented in Borak, where
remedial alternatives existed. 90 This is especially significant in that it
tends to establish the validity of the Ash decision in view of the similarity
of the factors considered and mode of analysis applied by the two courts. 91
Ash is important because it is one of the first lower federal court
decisions interpreting Amtrak. Rather than accepting the latter case as a
Supreme Court directive to decelerate the use of the Borak rationale in
creating implied private civil remedies,9 2 the Third Circuit narrowly
construed Amtrak as a pronouncement requiring the denial of a private
cause of action when the legislative intent to grant an exclusive remedy is
85. 377 U.S. at 434-35.
86. Id. at 435.
87. Id. at 434.
88. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 52-59 and accompanying text supra.
90. In addition to the alleged violation of federal law, the complaint in Borak
contained as a separate count, allegations that the directors had breached their fiduciary
duties to their stockholders. 377 U.S. at 427. It should be noted that, in a specific
factual situation, a transaction involving supposedly false and misleading proxy state-
ments might constitute deceit, for which an additional state action in tort could have
been maintained. See PROSSER, supra note 27, at 685-86.
91. For the Borak analysis of the implied right of recovery, see 377 U.S. at 431-32.
92. Judge Aldisert, dissenting in Ash, stated that he interpreted Amtrak to be
an indication to the lower courts to deemphasize implied causes of action. 496 F.2d
at 426. He buttressed his conclusion by mentioning the Supreme Court's reference in
Amtrak to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Id. at 426-27. However,
it is submitted that reliance upon that maxim cannot be absolute. As a general rule
of construction, negative implication expresses only one possible determination of
legislative intent; a second, contrary interpretation is also possible. See Comment,
supra note 13, at 290.
The Ash court dealt with this aphorism (see note 45 supra) in a manner
similar to that of the Supreme Court in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943), wherein the Court found that in a case where conflicting interpretations
are possible, the maxim should be subordinated to the doctrine of construing the
details of an enactment in conformity with its general purpose. Id. at 350-51.
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clear.9 3 Such an interpretation would appear to be defensible because of
the exceedingly clear congressional intent discernible in Amtrak.94 Despite
its reference to expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Amtrak Court
relied upon other factors such as legislative history and the need for effec-
tive administrative enforcement in reaching its decision to deny the implied
cause of action.95
It is submitted that Ash's significance results both from the creation
of an implied private cause of action for a section 610 violation and the
mode of analysis adopted by the Court.96 While the creation of a new
cause of action expands the remedies available under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, the court's analytical framework will have a broader
impact because it can be applied to any statute in order to determine the
propriety of private relief. While the Ash court did not consider any
factor not considered in previous federal court decisions, it did expressly
formulate a specific test which must be met in order to justify the recog-
nition of a private cause of action.97 Ash also elucidated the various
factors and considerations of Borak, Bivens, and Amtrak: purpose, effec-
tuation of policy, and alternative remedies,9s each of which is more easily
determined than the often elusive legislative intent.
The most cogent argument advanced against expanding the applica-
tion of the doctrine of implied causes of action raises the issue of where
that process will end. 99 While this question may not be answerable at
present, Ash, at least, provides objective guidelines to aid a court attempt-
ing to remain within the proper parameters. The "limitless extension"
criticism advanced by the Ash dissent'0 0 is an argument for greater judicial
restraint; yet such restraint was imposed by Ash,1° 1 because, at the
93. The factors considered in the Amtrak Court's analysis so clearly required a
denial of a private right of action that the Court's failure to emphasize more posi-
tively any required deceleration of the use of Borak lends credence to the Third
Circuit's interpretation of Amtrak. See note 45 supra.
94. See 414 U.S. at 458-61.
95. Id. at 458-62.
96. Ash was remanded for a decision upon the merits which would require a
determination that there had been a violation of section 610. 496 F.2d at 426. Also at
the trial, defendant would be allowed to assert any contention as to the unconstitu-
tionality of section 610. Id. For a discussion of the constitutional issue, see United
States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
97. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
98. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
99. Judge Aldisert noted that all criminal statutes are intended to protect some
individual, public, or social interest. He therefore asked whether it was to be inferred
that Congress intended a comprehensive unwritten civil code to mirror Title 18 of the
United States Code. 496 F.2d at 428-29 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 429 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
101. One of the consequences of creating a new cause of action is that the creator
must proffer its definition, which may demand the inclusion of a statute of limitations,
the establishment of proper venue, and the elucidation of various defenses. The defining
of defenses is an important consideration in light of the type of prohibition involved
in Ash. The express language of section 591 (f) of the Federal Election Campaign'
Act of 1971 requires that there be a purpose to influence. See note 47 supra. This
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minimum, two elements, purpose and effectuation, must be present whereas
previously a single one would have been sufficient. 10 2 In addition, while
Ash failed to discuss -the availability of effective alternative state remedies,
this element can and should be included in a ,court's calculus. Thus, each
of the above considerations, as well as standing to bring suit, will set
limitations upon when a new federal cause of action can be properly held
to have been implied for the benefit of and maintained by an appro-
priate party.
The potential for usurpation of the legislative function by the judiciary
exists whenever the latter branch 'of government is called upon to divine
the intent of the former.103 Nevertheless, in'the course of carrying out
the judicial function of applying statutory law, a court must determine
the law's intended effect,'0 4 and Ash v. Cort eases that task by establishing
the clearest guidelines to date.
Steven M. Gevarter
indicates that the criminal offense requires mens rea and that the statute does not
impose strict liability as in the case of so-called public welfare offenses. See generally
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 31, at 218-22, 359 (1970).
Therefore, it is also doubtful that a court would find strict civil liability. A state
tort action would be based upon negligence and measured by a reasonableness standard;
and in those states in which violation of a statute is at most only evidence of negli-
gence, the jury could still determine that a good faith mistake was reasonable conduct.
A paradox would exist, however, where the statutory -breach is deemed negligence
per se, the legislature's prior - and perhaps unwitting -- action thereby determining
what is reasonable. To allow a jury to determine that the mistake was reasonable
would defeat the purpose behind the negligence per se doctrine, that of substituting the
legislature's determination for the jury's. Where a new federal cause of action is
provided, this theoretical conflict may be bypassed, but the practical need to define
defenses would still exist.
102. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
103. Prosser, believing that findings of implied intent were fictions, addressed the
singularly important question of why a court would concoct such a fiction:
Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation is that the courts are seeking, by
something in the nature of judicial legislation, to further the ultimate policy for
the protection of individuals which they find underlying the statute, and which
they believe the legislature must have had in mind .
PROSSER, supra note 27, at 191.
If the courts indulge in some judicial legislating, the true issue then will
become one of when such action will constitute a usurpation of the legislative power
requiring corrective action by the legislature.
104. One writer has noted that courts have a duty to effectuate the policies and
principles established by a statute; and it is from this duty that the judicial power to
provide remedies not specified by the enactment is derived. Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. Rtv. 1532, 1549 (1972).
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CIVIL RIGHTS - IMMUNITY - THE "DISCRETIONARY-MINISTERIAL"
TEST IS APPLICABLE TO AND COMMON LAW IMMUNITY IS AVAILABLE
TO STATE EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS SUED UNDER SECTION 1983 OF TiE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871.
Fidtler v. Rundle (1974)
Plaintiff, a convicted state felon, instituted suit pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act -of 18711 against the warden of the Pennsylvania State Correc-
tional Institution at Graterford (Graterford), alleging that his constitu-
tional rights had been violated when defendant forced him to work in the
prison laundry before he 'had been sentenced.2 The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss 3 upon the grounds that since he was required
by a state statute 4 to order plaintiff to work, defendant was insulated against
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See generally McCormick, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protection; Part I, 60 U. VA.
L. REV. 1 (1974).
2. Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794, 796 (3d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff was convicted
in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, of aggravated
robbery. Pending sentencing, he was sent to the county prison (Holmesburg), but
due to overcrowding there, plaintiff, still unsentenced, was transferred to Graterford.
Id. The instant case dealt with his forced work at Graterford during the 10 months
before imposition of his sentence. Id. Specifically, plaintiff contended that 1) defend-
ant's requiring him to work before he was sentenced amounted to "involuntary
servitude" in violation of the thirteenth amendment; and 2) in requiring plaintiff to
work, defendant was exercising the exclusively judicial function of sentencing persons
convicted of crimes, thus violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id.
3. Id. at 797. Plaintiff first sought federal relief when he obtained an injunction
against the warden of Holmesburg prohibiting the warden from forcing plaintiff to
work before he was tried. Fidtler v. Hendricks, 317 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
After his transfer to Graterford, plaintiff, acting as his own attorney, brought the
present action against Warden Rundle. Initially, the district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment upon the grounds that 1) since plaintiff was "con-
victed" he could properly be ordered to work under the relevant state statute, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 141 (1964) ; and 2) the factual bases of plaintiff's allegations
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Fidtler v. Rundle, 316 F. Supp. 535,
536 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
Immediately after the entry of this order, plaintiff retained the services of an
attorney who persuaded the district court to vacate the summary judgment and allow
plaintiff to proceed with his action. Thereafter, plaintiff amended his complaint to
include Warden Hendricks as a defendant. On May 7, 1973, the district court granted
both defendants' motions to dismiss in an unreported opinion discussed by the circuit
court. 497 F.2d at 796, 797. Plaintiff originally sought to appeal both dismissals;
however, at oral argument plaintiff's counsel asked that the appeal as to Warden
Hendricks be discontinued. Id. at 797.
4. The state statute provides in pertinent part: "[W]ardens . . . are directed to
employ the convicts under their control for and in behalf of the state." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 61, § 141 (1964).
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suit by the common law defense of good faith.5 On appeal, plaintiff con-
tended, inter alia, that the district court had incorrectly discerned and
applied the standards relating to the immunities and defenses available to
the defendant.0 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that in section 1983
suits, common law defenses and immunities are available to state executive
officials; but that it had been an error for the district court to dismiss
plaintiff's suit without determining whether defendant's actions were dis-
cretionary7 or ministerial, and, if ministerial, whether he had in fact acted
in good faith.8 The court further held that to make such a determination,
a more complete record than that compiled in support of a motion to
dismiss was "required.9 Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1974).
Governmental officials' immunity from suit was originally derived
from the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the King.'0 In the United States
the need for immunity received early recognition when it was discovered
that in order to allow governmental officials to serve competently and
vigorously, they must be free from fear that dissatisfied citizens might
bring suit in retaliation for unpopular decisions or actions." Specifically,
absolute immunity from suits based upon actions taken within the scope
of their authority has been uniformly granted to legislators 12 and judges.'3
However, the availability of similar immunity to executive officials has
been less widespread.
5. The instant court said that the district court relied upon Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967), which held that in a section 1983 suit, police officers could assert
the affirmative defense of good faith. 497 F.2d at 797 n.4.
6. 497 F.2d at 797. The exact nature of plaintiff's argument that Pierson was
inapplicable to the instant case was not explained by the Fidtler court. Plaintiff re-
iterated his constitutional claims and alleged that the district court had construed the
Pennsylvania statute incorrectly also. Id. See note 2 supra.
7. If defendant's actions were discretionary, he was entitled to immunity. 497
F.2d at 800. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text, infra.
8. 497 F.2d at 800. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text, infra.
9. The record apparently consisted of affidavits, admissions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and the complaint. 497 F.2d at 801. The Third Circuit specifically avoided
any discussion of plaintiff's other claims, saying that it should avoid considering con-
stitutional questions and state statutes which have never been interpreted by state
courts. Id. at 802. See note 6 supra.
10. Whenever any official was sued, the monarch could claim the official's act
as "his own" and thus bar the action. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963); see generally James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units & Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610 (1955).
11. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) ; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 569-74 (1959). This policy rationale was articulated by Judge Learned Hand:
The justification for [granting immunity] is that it is impossible to know whether
the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579-581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (common
law immunity available in section 1983 suits to state legislators acting within the
"sphere of legitimate legislative activity").
13. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (common law immunity available in
section 1983 actions to the state iudiciarv and nolice officers).
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In the nineteenth century case Kendall v. Stokes,14 the Supreme Court
of the United States recognized Cabinet members' absolute immunity from
suit for discretionary actions which fell within their official authority.'
Some 100 years later, in Barr v. Matteo,16 this immunity was extended,
in certain circumstances, to lower-ranking officials. 17 In Barr a majority of
the Justices' 8 established a two-pronged test for determining whether or not
immunity was appropriate: First, an officer's position had to be of a policy-
making character requiring the exercise of judgment. Second, the particular
act that formed the basis of a suit must not have passed the outer perimeter
of the official's authority.19 Once an action was found to meet these two
criteria, its doer was entitled to absolute immunity even for malicious acts.20
Conversely, an official's action was characterized as ministerial if the dis-
charge of his or her authority did not require the exercise of personal judg-
ment and no immunity was available, though the defense of good faith
still might be asserted.21 The application of this discretionary ministerial
dichotomy has allowed officials such as federal agency directors, 22 United
14. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845) (Postmaster General). See Spaulding v. Vilas,
161 U.S. 483, 489 (1896) (immunity extended to encompass all official acts).
15. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 97-99.
16. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). This case involved a suit by two former employees
against the Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization for his allegedly malicious
statements made in a press release. Id. at 565.
17. Id. at 572-73. The Barr Court espoused the following rationale for extending
immunity: "The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an
expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government." Id.
18. Four Justices concurred in the plurality opinion and Justice Stewart agreed
with the proposed test but dissented upon the grounds that the defendant was acting
outside the scope of his authority. 360 U.S. at 592. Justice Black concurred in the
result upon first amendment grounds stating that the public had a right to receive
information concerning governmental employees. Id. at 576. The three remaining
dissenters saw no need to grant the defendant absolute immunity. Id. at 583 & 587.
19. 360 U.S. at 575. The efficacy of this test in determining a particular official's
entitlement to immunity has been questioned:
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion . . . and to require
a finding of "discretion" would merely postpone, for one step in the process of
reasoning, the determination of the real question - is the act complained of the
result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the Government official
be free to make without fear of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged personal
liability?
Ove Gustavsson Contr. Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 827 (1963). Some commentators have suggested that the discretionary-
ministerial dichotomy is actually a vague way of stating a result reached, rather than
being a means for arriving there. -See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218 (1963) ; James, supra note 10, at 645-46.
20. 360 U.S. at 575.
21. Id. In Kendall v. Stokes, the Court had recognized the distinction between
discretionary actions of an official "in relation to which it is his duty to exercise
judgment and discretion" and merely ministerial actions which do not require judg-
ment. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 98. For a detailed discussion of the Barr dichotomy and
the common law defense of good faith, see Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820,
823-25 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974).
22. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
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States marshals, 23 and federal prison wardens24 to invoke immunity, while
officials such as police officers25 and federal narcotics agents2 6 have not been
so entitled.
The Barr dichotomy remained the foundation for executive immunity
until Scheuer v. Rhodes, 27 the recent Supreme Court decision reversing a
lower court's dismissal, upon grounds of immunity, of a suit against the
Governor of Ohio, various members of the Ohio National Guard and the
university's president brought by parents of four students who were killed
during a disturbance at Kent State University.28 By implication, the Scheuer
Court undermined the relevance of the discretionary-ministerial distinction 29
when it held that even a state's chief executive must show that he had acted
in good faith before he can invoke immunity.30 Also, because good faith is
an affirmative defense, the Court determined that in order for a court
to properly* deal with this issue, a relevant, complete record had to be
developed. 3' Finally, Scheuer specifically established that state officials
could invoke some common law immunities, even in section 1983 actions, if
the Court's threshold tests were satisfied.32
23. Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
981 (1965).
24. Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 148(1974) ; Boulware v. Parker, 457 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1972).
25. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
26. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
Apparently, the Bivens court was the first to characterize the action of federal nar-
cotics agents as ministerial. Before this opinion, it had been generally accepted that
such federal officers were immune from suit. See Note, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents: A New Direction in Federal Police Immunity, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 987, 990(1973). However, state officials of similar rank have not been granted immunity.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). See note 5 supra.
27. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
28. Id.
29. The instant court disagreed with this analysis •
Although the language of the Supreme Court in Scheuer may be read to cast
some doubt on the viability the [sic] ministerial-discretionary distinction, the
Court seems to have adopted this general approach to immunity in section 1983
suits.
497 F.2d at 800. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text infra.
30. 416 U.S. at 247-48. The Court stated:[11n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of Government, the variation dependent upon the scope of discretion and
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the ex-istence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Id. (emphasis added). In this manner the Supreme Court attempted to balance morejudiciously the policy consideration of promoting vigorous public service with the
public's right to be free from abuse of governmental office. See note 32 infra.
31. 416 U.S. at 250. The record consisted only of the proclamations issued by
Governor Rhodes and brief affidavits of the Adjutant General of the Guard and his
assistants. Id.
32. Id. at 247. See text accompanying notes 44-51 infra. Prior to Scheuer, theSupreme Court had specifically allowed such immunities in section 1983 suits against
state legislators in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and against state 19
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The instant court followed Scheuer and expanded upon its earlier
decision, Johnson v. Alldredge,3 when it stated that, to some extent, com-
mon law immunities and defenses were available to all state executive
officials defending section 1983 suits. 8 4 The Third Circuit noted that in the
context of judicial immunity the Supreme Court had observed, "'[t]he
legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress [in enacting sec-
tion 1983] meant to abolish all common-law immunities,' "5 and decided
that this statement of congressional intent was equally applicable to suits
involving state executive officials.36 Furthermore, though the cases in this
area, prior to Scheuer, had dealt with federal officials, 8 7 the Fidtler court
found no reason to make a distinction when the defendants were state
officers 8 and therefore declared that federal courts resolving section 1983
suits were not bound by an individual state's common law but were to be
controlled instead by the common law prevailing in the co'untry.8 9
Although admitting that Scheuer might be read to cast some doubt
upon the validity of the Barr dichotomy, the Fidtler court nonetheless found
this test appropriate to the instant case,40 and thus concluded that the district
court had erred in failing either to categorize the defendant's actions as
discretionary or to classify his actions as ministerial and decide the issue
of good faith before granting a dismissal.41 Lastly, the court, following
Scheuer, said that these issues could not be properly decided upon the sparse
district court record, 42 and that defendant's action in compliance with a
state law was not considered to be dispositive since "the district court did
court judges in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). As for state executive officials.
most circuit courts had held that such immunities were not available in section 1983
actions, because their recognition would undermine one of the statutory purposes -
to give citizens a remedy against the abuse of office. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507, 530 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26,
1975) noted in 20 VILL. L. REV. 214 (1974); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 637-38
(2d Cir. 1971). The Third Circuit presaged the Supreme Court's approval of immunity
for state executives in section 1983 actions in Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820,
826-27 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974).
33. 488 F.2d 820, 826-27 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974).
Johnson, unlike Fidtler, dealt with a federal executive official. See note 21 supra.
34. 497 F.2d at 798.
35. Id., quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
36. 497 F.2d at 798.
37. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1973); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
38. 497 F.2d at 801.
39. Id. at 800.
40. Id. See note 28 supra.
41. 497 F.2d at 802.
42. 497 F.2d at 801-02. See note 9 supra. The Fidtler court cited Safeguard
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1973), and Lasher v. Shafer, 460 F.2d
343 (3d Cir. 1972), as guidelines for determining whether the record was sufficient
to enable a court properly to decide whether a) a defendant's action had been dis-
cretionary or ministerial, and b), if the latter, whether he had acted in good faith.
497 F.2d at 801-02. However, neither these cases nor Scheuer definitively stated
how extensive this record must be or how it should be developed.
[VOL. 20
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/9
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
not, nor could it, without further proceedings calculated to develop the
relevant facts, make any finding that Rundle did, in fact, rely in good faith
on this statute." 43
While it noted that Scheuer created doubt as to the relevance and
viability of the Barr dichotomy, the Fidtler court made no attempt to dis-
tinguish Scheuer or reconcile the Supreme Court's language and the ap-
plication of the Barr dichotomy to the instant case. 44 Thus, Fidtler appears
to be in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's holding that "a qualified
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of Government
....", Since a state governor may expect only a qualified immunity de-
pendent upon a demonstration of his good faith, 46 it is doubtful that a state
prison warden could ever be entitled to absolute immunity.
It is unlikely that continued use of the Barr dichotomy will be helpful
analytically. Though arguably Scheuer can be read narrowly to mean that
the issues 'of immunity and good faith cannot be properly resolved unless
an adequate record is developed, it is submitted that the primary thrust of
that opinion was to announce that no executive official is entitled to abso-
lute immunity.47 Therefore, it would appear that the categorization of an
official's action as either discretionary or ministerial would be unnecessary
when the official would still have to show that he was acting in good faith
before obtaining any immunity.48
In addition to its conflict with Scheuer, Fidtler creates another prob-
lem because it seems that the Third Circuit, by affording executive officials
absolute immunity, may have swung the balance of policy considerations
too far in favor of such officials as defendants in suits brought under section
1983. Other circuits which have confronted this question have consistently
held that to allow executives to invoke absolute immunity in section 1983
actions would undermine the statutory purpose since such officials are those
43. 497 F.2d at 801.
44. Instead, the court chose to view the discretionary-ministerial distinction
within the Supreme Court's "general approach." Id. at 800. See note 29 supra.
45. 416 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added).
46. Id. See note 30 supra.
47. The Court stated in Scheuer:
Since the statute relied on thus included within its scope the "'[mlisuse of power
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer
is clothed with the authority of state law.' ", government officials, as a class, could
not be totally exempt, by virtue of some absolute immunity from liability under
its terms.
416 U.S. at 243, quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), quoting United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). See McCormick, supra note 1, at 17.
In fact, the instant opinion is internally inconsistent as to the nature of the granted
immunity: initially, the court spoke of the qualified immunity recognized by Scheuer,
497 F.2d at 798, yet later in discussion it revived the absolute immunity granted in
Barr. Id. at 802.
48. See note 30 subra.
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most likely to infringe a citizen's rights under the color of state law.' 9 As
the Scheuer Court declared:
Under the criteria developed by precedents of this Court, § 1983 would
be drained of meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or
other high executive officer has "the quality of a supreme and un-
changeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property and
unreviewable through the judicial power of the federal government." '0
Allowing officials to invoke absolute immunity from the effects of their
discretionary acts, Fidtler may have seriously impaired the vitality of sec-
tion 1983 since some plaintiffs may find themselves without a remedy for
the infringement of their civil rights by state executives. 5 '
Nevertheless, based upon Fidtler, one can expect that courts in the
Third Circuit will be continuously confronted by defendants in civil rights
actions asserting common law defenses and immunities, especially since less
favorable state law will not be controlling.5 2 However, it is suggested that
the ultimate adjudication of common law immunity issues will be unjustifi-
ably time consuming.5" Courts following either Scheuer or Fidtler must
establish involved evidentiary procedures which will take considerably more
time than those required by the typical pretrial motion to dismiss. 54 Indeed,
it is questionable that resolution of these factual issues should be the basis
of pretrial hearings at all. Normally, such determinations are left until the
trial so that they may be resolved by the trier of fact.5 5 Regrettably, neither
Scheuer nor Fidtler gave concrete guidelines to district courts for dealing
with this problem. 56
49. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 530 (5th Cir. 1974); Dale v. Hahn,
440 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1971).
50. 416 U.S. at 248, quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932).
51. The Third Circuit is apparently following its own line of cases rather than
Scheuer. See, e.g., Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973).
52. The present suit presents an excellent example of a major difference between
the treatment of executive officials under state common law and under the Third Cir-
cuit's view of the common law, which accords with that generally prevailing in the
country. See text accompanying note 39 supra. Pennsylvania never developed a dis-
cretionary-ministerial dichotomy and therefore requires all executive officials to
demonstrate good faith before they can invoke immunity. See, e.g., Yealy v. Fink, 43
Pa. 212 (1862).
53. Since it is the policy of the courts to avoid resolution of constitutional claims
unless resolving them is absolutely necessary, district courts resolving a section 1983
action that presents such a claim must preliminarily determine the type of official action
involved and, if necessary, the official's good faith. 497 F.2d at 801-02. However,
such involved inquiries are only necessary if the plaintiff has, in fact, stated a cause
of action. Thus, though contrary to court policy, it seems that time could be saved
if the courts would first determine the merits of the alleged constitutional violations.
Only if these claims were meritorious would investigation of the immunity question
be required. The Fidtler court acknowledged this argument but ultimately concluded
that the constitutional questions should be avoided despite any possibility of delay.
Id. at 802.
54. See 416 U.S. at 250.
55. Of course, this objection would not apply in a nonjury trial.
56. The Third Circuit attempted to provide some guidance by citing several of its
earlier decisions. 497 F.2d at 801-02. See note 42 supra. However, these opinions
appear to provide very little help.
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Fidtler is one of the first cases to interpret Scheuer. However, in view
of the Third Circuit's refusal to deal adequately with the Supreme Court's
denial of absolute immunity for executive officials, its insistence upon a
seemingly irrelevant distinction, and its failure to give the district courts
guidelines for dealing with pretrial proceedings, it is submitted that the
future application of Fidtler should be extremely limited.
Kevin S. Anderson
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY - AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 - STATE WITH AGE DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCY MUST BE GIVEN 60 DAYS To
RESOLVE A CONTROVERSY AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SUIT IN
FEDERAL COURT.
Goger v. H. K. Porter Co. (1974)
Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer for allegedly ter-
minating her employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 19671 (ADEA). The district court dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction as plaintiff had not filed a complaint with the appropriate
state agency 2 before instituting the civil action as required by section 633 (b)
of the ADEA.a To effectuate the policy of the ADEA, the Third Circuit
vacated the order of the district court and remanded for a trial upon the
merits, but held that in the future, if the alleged violation should occur in
a state with an agency having authority to grant relief in age discrimination
cases, the state must be given 60 days to resolve the controversy as a con-
dition precedent to the institution of a suit. Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492
F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19674
to prohibit an employer, employment agency, or labor organization5 from
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
2. The Division on Civil Rights of the New Jersey Department of Law and
Public Safety was the state agency having authority to prevent and eliminate dis-
criminatory practices on account of age. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-6 (Supp. 1974).
3. The Act provides in pertinent part:
(b) Limitation of Federal action upon commencement of State proceedings.
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has
a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing
or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory
practice, no suit may be brought . . . before the expiration of sixty days after
proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
5. Id. § 623(a), (b), (c). 23
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discriminating because of age against any individual between 40 and 60
years of age.6 Enforcement of the ADEA is primarily entrusted to the
Secretary of Labor, 7 who must be given 60 days notice so that conciliation
can be attempted prior to permitting an aggrieved person to bring suit for
legal or equitable relief."
Section 633(b) deals with the federal-state relationship under the
ADEA by giving federal and state agencies concurrent jurisdiction. How-
ever, the commencement of state administrative proceedings in a state which
has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and an
authority empowered to grant or seek relief for violations of that law 9 post-
pones a suit under the ADEA 10 for 60 days unless such proceedings have
been terminated earlier." Conversely, the initiation of an action alleging
a violation of ADEA supersedes any state action.12
The language of section 633 (b) is almost identical to that in the state
deferral provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13 Courts
construing this provision in Title VII have consistently held that when a
6. Id. § 631; Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th
Cir. 1972).
The purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
ment, and to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970) ; S. REP. No. 723,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967).
An employer may show as defenses to an allegation of discrimination that
age is a bona fide occupational qualification for the position, or that the purpose of his
hiring practice is to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or employee
benefit plan, or that he has discharged or disciplined an employee for good cause.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1970).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 622, 624-26, 628, 632 (1970). The provisions of the ADEA
are to be enforced in accordance with sections 211(b) (authorizing the utilization of
state agencies), 216 (except subsection a; the other subsections authorize wage col-
lection suits by employees and by the Secretary of Labor), and 217 (allowing suits
for injunctive relief) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
(1970). 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
The Secretary is also directed to attempt conciliation even before any com-
plaint is made. Id. See also comparable provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (Supp. II, 1972).
8. 29 U.S.C. 626(d) (1970).
9. Thirty-two states have laws prohibiting age discrimination in employment,
and of these states, only two have no enforcement agency. The provisions of these
laws vary considerably. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINIS-
TRATION, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, at 21-39 (1972).
10. Suits are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), (d) (1970).
11. Id. § 633(b).
12. Id. § 633(a).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970, Supp. III, 1974). The deferral provision of
the Civil Rights Act provides in pertinent part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State . . . which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to
grant or seek relief ... no charge may be filed [with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission] . . . by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty
days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law ..
Id. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. III, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
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competent state agency 14 for enforcing statutes prohibiting employment dis-
crimination exists, an aggrieved party must file a complaint with that state
agency at least 60 days before instituting any federal action.15 Therefore,
the primary issue before the Goger court was whether the similarity of
language in the two provisions indicated Congress' intent to require com-
plainants to resort to state agencies prior to commencing a suit for an
ADEA violation.
The appellant, and the Secretary of Labor as amicus curiae, argued
that the 60-day deferral to state agencies was operable only when the ag-
grieved party chose to pursue state remedies first.' 6 This contention was
based upon the heading to section 633(b) : "Limitation of Federal action
upon commencement of State proceedings."' 17 The Goger court disagreed,
and found that Congress' use of nearly identical language compelled a con-
struction consonant with the judicial interpretation of the parallel provision
of Title VII.18 The court found the legislative history of the ADEA devoid
of any indication that Congress had intended to deviate from the 1964
Act's policy of initially giving state agencies 60 days to resolve a problem. 9
As noted by the Goger court, most of the legislative history of section
633 (b) is an unenlightening restatement of the statutory language.20 The
only helpful legislative history was two witnesses' 21 testimony that the
14. EEOC has developed guidelines for determining if state agencies are qualified
to receive the first complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1974).
15. E.g., Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972) ; Mitchell
v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 466 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928
(1973). Cf. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972). See generally Rosen, Division
of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study
in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 846 (1966).
The purpose of the Title VII provision, expressed by the legislative history,
was to promote local efforts at voluntary compliance with the requirements of the
federal law. See Love v. Pullman, supra, at 526; Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp.,
supra, at 975; Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 422 F.2d 1028, 1030-31
(9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971). See also Coleman,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 DUQUESNE
L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1969).
16. 492 F.2d at 15.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970) (emphasis added). For the full text of section
633(b), see note 3 supra.
18. 492 F.2d at 16, 17.
19. Id. at 16.
Judge Garth, in a concurring opinion, did not agree that similar language
mandated parallel construction. Id. at 17. He found section 633(b) to be aimed at a
reconciliation of the federal and state interests in combating age discrimination in
employment and rejected the idea that the section contained jurisdictional prerequisites
for instituting suit. Judge Garth believed the cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act
not to be analogous because the similar provision of Title VII appears in the section
providing jurisdictional prerequisites to suit, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (Supp. III, 1974).
He found the statutory construction of the Secretary of Labor persuasive, given the
deference usually accorded the opinion of an agency charged with administering a
statute. 492 F.2d at 17-18, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. 492 F.2d at 16; S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1967).
21. The witnesses were Andre J. Biemiller, Legislative Director, American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Judge J. Edward
Conway, Commissioner, New York State Commission for Human Rights. Hearings
1974-1975]
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state agency deferral provision in Title VII had been a good reconciler of
federal and state interests under the Civil Rights Act and, therefore, a
similar provision should be included in the ADEA.2 2 Since the bill which
became the ADEA did not include a state deferral provision before these
hearings were held,23 there is some basis for concluding that section 633(b)
was a response to this suggestion and, therefore, mandated deferral pro-
cedures similar to those under Title VII. It is submitted that the position
of the Goger majority best comports: with congressional intent by making
the procedure under section 633 (b) of the ADEA parallel the requirements
of the Civil Rights Act.
While it is apparent that the Goger court's imposition of a condition
precedent was based upon sound statutory construction, its remand 24 of the
instant case to allow a trial was equitable in light of Ms. Goger's reliance
upon the Secretary of Labor's opinion that she could commence her action.2 5
However, the instant court's interpretation of section 633(b) suggests that
the policy of compelling persons to seek local relief should be reconsidered
in light of the apparently inefficient commitment of resources required to
follow this procedure when a party need not exhaust the state remedies
on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, 223 (1967).
22. 492 F.2d at 16 n.13. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 102, 234.
23. Compare S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), with 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1970).
24. In the instant case, the court granted equitable relief to appellant and re-
manded for a hearing on the merits. 492 F.2d at 16-17. The court found this relief
to be justified because there had been no previous judicial construction of section
633(b) and because the ADEA was a remedial statute. Id. at 17. Plaintiff could
not have turned to the state agency for relief because she was barred from initiaitng
any action by New Jersey law which required all complaints to be filed within 180
days of the alleged act of discrimination. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-18 (Supp. 1974).
Under Title VII, a mere technical omission or defeat, such as failure to
clarify allegations, is an excusable error that still allows a federal court to proceed
upon the merits. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court has said that technical errors should be ignored because "[s]uch
technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen,
unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process." Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522,
527 (1972). When complainants under Title VII have failed to file with a state
agency, some courts have retained jurisdiction while the requirement was being
fulfilled. E.g., Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004 (1971),
vacating and remanding 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970). However, when a plaintiff
who filed a complaint with the EEOC was referred to the appropriate state agency,
which refused to accept her complaint because it was untimely under state law, the
Tenth Circuit dismissed her action. Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973(10th Cir. 1972). The Dubois court rejected appellant's argument that the state
agency's refusal to consider her complaint was a statutory termination of state pro-
ceedings because such an interpretation would allow a complainant to bypass state
proceedings and thereby frustrate congressional intent. Id. at 975. The Third Circuit
vacated a similar result reached by a district court prior to the Goger decision. The
district court had rejected a plea similar to Ms. Goger's that dismissal would leave
her without a forum. McGarvey v. Merck & Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J.
1973), vacated, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
25. 492 F.2d at 14-15.
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before instituting Suit. 26 Additionally, deferral enhances the procedural
obstacle created by the law's requirement that an aggrieved party give the
Secretary of Labor notice 60 days prior to bringing suit so that conciliation
may be attempted. 27  This obstacle may deter a party with a legitimate
claim from seeking judicial relief under the ADEA.
While the deferral provision of Title VII was a compromise designed
to elicit legislative support for the Civil Rights Act,28 the similar ADEA
provision was apparently not the result of such a compromise. 29 Since the
ADEA was intended to substitute federal remedies for inadequate prior
law,30 section 633(b) appears to be a duplicative procedural barrier to
meaningful relief which the Congress should take steps to remove. 31
Richard I. Conn
SOCIAL SECURITY - MEDICARE - SECTION 1395y(a) (1) - MERE
DETERMINATION THAT SERVICES COULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY
A LESSER-CARE FACILITY IS NOT ENOUGH TO DENY COVERAGE UNDER
MEDICARE WHERE SUCH SERVICES WERE OTHERWISE REASONABLE
AND NECESSARY FOR THE TREATMENT OF DISEASE.
Hultzman v. Weinberger (1974)
Appellant, an elderly woman, was hospitalized from July 13 through
September 3, 1970.1 The hospital's request for payment 2 for services ren-
26. The court said that a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before bring-
ing action in federal court. Id. at 15.
27. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431,
452-53 & n.91 (1966). The Title VII requirement has been criticized. Developments
in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1212-16 (1971); Note, 5 COLUM. J. OF LAW AND Soc.
PROB. 1, 17-19 (1969).
29. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
30. See S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1967).
31. For an exposition of activities under the ADEA, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1967 (1972).
1. Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1277 (3d Cir. 1974). Appellant
suffered from severe rheumatoid arthritis, persistent iron loss anemia, a urinary tract
infection, eye problems, and previous episodes of gastrointestinal bleeding. She was
nonambulatory, which precluded treatment as an outpatient, and her admitting phy-
sician ordered hospitalization so that her other ailments could be treated while she
was receiving physical therapy for her arthritis. Id. at 1278.
2. An elderly individual is entitled to hospital insurance benefits under Medicare
if he or she has attained the age of 65 and is otherwise entitled to old age and
survivors' benefits under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1970), as. amended
1974-1975]
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dered was subsequently submitted to appellee's 3 fiscal intermediary, 4 Blue
Cross of Greater Philadelphia, but it was rejected upon the grounds that
inpatient services had been required for only the first 7 days of the appel-
lant's hospitalization and a lesser-care facility could have satisfactorily
served thereafter.5 Appellant sought and obtained administrative review of
Blue Cross' decision to deny coverage. 6 The hearing examiner agreed with
Blue Cross that the services rendered were not reasonable and necessary
inpatient hospital services, 7 and thus they were excluded from coverage by
section 139 5y(a) (1) of the Social Security Act.8 This denial became the
final decision of the Secretary and was upheld by the district court as
supported by substantial evidence.9 Upon appeal the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that appellant was improperly denied benefits because all of the
other statutory requirements were met 10 and section 1395y(a) (1) excludes
(Supp. III, 1973). These benefits, delineated in sections 1395c to 1395j, constitute
part A of the Social Security plan of health insurance for the aged and disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 405.101-.192 (1974). In order to receive coverage, a written request
signed by the individual must be submitted to a person prescribed by the Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in this case Blue Cross. 42
U.S.C. § 1395f (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
3. Where a civil action is instituted seeking review of a decision involving
Medicare payments, the person holding the office of Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare is, in that capacity, the proper defendant. 20 C.F.R. § 422.210 (1974).
4. If a group of providers of services, such as hospitals, wishes to have payment
made through a national, state, or other public or private agency or organization, the
Secretary may enter into an agreement with the organization allowing it to deter-
mine the amount due under the plan and authorizing payment. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a)
(1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973). However, the organization must be willing
and able to assist the hospital in the application of safeguards against unnecessary
utilization. Id. § 1395h(b) (1) (B).
5. 495 F.2d at 1278.
6. The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under the
provisions of the Medicare statute is to be made by the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare in accordance with regulations prescribed by him. 42 U.S.C. §
1395ff(a). An individual dissatisfied with such a determination is entitled to a hear-
ing by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b). Id. §
1395ff (b), as amended (Supp. III, 1973). Under the regulations, an individual has a
right to a hearing if his claim has been reconsidered by the social security adminis-
tration, 1) he was a party to the initial or reconsidered determination, 2) a written
request has been filed, and 3) the amount in controversy is 100 dollars or more. 20
C.F.R. § 405.720 (1974). A hearing is conducted by an Administrative Law Judge
designated by the Director of Hearings and Appeals or his delegate. Id. § 404.921.
His decision is final unless reviewed by the Appeals Council pursuant to regulation
section 404.945, id. § 404.945 (1974), revised, id. § 404.956 (1974) ; or unless a civil
action is filed in the United States district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1970). 20 C.F.R. § 404.940 (1974). However, judicial review is not available unless
the amount in controversy is 1,000 dollars or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b) (1970),
as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
7. This term is defined in section 1395x, which defines various terms used
throughout the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1) (1970). For the text of the statute, see text
accompanying note 26 infra.
9. 495 F.2d at 1278.
10. Id. at 1282. See note 2 supra, and notes 15, 17 & 18 infra.
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from coverage only those services which are not reasonable and necessary
to the treatment or diagnosis of a patient's ailments; it does not authorize
a denial of benefits upon the grounds that such services could be provided
in some other type of medical facility. Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d
1276 (3d Cir. 1974).
In 1965, the Social Security Act" (the Act) was amended to include
Medicare, a program of medical care designed primarily for the aged12
which provided, among other things, protection against certain fundamental
costs associated with hospital and similar health care." Payment for in-
patient hospital services was specifically provided in section 1395d(a) (1),14
with a limitation only upon the maximum number of days for which a
patient may receive reimbursement. 15
In order to obtain payment for services rendered to patients eligible
for Medicare, a hospital must comply with the conditions contained in cer-
tain provisions of the Act which seek to encourage efficient and economical
use of medical facilities. Initially, a physician must certify, no later than
the 20th day of hospitalization, 16 the medical necessity of the inpatient
services furnished.1 7 Second, inpatient hospital services that extend beyond
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970).
12. Id. §§ 1395 et seq. (1970). The purpose of the 1965 Act was to ensure that
adequate medical care was available to the aged throughout the country. Sowell v.
Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.S.C. 1970).
13. A supplemental medical insurance program is also available upon a voluntary
basis to provide insurance for certain costs not otherwise covered. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j
et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973). This is denominated part B of the
plan. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.201-252 (1974).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (1) (1970). The primary purpose for the appellant's
admission to Albert Einstein Medical Center had been to receive physical and occu-
pational therapy. 495 F.2d at 1278. The Hultzman Court noted that the legislative
history reinforced the conclusion that section 1395x(b) (3) covers physical therapy as
rendered to the appellant. 495 F.2d at 1279 n.3, quoting 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEws 2909. See also S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1967).
15. An otherwise qualified patient is entitled to coverage as an inpatient for up
to 150 days during any spell of illness, minus 1 day for each day of inpatient services
in excess of 90 during any preceding spell of illness for which payment was received.
42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(1) (1970). Spell of illness is defined at id. § 1395x(a),
as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(3) (1970).
17. The Social Security Act contemplates that the physician is to play a key
role in the administration of Medicare. The legislative history provides, in per-
tinent part:
The physician is to be the key figure in determining utilization of health services-
and.., it is a physician who is to decide upon admission to a hospital, order tests,
drugs and treatments, and determine the length of stay. For this reason the bill
would require that payment could be made only if a physician certifies to the
medical necessity of the services furnished.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1965).
1974-19751
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20 days must be approved as medically necessary'" by the hospital's utiliza-
tion review committee. 19
In order to ensure the hospital's compliance with these regulations,
the Secretary is empowered to decertify the hospital,20 or, upon notice, deny
reimbursement 2' for inpatient hospital services if the utilization review
committee fails to function effectively. Moreover, all applications for pay-
ment must meet the standards of section 1395y(a) (1) which denies pay-
ment for expenses incurred for items or services unless certain conditions
are met.22 In the instant case, payment was denied because the hearing
examiner found that the services rendered to appellant did not meet the
standards enunciated in that section.23
On appeal, 24 the Secretary argued that this denial should be sustained
because section 13 95y(a) (1) gave his office the power to deny payment
for services when it was not reasonable and necessary to render such services
in a hospital rather than in a lesser-care facility.25 In disposing of this
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a) (7), as amended (Supp. III, 1973). A hospital's
utilization review plan must provide for review of admissions to the institution, dura-
tion of stays, and professional services furnished, from the standpoint of medical
necessity and efficiency upon a sample or other basis, Id. § 1395x(k)(1). The plan
is to be promulgated by either a staff utilization review committee composed of at least
two or more physicians, or a similarly composed group outside the institution that
complies with certain standards. Id. § 1395x(k) (2), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
The committee is further responsible for review of each case of inpatient services
of extended duration. Id. § 1395x(k) (3). Should the committee determine that
further stay is unnecessary it must, before payment can be discontinued, promptly
notify all parties involved. Id. § 1395x(k) (4). However, payment may be made for
services furnished before the fourth day after the day upon which the hospital receives
notice of the Committee's finding of overutilization. Id. § 1395f(a) (7), as amended
(Supp. III, 1973).
19. Before a determination that such services are unnecessary can be made,
the committee must afford the attending physician an opportunity for consultation.
Id. § 1395x(k) (4).
20. Id. § 1395b(2), as amended (Supp. II, 1973). In order to be considered an
eligible provider of services, a hospital must operate with a utilization review plan
and be accredited by either the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, or
at the discretion of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, by the American
Osteopathic Association. Id. § 1395bb, as amended (Supp. III, 1973). If the utiliza-
tion review committee fails to function effectively, the Secretary may terminate the
agreement made with the hospital. Id. § 1395cc(b) (2), as amended (Supp. II, 1972).
In addition, if it is found that there has been a failure to make timely review of
"long stay" cases, the Secretary may, in lieu of terminating his agreement, deny
payment after the 20th day of a continuous period of such services. Id. § 1395cc(d),
as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
21. Id. § 1395cc(d), as amended (Supp. III, 1973). The institution or agency
must have reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing before a decision to
terminate payment can be made. Id.
22. Id. § 1395y(a) (1). See text accompanyg note 26 infra.
23. 495 F.2d at 1282 n.9.
24. The Third Circuit Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ff(c) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
25. 495 F.2d at 1282. 30
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contention, the Hultaman court looked directly to the statute, which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, no payment
may be made ... for any expenses incurred for items or services-
(1) which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a
malformed body member .... 26
The court reasoned that, even if it were unnecessary to provide the services
upon an inpatient basis, the conclusion that they were specifically excluded
from coverage was simply not warranted by the plain language of section
13 95y(a) (1).27 That section's limitation of coverage, the court held, did
not depend upon a determination of whether it was medically necessary to
provide such services upon an inpatient or outpatient basis, or in a hospital
instead of an extended-care facility. 28 Rather, any exclusion from coverage
under section 1395y(a) (1) depended upon whether the services rendered
to the appellant were reasonable and necessary to the treatment and diag-
nosis of her ailments, 29 and the court measured the Secretary's actions
against this standard. 30 Since the hearing examiner had not disputed the
necessity of the services8 1 but had only questioned the need to provide them
upon an inpatient basis, the court's interpretation of section 1395y(a)(1)
required that payment'be made for the inpatient services given to the
appellant. 32
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (a) (1) (1970).
27. 495 F.2d at 1282.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court stated that the Secretary's position was not supported by the
legislative history. Id. at n.7, citing 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1989. The
legislative history provides in pertinent part:
The committee's bill would exclude certain health items and services from
coverage under both the hospital insurance and the voluntary supplementary
medical insurance programs in addition to any excluded through the operation
of other provisions of the bill. For example, the bill would bar payment for
health items or services that are not reasonable and necessary for the treatment
of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member.
Thus, payment could be made for the rental of a special hospital bed to be used
by a patient in his home only if it was a reasonable and necessary part of a sick
person's treatment. Similarly, such potential personal comfort items and services
as massages and heat lamp treatments would only be covered where they con-
tribute meaningfully to the treatment of an illness or injury or the functioning
of a malformed body member.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1965).
30. The main issue presented by the case - the proper interpretation of section
1395y (a) (1) - was decided in a single brief paragraph. 495 F.2d at 1282. The
greater part of the opinion discussed procedures provided by the Act for review of
lower level decisions, legislative history, and other statutory provisions having in-
direct bearing upon the decision. Id. at 1279-82.
31. Id. at 1281-82. The hearing examiner concluded that "it is apparent that
[Mrs. Hultzman] was in need of these services." Id. at 1282.
32. Id. at 1282. Section 1395y(a) (9) was discussed but not interpreted, as it
did not form the basis for the Secretary's denial of coverage in this case. 495 F.2d
at 1281. This subsection has frequently been the subject of litigation. See, e.g.,
Ridgely v. Secretary of HEW, 475 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Weinberger, 31
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The Third Circuit's analysis was entirely statutory.33  It consisted
essentially of pointing out that section 139 5y(a) (1) did not grant the
Secretary the powers he asserted,3 4 and that the Secretary's interpretation
of the section was not supported by precedent 35 or legislative history. 6
371 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Low v. Richardson, 360 F. Supp. 499 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Bremer v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 465 (D. Neb. 1972); Weir v. Richard-
son, 343 F. Supp. 353 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Reading v. Richardson, 339 F. Supp. 295
(E.D. Mo. 1972) ; Johnson v. Richardson, 336 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Sowell
v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 689 (D.S.C. 1970).
33. 495 F.2d at 1279-82.
34. The opinion's analysis applied traditional rules of statutory interpretation
and tried to ascertain the legislative intent. Id. at 1280. Where the words of a statute
are sufficient, in and of themselves, to belie the purpose of the legislature, their plain
meaning is followed. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940). Consideration should, however, be given to other parts of an act and its
legislative history. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934).
35. 495 F.2d at 1282. The only other court which had considered the pre-
cise question posed by this case rejected the Secretary's interpretation of section
1395y (a) (1). Blacker v. Richardson, CCH 1973 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE 11
25,613 (D. Mont. Nov. 21, 1972).
The factual background in Blacker was similar to that in the instant case.
The plaintiff, an elderly woman, had been admitted with a shoulder fracture and had
remained in the hospital for approximately 3 months. The hearing examiner had
determined that only part of that time was actually covered because the services
provided had not required skilled care in a hospital. The issue presented was the
validity of the Secretary's position that if it were found that any inpatient services
could have been rendered upon an outpatient basis, there would be no coverage for
such service. The Blacker court rejected this interpretation:
Here . . . the services were not purely custodial and the X-rays, removal
of cast, and physiotherapy were services reasonable and necessary for the diag-
nosis and treatment of an injury. Such being true it is the certification of the
physician which determines coverage, and the Secretary under the statutes is
not free to deny coverage on the ground that the services might have been ren-
dered on an outpatient basis.
Id. at 9036.
In view of Blacker and the clear wording of section 1395y(a) (1), it is some-
what surprising that Hultzman ever reached the Third Circuit: although the Secre-
tary's findings of fact are binding upon a reviewing court when supported by sub-
stantial evidence, the court is not bound to accept his conclusions of law. Social Sec.
Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); Reading v. Richardson, 339 F. Supp. 295
(E.D. Mo. 1972).
The lack of express statutory support and the decisive nature of the Blacker
holding point, at least initially, to a conscious effort by the Secretary to obtain a
broad statutory interpretation to expand by implication his power to deny coverage.
However, the fact that Hultzman originated with a review by Blue Cross and
progressed through several other levels of agency review suggests that the Secretary's
position ignored Blacker and was the prioduct of administrative error in interpreting
the exclusion contained in section 1395y(a) (1). Such an interpretation may have
resulted from reading the custodial care exclusion of section 1395y(a) (9) and the
unnecessary service exclusion of section 1395y(a) (1) together. The former deals
with the level of care provided while the latter relates only to the overall need
for services.
The Secretary's position seems to have improperly synthesized the two sec-
tions and sought an exclusion based upon overutilization of the required level of care.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Hultzman court rejected the case
authorities cited by the Secretary because they all involved interpretations of the
exclusion of custodial services. 495 F.2d at 1282. A similar problem was presented
in Blacker. See CCH 1973 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE at 9036. See also Bremer v.
Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 465 (D. Neb. 1972).
36. 495 F.2d at 1282. 32
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Despite its apparent simplicity, Hultzman's importance to potential medi-
care recipients should not be overlooked. A judicial affirmation of the
Secretary's position would have given his office the power to deny payments,
without prior notice, whenever it concluded that services performed in a
hospital could have been rendered in a lesser-care facility. This power
would have created substantial uncertainty about coverage in all cases where
there was a question about the need to have medical services provided by a
hospital. Thus, the risk of noncoverage placed upon the patient and upon
the physician would have been increased and, especially in cases involving
marginal financial resources, this danger could have resulted in decisions
to seek financial security rather than desirable, perhaps necessary, health
care. Moreover, a statutory interpretation in favor of the Secretary would
have resulted in a usurpation of the power statutorily granted to the utiliza-
tion review committee, because the Secretary would have been empowered
to second-guess any physician's decision to proceed with a particular mode
of care although it had been approved by the utilization review committee.
This veto power would have partially frustrated Medicare's intended pur-
pose of providing the elderly with adequate, physician-controlled health
care.37 The court's decision precluded these results by limiting the power
to exclude coverage to that expressly granted by section 139 5y(a) (1).
However, the application of section 1395y(a') (1) was not without an
inherent problem even when the Third Circuit's interpretation was em-
ployed. The Secretary was still empowered to completely deny coverage to
a patient after the patient's attending physician, with the concurrence of
the utilization review board, had deemed hospitalization medically necessary
and the patient had incurred substantial expenses in reliance upon these
evaluations,38 if it were determined that the hospitalization was not neces-
37. See notes 12 & 17 supra.
38. Hultzman is ambiguous about the issue of whether section 1395y(a) (1)
authorizes retroactive denial of payment. After discussing the function and purpose
of the utilization review committee the court continued:
Nowhere, however, in the Medicare statute or in the legislative history is
there any suggestion that Congress intended that the Secretary deny coverage
retroactively to patients whenever he believes the utilization review committee
has ceased to function properly. Indeed the two express statutory remedies
which are provided ...foreclose retroactive effect because of the requirements
that notice be given.
495 F.2d at 1281, citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(b),(d) (1970).
As a general statement, this would appear to be inaccurate for a number of
reasons. First, section 1395y(a) excludes, by its own terms, the limitations governing
other sections of the Act: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter,
no payment may be made under part A or part B for any expenses incurred for items
or services- ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
The notice limitations of sections 1395cc(b) and (d) do not, therefore,
govern the application of section 1395y(a). Secondly, the passage in 1972 of section
1395pp to add the requirement that a patient who is to be denied coverage pursuant
to section 1395y(a) (1) have notice, strongly suggests that Congress viewed section
1395y(a) (1) as allowing retroactive denial without notice. Otherwise, there would
have been no reason to undertake that amendment. See notes 39, 41 & 42 and accom-
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sary for the treatment of the patient's problem. Although it would have
been highly unlikely that the prescribed review procedures could fail so
completely and produce this result, the theoretical possibility increases the
risk attendant upon a decision to obtain treatment.
In apparent recognition of this problem, Congress eliminated the
patient's personal financial risk by enacting section 13 95pp which places
a limitation upon the patient's liability when it is determined that a claim
will be disallowed under section 13 9 5 y(a) (1).39 Section 13 9 5pp provides
that when the individual and the provider of services did not know and
could not reasonably have been expected to know that payment would not
be made, payment shall be made as though section 1395y(a) (1) did not
apply.40 Additionally, the statute requires that in order for a section 13 9 5 y
(a) (1) denial to be valid, the individual affected must have had reasonable
notice in advance of receiving services that a denial might be forthcoming,
and even when the provider of services knew or could be expected to know
that payment would be denied, the individual is indemnified.41 Thus, this
amendment eliminated the problem presented by the unsuspecting patient
caught between a large medical bill and an unexpected denial of coverage
by the Secretary. Because of section 139 5 pp, review of future decisions
denying coverage under section 139 5y (a) (1) should be confined to a deter-
panying text infra. Finally, if retroactive denial were, as the instant opinion sug-
gested, precluded by the Act, the court could have resolved iIultzman upon that basis
since the denial in question was apparently retroactive and without notice. However,
there is no indication that the court's holding in any way relied upon the retroactive
denial issue.
Furthermore, the court observed:
[I]n certain limited situations Congress has authorized the Secretary to deny
coverage for services which otherwise meet the requirements of the statute.
These situations are enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a), the statutory section
relied upon by the Secretary to support his decision.
495 F.2d at 1281. This statement and the analysis that follows it suggest that the
court recognized an exception to the previously stated rule of nonretroactivity. How-
ever, the remainder of the opinion did not define this exception; it deals only with the
Secretary's faulty interpretation of section 1395y(a) (1).
Since sections 1395cc(b) and (d) did not form the basis for the denial of
coverage in this case, the Hultzman court's discussion of the notice requirements
contained therein would seem to be of questionable relevance. Moreover, the court's
initial statement about retroactive denial and the actual provisions of the statute can
only be reconciled by using section 13 9 5pp, which could not be applied to this case.
See note 42 infra.
39. Section 1395pp also relates to denial of coverage based upon section 1395y(a) (9). The overall impact of section 1395pp will likely be greater with respect to
that section, as section 1395y(a) (9) has been the subject of much more litigation
than section 1395y(a) (1). See note 32 supra.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp (Supp. II, 1972).
41. Id. This indemnification is subject to the deductability and coinsurance pro-
visions of the subchapter. This subsection further provides that payments made by
the Secretary as indemnification shall be deemed to have been made to the provider
of the services and shall be treated as overpayments recoverable from the provider. Id.
[VOL. 20
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/9
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
mination of whether substantial evidence supports the conclusions that
services were not medically necessary and that the individual had notice.
4 2
This recent statutory development should help eliminate inequities in-
herent in the application of the previously existing rules governing exclu-
sions from Medicare coverage. Moreover, section 1395pp should be es-
pecially effective in view -of the contribution made by Hultzman in clearly
defining situations warranting the application of section 1395y(a) (1).4"
Edward P. Welch
CIVIL RIGHTS - STATE ACTION PUBLIC UTILITY'S TERMINATION OF
SERVICES FOR NONPAYMENT NOT STATE ACTION UNDER SECTION
1983.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
Appellant Jackson initiated a class action' under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,2 alleging that the appellee, a privately owned and publicly regulated
42. Section 13 9 5 pp is applicable only to services rendered after its effective date,
October 30, 1972. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 213(b),
86 Stat. 1386. In Hultzmnan, the services were rendered in 1970, and section 1395pp
was inapplicable. Had it applied, the issue decided by this appeal probably would not
have been reached, as there was no indication that the appellant or any other party
had had any knowledge that the Secretary would attempt to deny coverage under
section 1395y(a)(1). If notice could not have been shown, the services would have
been automatically covered pursuant to section 1395pp even though the application of
section 1395y(a) (1) would also have been inappropriate, as ultimately shown by the
instant decision. Thus section 1395pp would have presented an alternative basis for
decision, although it would have been unlikely that the case would have reached the
Third Circuit because of section 1395pp's provisions protecting the patient from a
denial of coverage.
43. It should be emphasized that Hultzman addressed only the issue of denial
of coverage for alleged overutilization when the services in question had already been
rendered. The Secretary still possesses the power to regulate admissions and dura-
tions of stay before services are rendered, in order to assure that overutilization and
a commensurate waste of resources do not occur. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1) (1970).
Moreover, recent amendments to utilization review regulations suggest a new em-
phasis upon greater efficiency. For example, 20 C.F.R. § 405.1035(e) (1974), has
been amended to require that:
The physician members of the committee or group, in accordance with guide-
lines established by the Secretary, select or develop written criteria and standards
for reviewing the necessity for admissions and continued stays and conducting
medical care evaluation studies.
20 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (e) (6) (1974). The amendments further require that the system
of admission review provide for closer scrutiny of cases involving diagnoses or treat-
ments associated with unusually high cost or the frequent furnishing of excessive
services. Id. § 405.1035 (f) (3). Special attention is also to be focused upon cases in-
volving extended stays. Id. § 405.1035(g).
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides for the bringing of class actions.
The issue of the propriety of the plaintiff's class action was not reached in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
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utility," violated her fourteenth amendment rights to due process of law
when it terminated her electric service for nonpayment of disputed past
bills by disconnecting the line at the company's utility pole on the street
near her house.4 The trial judge, after a factfinding hearing, granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss upon the ground that the appellant "failed to
make a sufficient showing of state involvement in the activity complained
of .... 5" On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed holding that when a privately
owned and operated corporation acts pursuant to its own regulations in
terminating customer service without entering upon the customer's private
property, without utilizing any state statute or regulation permitting reentry
upon that property, and without any specific direction or auhorization of
the regulatory body, its conduct is not state action or action under color
of state law creating a viable claim under the Civil Rights Act., Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct.
449 (1974).7
While the Civil Rights Cases8 saw the Supreme. Court of the United
States lay down the principle that section 1983 did not extend the fourteenth
amendment protections to the discriminatory conduct of private individuals,
subsequent Court decisions recognized that there existed few sharp dis-
tinctions between private and public conduct.9 When the Supreme Court
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings for redress.
Id.
3. The Metropolitan Edison Company is subject, as are all other Pennsylvania
utilities, to the provisions of the Commonwealth's Public Utility Codes and the regu-
lations of the Public Utilities Commission. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1101 et Seq.
(1959).
4. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 348 F. Supp. 954, 955 (M.D. Pa. 1972).'
Appellant sought money damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging
that the defendant utility company summarily terminated her service without prior
notice or hearing upon the merits. The district court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the defendant from terminating appellant's service until the hearing
upon the preliminary injunction. At that hearing, the parties agreed that the de-
fendant would continue service in order to allow it to respond to appellant's complaint.
Id. at 955.
5. Id. at 958.
6. The court noted that at least one court has speculated that the tests for "state
action" and action "under color of law" may differ. See Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457
F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1972). However, it assumed that the two terms were synonomous.
483 F.2d at 757 n.4. See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
7. Since this writing the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision,
holding that where a private utility is heavily regulated, enjoys a partial monopoly
in providing electrical service, and has chosen a service termination procedure found
by the Public Utilities Commission to be permissible under state law, there is an in-
sufficient connection between the state and the utility's actions in terminating a
customer's service to attribute the utility's action to the state for the purposes of a
section 1983 claim. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449, 457 (1974).
8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (upholding the constitutionality of section 1983).
9. Thus, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held that the
words "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any
[VOL. 20
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/9
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
noted in Burton v. Wilmington .Parking Authority1° that the issue of
whether there has been state action or action under color of law is a
question which can be resolved 'only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances,"" it articulated the approach that had in fact been used
in the past and thereby foretold its future treatment of state action. For
example, in Burton, the 'Supreme Court found state action in a leasing
arrangement between the state and a private restaurant engaging in racial
discrimination while located in a publicly owned and operated automobile
parking building, because "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with [the lessee defendant] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity .... -12 There-
fore, the Court found that when a close relationship exists between the
private actor and state authority or support, the actor's conduct is not
necessarily "purely private."
In the same year, in Evans v. Newton,"3 the Court upheld a challenge
to the segregation policies of a "private" park which, prior to a state court's
appointment of private trustees, had been managed by a municipality. The
Court said: "[C]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined
with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental char-
acter as to become subject to the constitutional.limitations placed upon
state action.' 4
Thus, the Court adopted two seemingly distinct approaches to the
same issue. In Burton it applied a quantitative mode -of analysis and ques-
tioned whether the state was involved to a "significant extent" in the dis-
State or Territory" did not exclude the acts of an official or police officer who could
show no authority under state law, custom or usage to commit those acts. Id. at 172.
The Court held liable under section 1983 13 police officers alleged to have deprived
six black children and their parents of their civil rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment and thereby reaffirmed earlier decisions that official abuse of power constitutes
action under color of law. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) ;
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.- 91 (1945) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941). See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (allegations
that 15 private individuals conspired with law officers to release three county prisoners
for purpose of later killing them stated cause of action under section 1983).
10. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
11. Id. at 722.
12. Id. at 725. The restaurant was located in a building constructed, owned,
and operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, a Delaware state agency. The
lease provided that the Authority would assume financial responsibility for the upkeep-
and maintenance of the building, and would complete "the decorative finishing of
the leased premises and utilities therefore, without cost to Lessee." Id. at 719. The
Court found that insofar as the lessee had made $220,000 worth of improvements to
the realty, it enjoyed the Authority's tax exemption. Id.
13. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
14. Id. at 299. With reference to the management of the private park, the Court
measured the reach of the fourteenth amendment by the "tradition of municipal
control" coupled with the nature of the service rendered to the community. Id. at 301.
In a subsequent action upon a motion by heirs of the trust, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Georgia Supreme Court's holding that in view of the result in Newton, the trust
had become unenforceable and therefore reverted to the estate and heirs of the
testator. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), aff'g 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E'2d 329 (1966).
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criminatory conduct. In Newton, it employed a qualitative "public function"
test and examined the nature of the service rendered by the private actor.' 5
However, later cases have done more than mechanistically apply these
tests. First, in an apparent attempt to narrow the reasoning of the Burton
approach at least, the Court in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.' concluded
that "a state is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party
when the State, by its law, has compelled the act. ' 17 Similarly, within little
over a year the Court added another gloss to the concept of conduct "under
color ,of law" in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,18 where it held that there
was no state action when the state merely granted a license to a private
club to sell liquor and the black guest of a white private club member was
refused service at the club's dining room and bar because of his race.
Despite the state's perversive scheme monitoring alcoholic beverages, the
Court observed that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's regulation of
private clubs could not be said to foster or encourage racial discrimination
because the regulatory scheme "[did] not sufficiently implicate the State
in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge so as to make the
latter 'State action' ....19
While neither Adickes nor Modse Lodge concerned public utilities,
the Jackson court cited both as authority for its holding. It relied in
particular upon the Moose Lodge holding as a springboard for its conclusion
that where a state regulation of public utilities20 is concerned, a finding of
state action required "a connection between the state regulation and the
proscribed conduct." 21 The Third Circuit's analysis, then, was grounded
upon an examination of whether there had been a direct relation between
15. Technically, the state was no longer involved in the challenged conduct; thus,
to some extent, the Newton court was foreclosed from focusing, as it did in Burton,
upon "the degree of state participation and involvement" in the disputed activity. 365
U.S. at 724 (emphasis added).
Fearing the long reach of the public function theory, Justice Harlan argued
vigorously against its use in Newton, noting a lack of firm doctrinal support in the
case law. 382 U.S. 296, 319-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 50 and accom-
panying text infra.
16. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). This case was an action brought by a white school
teacher who had been arrested while in the defendant's public lunchroom where she
had been refused service because she was "in the company of Negroes." While charg-
ing a conspiracy between the arresting officer and the defendant storeowner, she
also asserted that the private party's refusal to serve her was a deprivation of her
rights "under . . . custom and usage." Id. at 147-48.
17. Id. at 170 (emphasis added). The use of the word "compelled" in Adickes
has been interpreted to be a revival of the once-rejected distinction between laws
which establish segregation and those which merely promote it. Note, "Color of
Law" Requirement of Section 1983, 84 HARV. L. REV. 71, 80-82 (1970).
18. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
19. Id. at 177.
20. For an overview of the common law treatment of the duties and liabilities of
public service entities, see Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate
Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962).
21. 483 F.2d at 756 (emphasis added). See also Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73,




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/9
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
the state involvement and the termination of Jackson's service. It sum-
marized four instances in which state action or action under color of state
law may be found:
1. When a private party's action occurred in conjunction with a busi-
ness in which the state may be considered a partner or joint
venturer in a profit making field (Burton v. Wilmington [sic]
... [365 U.S. 715 (1961)] ;or
2. when a state statute or custom or usage compels the result (Adickes
v. Kress... [398 U.S. 144 (1970)] ;or
3. when a state agency affirmatively orders or specifically approves
the activity in the course of its regulatory rule making (Public
Utility Commission v. Pollack . . . [343 U.S. 451 (1952)]; or
4. when a private agency in effect is acting on behalf of and furnishing
a typical government service (Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) ).22
The premise of the court's approach was that the occurrence of one of the
above situations would show that the defendant company derived suffi-
ciently direct "aid, comfort, or incentive" from the state to satisfy the test
for state action.23
While recognizing a split in the circuits, the Jackson court chose to
rely upon the approach in Lucas v. Wisc.dnsin Electric Power Co. 24 where,
upon substantially the same facts, the Seventh Circuit had found no state
22. 483 F.2d at 757.
23. Id. at 758, quoting Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Pwr. Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). See notes 25-27 and accompanying
text infra.
The Third Circuit summarily rejected some alternative bases for finding state
action. First, the court found that while the utility company, pursuant to Public
Utility Commission regulations, had filed a tariff pertaining to its termination
procedures, there had been no state action because the Commission had never held a
hearing upon the challenge regulation. 483 F.2d at 757-58, distinguishing Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). The court also noted that although the
tariff authorized entry upon the customer's premises, the company had not, in termi-
nating service to the plaintiff, availed itself of that right. 483 F.2d at 758. It is not
clear from the text within which of the court's four theories the facts would have
fallen had there been an entry upon the customer's property. See text accompany-
ing note 22 supra. Had the utility availed itself of the right, there would have re-
mained the question of whether it could be said that the state statute had compelled
the result, the element required by the second theory. Since the third theory related to
the kind of affirmative action found in Pollak - that is, a direct order or specific
approval - it would be inapplicable; and the two remaining bases would offer no
suitable analogy.
24. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). In Lucas,
the plaintiffs attacked section 113.13(4) of the regulations of the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission, which provided in pertinent part:
(4) Disconnect Rule. (a) Service may be disconnected if a customer's current
bill for service as defined in the utility's filed rules is not paid within a reasonable
period set forth in said rules.
Id. at 642. Pursuant to this rule, the defendant company promulgated and filed with
the Commission detailed rules and regulations pertaining to disconnection. Id.
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action in the termination of electric service.2 5 As in Jackson, the defendant
in Lucas had been a privately owned, highly regulated utility.2 6 However,
while the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission rules required merely
that a utility imposing penalties upon customers for nonpayment file a rule
specifying under what conditions such penalties would apply,27 the Wis-
consin Commission's regulations specifically had authorized the utility to
disconnect for nonpayment. 28 Upon the facts, then, if Wisconsin's involve-
ment in the challenged disconnection procedures was insufficient to create
state action, Pennsylvania's still more remote involvement in Jackson would
seem to have required a similar result.
However, while the Jackson court reached this conclusion, it is unclear
whether the Third Circuit's reliance upon Lucas was intended to establish
an a fortiori argument for its own holding, or whether the court deemed
the factual distinction insignificant. The same distinction, however, had
arisen in a Seventh Circuit case more closely analogous to Jackson which
Lucas purported to follow, Kadlec v. Bell Telephone Co.2 9 In Kadlec, the
defendant phone company had acted pursuant to its own regulation in
terminating a customer's service, and the court had concluded that such
conduct was private for the purposes of section 1983 because the "nexus
between the state and the defendant's conduct" was insufficient30 and could
not be established by the mere filing of regulations with state officials.
3 1
25. Unlike the plaintiff in Jackson, the plaintiffs in Lucas had joined the state
public service commissioners as defendants. 466 F.2d at 641. Though the Lucas Court
found for both defendants, it rendered separate decisions as to each. 466 F.2d at 638,
646-47. See note 30 infra.
26. 466 F.2d at 641 n.5. See Wisc. STAT. §§ 196.00 et seq. (1969).
27. 483 F.2d at 758.
28. 466 F.2d at 642.
29. 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969). As in Jackson, the defendant utility company
in Kadlec had acted upon the authority of its own regulation, which was filed with
the Illinois Commerce Commission. Id. at 626. Notably, the company's regulation
provided a right of entry upon the customer's premises. Id. at 625 n.1. However, the
opinion did not indicate whether an entry was involved and did not discuss the entry
provision in the pertinent regulation. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
The Seventh Circuit has held consistently against customer-plaintiff in utility
service termination cases brought under section 1983. See 466 F.2d at 638. E.g.,
Particular Cleaners v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972). See note 32 infra.
30. 407 F.2d at 626-27. The Kadlec majority observed that "[tihe only apparent
state connection with the termination was in the fact that defendant company filed
its regulations with state authorities; the state in no sense benefited from, encour-
aged, requested or cooperated in the suspension of service." Id. at 626. Taking a
bifurcated approach to the question of state action, the Lucas Court reached the
same result. On the one hand, it found state action in the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission's acceptance of the utility's rule upon termination procedures, yet it
found no due process violation. 466 F.2d at 646-53. On the other hand, with respect
to the defendant utility, the court found that its conduct pursuant to the same rule
accepted by the Commission was not action under color of law. Id. at 653. Unless
the court applied a different test for state action than for action under color of law,
the result is an apparent contradiction.
31. 407 F.2d at 626. In his concurring opinion, Judge Kerner noted that "under
appropriate circumstances" it may be possible to demonstrate a sufficient nexus
[VOL. 20654
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Although Kadlec3 2 seems more analogous to Jackson than Lucas, the
Third Circuit's stress upon the latter case8 s suggests a holding stretching
beyond the facts in Jackson. Thus, Jackson may be precedent, in the Third
Circuit,8 4 for finding an absence of state action not only where a utility acts
pursuant to its own regulations, but also where its conduct is explicitly
authorized by the rules of the state regulatory commission. 5
The court briefly distinguished the opposing authority from other
circuits. For example, Palmer v. Columbia Gas,80 the most recent court of
appeals case reaching a contrary result, was said to be inapposite because
that service disconnection had been effectuated pursuant to a state statute
granting the utility a right of entry onto private premises.87 If the distinc-
tion between using the statutory authority or not to reach the same end
of disconnection seems frail, the Third Circuit was careful to point out that
Lucas suggested that its decision might have been different if there had
been entry.88
between the state and the utility, and suggested that some of the factors to be con-
sidered are whether:
1) the entry is subject to close regulation by a statutorily-created body . . .; 2)
the regulations filed with the regulatory body are required to be filed as a con-
dition of the entity's operation; 3) the regulations must be approved by the
regulatory body to be effective; 4) the entity is given a total or partial monopoly
by the regulatory body; 5) the regulatory body controls the rates charged and/or
specific services offered by the entity; 6) the actions of the entity are subject to
review by the regulatory body; and 7) the regulation permits the entity to per-
form acts which it may not otherwise perform without violating state law.
Id. at 628.
32. In another Seventh Circuit case, the customer-plaintiffs sought to distin-
guish Kadlec by arguing that a utility commission order authorizing the collection
of limited security deposits from applicants or customers seeking to use any public
utility services created the additional factor of specific state authorization absent in
earlier cases. Particular Cleaners v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189, 191
(1972). Rejecting this position, the court observed that "[tihe order in no way
directs or orders the collection of any security deposits . . . . The decision to require
security deposits . . . is strictly a private management decision .... " Id. at 190-91.
33. 483 F.2d at 758.
34. A federal district court, without comment, explicitly rejected the reasoning
of Lucas. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 446 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). With respect to a commission rule authorizing utility shutoffs for nonpay-
ment, the court therein noted that the failure of the commission to require constitu-
tionally adequate procedures "might be more correctly characterized as state inaction,"
rather than state action. Id. at 446. However, since the commission had not been
joined as a defendant in the action, the court did not reach the issue. Id. at 447 n.2.
35. The Supreme Court seems to have approved this perhaps unintended result.
While agreeing with the Third Circuit that Jackson involved no state authorization
of either the disputed regulation or the related conduct, the Court observed that any
Commission authorization would have been merely permissive. Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449, 456-57 (1974). Thus, as in Lucas, the plaintiff
would have had to show that the state actually ordered the challenged regulation or
conduct. Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall characterized this reasoning as a "sharp
departure from our previous state action cases." 95 S. Ct. at 462 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
36. 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
37. Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.12 (1953).
38. 483 F.2d at 759 n.5. Indeed, the Palmer Court had felt compelled to do the
same, noting that testimony that the utility had entered private premises distinguished
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However, since all the cases cited by the Jackson court involved per-
vasive regulation, the parameters of the factual distinctions it made are
not clear. If the test for finding conduct to have been under color of state
law is that of the presence vel non of "affirmative [state] support" which is
"significant, [when] measured ...by its contribution to the effectiveness
of the defendant's conduct,"3 9 then arguably the state-conferred monopoly
enjoyed by private utilities establishes the requisite nexus between the state
and the defendant's conduct.40 The Jackson court, however, explicitly re-
jected this proposition citing not only Lucas, but a landmark Supreme Court
case in the area ,of public services, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,
41
its facts from those in Lucas. 479 F.2d at 159 n.6. The Supreme Court's opinion
in Jackson did not address the statutory right of entry issue.
The Third Circuit distinguished the other leading contrary circuit court
decision, Ihrke v. Northern States Pwr. Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972), upon the ground that there the municipality which regu-
lated the utility had received 5 percent of the company's gross earnings and there-
fore had been a beneficiary of the payment of bills resulting from the utility's threats
to terminate service. 483 F.2d at 759. The Jackson Court suggested that the facts of
Thrke presented a "joint venture situation" such as that postulated in the first of the
court's four theories. Id. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
Several other contrary cases were dismissed as having been instances of
"callous and overbearing conduct" for which Pennsylvania state courts or the Public
Utility Commission, had they been faced with the same cases, probably would have
issued appropriate orders. 483 F.2d at 759 n.6. However, in these lower court de-
cisions the findings of state action had been based not upon the odious aspect of
the respective utility's arbitrariness, but upon the formal relationship of the state to
the utility or, alternatively, upon the nature of the service rendered. See Bronson v.
Consolidated Edison, 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ; Hattell v. Public Serv. Co.,
350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717
(D. Kan. 1972).
39. In this connection, the court in Ihrke v. Northern States Pwr. Co., 459 F.2d
566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972), noted that the First Circuit
had found that where a mobile home park was a monopoly by virtue of municipal
zoning ordinances, an eviction of a tenant therefrom was "state action" for the pur-
poses of section 1983. 459 F.2d at 570, discussing, Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1972). The Ihrke court left unclear the matter of whether its concern
with the state-granted monopoly related to an examination of the degree of state
involvement or whether it was a consideration which underscored the public function
of the utility. See note 42 and accompanying text infra.
40. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
41. 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952). Accord, Particular Cleaners v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972) ; Martin
v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Kadlec v. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). But see
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153, 163 (6th Cir. 1973) ; Ihrke v. Northern
States Pwr. Co., 459 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972) ;
Hattell v. Public Service Co., 350 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1972) ; Stanford v. Gas
Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972). The Stanford court stated cate-
gorically that:
[the defendant company] and a very few other corporations or business enter-
prises in privately owned utility businesses, do in fact enjoy a complete monopoly
of supplying an essential commodity to the citizens of this and other states whose
rates, method of and right to do business are solely under state control. Such 42
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in which the Court refused to base its finding of state action upon the
existence of a monopoly. 42
If the characteristics common to virtually all utilities, pervasive regu-
lation and state grants of monopoly power, will not support a uniform
finding of state action, then some legal theory or theories must account for
the different results reached by the various courts. Although the Third
Circuit distinguished the contrary court decisions upon their facts, it failed
to scrutinize the various tests those other courts applied.43 Technically, it
drew accurate factual distinctions between Jackson and the cases of other
circuits, for, as a matter of degree, they presented instances of greater state
involvement in the challenged activity. However, while Jackson focused
upon the "nexus between the state involvement and the defendant's con-
duct," the cases reaching a contrary result addressed not only the relation-
ship of the state to the utility, but also the relationship of the utility to
the public; that is, the utility's serving of a public function. 44
public utilities, beyond question, perform public functions in the public interest
under public regulation.
346 F. Supp. at 722. This viewpoint was also advanced by the dissent in Lucas, which
noted that monopolies were "odious" to common law and were to be tolerated only
upon the occasion of great public convenience or necessity. 466 F.2d at 659 (dis-
senting opinion), quoting Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wisc. 539, 546-47
(1858). The dissent also observed that, when faced with antitrust litigation, utilities
have successfully argued that their acts were "state action" and were thus excluded
from the operation of the antitrust laws. 466 F.2d at 662. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972).
42. Also relying upon Pollack, the Supreme Court in Jackson said that a state
guarantee of monopoly was not determinative for the purpose of finding state action.
95 S. Ct. at 454. Additionally, the Court doubted both that the state had granted a
monopoly in the first instance and that one in fact existed. Id.
43. In Palner, for example, while it is true that the Sixth Circuit was concerned
with the utility's use of the state-granted right of entry and the ex parte enforcement
proceeding, it is not clear that the decision rested upon those factors alone. 479 F.2d
at 160. The court considered not only the specific proscribed conduct, but the extent
of the state's power over the entire operation of the utility and the power given to the
utility which is usually reserved to the state. Id. at 163-66. Additionally, it observed
that furnishing natural gas is a "legitimate public function." Id. at 165. Thus, the
court applied both a joint participation theory and a public function theory.
Similarly, in Ihrke, though the profit sharing involved was important, the
court reviewed other factors as well and concluded that "[w]hen private individuals
or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature,
they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional
limitations." 459 F.2d at 569, quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
However, the Ihrke Court either fused or confused its analysis of the "significant
extent" of the government's involvement with the inherent nature of a utility service:
while it seemed to adopt a public function theory, it purported to rely upon the
concurring opinion in Kadlec, which concerned not "powers or functions govern-
mental in nature," but the degree of state involvement presented by the facts. 459
F.2d at 568. See note 31 and accompanying text supra. See Hattell v. Public Serv.
Co., 350 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1972) (no significant difference found between
flat fee or tax, which Colorado companies are required to pay, and profit sharing
agreement in Ihrke).
44. See note 38 supra. Invariably, where the courts have found state action in
utilities cases, they have alluded to the public function line of reasoning of Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966), where a "typical government service," the basis
of the Third Circuit's fourth theory, was held to be state action under section 1983.
See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
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The Jackson court did not discuss the public function theory either
as it would be applied to the instant case or as it had been treated in the
factually inapposite cases. The conspicuous absence of such a discussion is
confusing. Regardless of the merits of the test or whether it is appropriate
in public utilities disputes, it is the test upon which the contrary opinions
seemed to turn.45 There simply is no. apparent explanation for the court's
failure to comment upon the application of that theory. Moreover, the
court did not clarify whether the public function theory was disfavored, or
.whether it was merely inapplicable to situations beyond those in Marsh or
Newt n.
The Third Circuit's failure to apply the theory to Jackson may be
due in part to its reliance upon Moose Lodge.40  However, the court ad-
mitted uncertainty as to the mandate of Moose Lodge by ,observing that the
distinction between a private club and a utility might require a different
result.47 This uncertainty was underscored by the substantial dicta upon
the issue of whether, given state action, the receipt of utility services was
a federally protected property right and, if it was, whether there was a
denial of due process in the defendant's termination procedures. 48
Whatever the reasons for the Third Circuit's failure to apply Newton's
,public function test, the opinion suggested that even if it were to apply
the test in the future, the same result would obtain. The court is reluctant,
as is the Supreme Court, to find state 'action wherever there is pervasive
regulation.49 Though courts applying it have not discussed its implications,
45. Finding it necessary to address the public function theory in its decision of
Jackson, the Supreme Court concluded that since state statutes imposed no obliga-
tion upon the state to furnish utility service, the imposition of that obligation upon
private utilities did not transmute the provision of such services into a public function.
95 S. Ct. at 454. Arguing that by defining an activity "traditionally associated
with the sovereignty" as one which the state requires be governmentally operated
the majority had interpreted the public function theory too narrowly, Justice
Marshall observed that it was sufficient that a utility is traditionally identified with
the state through universal regulation. 95 S. Ct. at 464 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
46. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra. In Moose Lodge, the Court
did not consider the Marsh v. Alabama-Evans v. Newton line of cases.
47. 483 F.2d at 759. The Palmer Court had rejected Moose Lodge as authority
for precisely this reason: "It is noted . . . that the points of difference in that equal
protection case dealing with a private club exceed in significance and in number the
points of similarity to this due process case dealing with a public utility company."
479 F.2d at 162-63 n.14. In its affirmance of the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court's
reliance upon Moose Lodge was limited to its statement that extensive regulation
did not transform a private entity into a state agent for the purposes of finding state
action under section 1983. 95 S. Ct. at 457. The Court's silence about the qualitative
distinction between a private corporation providing a utility service and a private club
serving a limited social function, seems consistent with its view that utility services
are not public functions. 95 S. Ct. at 454.
48. 483 F.2d at 759-62.
49. Id. at 762. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1971)
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143 (1958). Dis-
cussing the inevitable increase of state interference in citizens' lives as a consequence
of governments expanding role in achieving social and economic justice, Jones, supra,
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the public function theory has the potential for expanding the state action
concept to include a plethora of state-regulated activities.50 Given wide-
spread and increasing governmental regulation of the production of goods
and services, the fear of gathering all regulated activities under the rubric
of state action and thus involving the courts in the extended supervision
of administrative functions is not unfounded. 5' Yet the salient characteristic
of the public utility, one certainly not shared by all governmentally regu-
lated entities, is that it enjoys monopoly power at the pleasure of the
state.52 Presumably, if private enterprise did not administer these services,
the government would. 53 Thus, it might be said that in its protection of
the monopoly status of utilities, the state employs private entities to per-
form a "public function. ' 54 Indeed, this reasoning, though not explicit, was
suggested by the Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts.55 The Third Circuit's
treatment of the monopoly factor, however, was confined to an examination
of whether it established the required connection between the state regu-
lation and the defendant's conduct. Finding that it did not, its subsequent
analysis necessarily focused upon questions of degree, not substance.56
correctly predicted that in order to provide the public with some measure of certainty,
the courts would have to develop new legal concepts designed to limit the discre-
tionary powers that attend the growth of government's administrative functions. 58
COLUM. L. REV. at 154-55.
50. Rejecting the petitioner's argument that since the furnishing of a utility
service is "affected with a public interest" the utility company is a state actor, the
Supreme Court expressed fear in Jackson that this logic would require finding state
action with respect to many regulated businesses providing arguably essential goods
and services. 95 S. Ct. at 455.
51. See Ilardi, The Right to a Hearing Prior to Termination of Utility Services,
22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1057 (1973). As a rule, our economic and social policies mili-
tate against monopolies upon the premise that free competition best serves the public
by providing quality goods and services at the lowest price. However, because of the
cost of administering utilities, and because they are generally viewed as services essen-
tial to the health and safety of the public, private utility companies are protected
from the burdens of competition. See generally 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES REGULATION 1-25 (1969).
52. For a discussion of how the objective of "lowest possible rates" for the utili-
ties consumer has generally inhibited public regulation of managerial discretion in
the area of utility shutoffs for nonpayment, and how current environmental, aesthetic,
and recreational considerations are altering the application of that objective as a guid-
ing principle, see Shelton, The Shutoff of Utility Services for Nonpayment: A Plight
of the Poor, 46 WASH. L. REV. 745 (1971).
53. See generally Ilardi, supra note 52.
54. In his dissent to the Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson, Justice Marshall
adopted a similar line of reasoning and posited that the monopoly protection extended
to private companies is but a reflection of the view that services provided thereby are
"the functional equivalent of service provided by the State." 95 S. Ct. at 462 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Perhaps a more descriptive term is "quasi-public function." Bronson
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
55. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973) ; Ihrke
v. Northern States Pwr. Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S.
815 (1972).
56. In its opinion in Jackson, the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed this mechani-
cal analysis of the relation of a grant of monopoly power to the nexus between the
state and the defendant's activity. 95 S. Ct. at 454. See note 42 supra.
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Even allowing for the gloss that results from its reliance upon Lucas,57
the Jackson court's holding is a narrow one. If future plaintiffs5 s claiming
deprivations of their civil rights are to obtain relief against a privately
owned utility, they will be required to show either affirmative action by
the state with respect to the particular activity of which there is complaint,
or utility action pursuant to a particular state statute or commission rule.
Although the Third Circuit may have no difficulty in finding action under
color of state law where a government-owned utility is concerned, it is not
clear where the line as to what is state action may be drawn with other
variations of state regulation, protection, and support. 59
The questions left unanswered by the Third Circuit constitute the
natural residue left by the vagaries inherent in the notion of state action
or action under color of state law. While Jackson advanced the continuing
debate by offering a practical delineation of theories drawn from precedent,
it reaffirmed an approach which has consistently led the courts to reach
varying results when given what are not necessarily varying facts. It has
been suggested that a major shift in the substantive law of state action is
needed.6 0 However, absent such new direction from the Supreme Court6'
or from their respective state legislatures, injured public utility customers
will find only limited recourse in the courts.
L. C. MaIm gren
57. See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
58. Utility shutoffs usually involve and have the greatest impact upon the poor.
In connection with constitutional protections for utility customers, it has been noted
that although a due process argument would have a greater chance of success in the
courts than an equal protection argument, "for the poor it would probably only mean
that the utility would be shutoff after a hearing procedure, rather than before."
Shelton, supra note 53 at 767. Cf. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7 (1969).
59. In commenting upon this same problem, a district court in Colorado observed:
"We are troubled by the manifest inconsistency which could result when private utili-
ties are compared to municipally owned plants, especially those owned by home rule
cities in Colorado. Then, of course, half way in between are the rural electrics with
their government financing." Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240, 244 n.4
(D. Colo. 1972).
Confining its holding to private utilities, the Supreme Court in Jackson did
not address this issue. It seems clear from that opinion, however, that in the area
of utility services, future courts are effectively precluded from finding state action
based upon the public function theory. See 95 S. Ct. at 454. See note 46 supra.
60. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposi-
tion 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
61. The Supreme Court's analysis in Jackson was similar to that of the Third
Circuit. It, too, considered the various state action theories independently of each
other and found that the facts did not precisely satisfy the requirements of any one
of them. However, the Court did not review the cumulative impact of all the factors,
each of which, standing alone, failed to establish state action. Critical of this seriatim
approach, Justice Douglas insisted that the Court look to the aggregate weight of
the factors. 95 S. Ct. at 458 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - SECTION 119 - GROCERIES CON-
STITUTE MEALS WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 119 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
Jacob v. United States (1974)
Plaintiff-taxpayer, the director of a mental institution who was re-
quired by his employer to live on the premises and be available 24 hours
a day, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey to recover federal income tax paid in accordance with a de-
ficiency assessment levied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who
had disallowed the plaintiff's exclusion from his gross income of the value
of groceries and non-food items provided by his employer.1 The trial court
ruled the exclusion valid under section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 19542 (Code) which permits the value of employees' meals furnished
by the employer to be excluded from the gross incomes of the employees
who receive them. 3 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that because the
food was provided for the convenience of the employer, and was prepared
for meals which were consumed by the employee at the employer's business
premises, its value was a proper subject for exclusion under section 119
of the Code. In addition, the court held that non-food items furnished by
the employer 4 were also excludable as either food or lodging. Jacob v.
United States, 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974).
Section 61 of the Code defines gross income expansively as being "all
income from whatever source derived . . . ."5 The Supreme Court of the
1. Jacob v. United States, 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff had also
excluded the value of employer-provided lodging which the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue had ruled includable in gross income. The district court decided this issue
in favor of the plaintiff and the Government did not pursue it on appeal. Id. at 1295
n.2. See note 49 infra.
Also, at oral argument, the Government withdrew from appeal the issue of
whether the value of groceries consumed by plaintiff's family, as opposed to groceries
personally consumed by plaintiff, was excludable under section 119 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter the Code]. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119. 493 F.2d
at 1298 n.10. See note 8 infra.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119. The pertinent text of section 119 appears
in the text accompanying note 10 infra.
3. 493 F.2d at 1295. The trial court reasoned that the section 119 requirements
for the exclusion of the value of the meals (see text accompanying note 10 infra)
were met because there was no difference between supplying to the employee groceries
which his wife prepared for family meals, and serving the taxpayer a cafeteria-style
meal (the normal section 119 situation). Jacob v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9212 (D. N.J. 1973).
4. The non-food items included such sundries as soap, napkins, etc. 493 F.2d
at 1295.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a). Pertinent Treasury Regulations expressly
state: "Income may be realized ... in the form of services, meals, accommodations,
stock, or other property, as well as in cash." Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (a) (1957) (emphasis
added). 47
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United States has held that by defining gross income this broadly, Congress
intended to tax all gains except those specifically exempted. 6
One of the exempted items is the value of employees' meals provided by
the employer for the latter's convenience. This exclusion first appeared
in 1919, without benefit of statute, when the Bureau of Internal Revenue
ruled that seamen were not liable for any tax upon the value of board
and lodging provided them by their employers. 7 Known as the "convenience
of the employer" exclusion, a number of cases and administrative rulings
attempted to delineate the criteria for its operation, often with conflicting
results.8 To resolve this uncertainty, Congress in 1954 promulgated section
119,) which provides in pertinent part:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the
value of any meals . . . furnished to him by his employer for the
convenience of the employer . . . if . . . the meals are furnished on
the business premises of the employer .... 10
The section has usually been interpreted to contain a two-part test
for the exclusion of the value of meals: first, the meals must be furnished
6. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955). The holding
in Glenshaw was based upon an earlier version of the Code, Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 22, 53 Stat. 9. Section 61 of the Code superseded section 22 and is as broad in
scope as the latter section. 348 U.S. at 432.
7. O.D. 265, 1 CuM. BULL. 71 (1919).
8. For the detailed history of the development of the "convenience of the
employer" exclusion during the period between its inception in 1919 and its replacement
by section 119 in 1954, see Gutkin & Beck, Some Problems in "Convenience of the
Employer", 36 TAXES 153, 153-60 (1958).
The exclusion's history is important in the instant case with respect to the
uncertain status of the value of benefits received by the employee's family (see note 1
supra). Two cases decided before the passage of section 119, under its regulatory
predecessor, allowed the exclusion of the value of meals and lodging of the wife when
the employer required the employee-husband to live on the business premises in order
to perform his duties. George Lamaze, CCH 1940 STAND. FED. TAX SERV. ff 7232-E,
(B.T.A. Mem. 1940); Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937), petition to review
dismissed, 97 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1938). See also Moulder v. United States, 56--i
U.S. Tax Cas. i" 9195 (W.D. Mo. 1955), wherein the court did not refer to the
"convenience of the employer" test but did allow the exclusion of the value of meals
and lodging provided the wife of a resident hotel manager. Section 119 does not
specifically mention the employee's family and in 1959, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) issued Rev. Rul. 59-409, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 48, which stated that section 119
applied only to benefits furnished to the employee; therefore, the value of meals and
lodging furnished to the wives and children of employees constituted income. Id. at
49. Then, in 1960, this ruling was withdrawn without explanation by Rev. Rul.
60-348, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 41. Since then, the IRS has not established new guide-
lines for the issue. In Jacob the IRS initially contested the issue but abandoned it on
appeal. See note 1 supra.
9. The Congress in passing section 119 stated: "The House and your com-
mittee has [sic] adopted provisions designed to end the confusion as to the tax
status of meals and lodging furnished an employee by his employer." S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
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for the convenience of the employer; and, second, the meals must be fur-
nished upon the business premises of the employer."
The issue of what the definition of "meals" in section 119 should coun-
tenance has rarely been considered under this two-faceted interpretation.
The legislative history of section 119 and the pertinent Treasury Regula-
tions provide little guidance. Congress, in enacting section 119, stated
simply that it applied "only to meals ... furnished in kind."12 The few ex-
amples of exclusion situations given by Congress and the Treasury Regu-
lations place no restrictions upon the word "meals.' u3 Also, judicial inter-
pretation of "meals" is not plentiful - only two cases have considered the
issue. In Charles N. Anderson14 a hotel manager received lodging and a
few food staples, the value of which the tax court held excludable under
section 119.15 Michael A. Tougher, Jr.'6 concerned a government em-
ployee, stationed at a remote island, who deducted the cost of groceries
purchased from the local government commissary.' 7 The Tougher court
disallowed the deduction for the reason that "meals" in section 119 cannot
include groceries.' 8
11. E.g., Charles N. Anderson, 42 T.C. 410 (1964), rev'd on other grounds,
371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
12. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 9, at 190-91; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A39 (1954). The only specific restriction Congress placed upon "meals"
was that the "in kind" language prevented a cash allowance from qualifying. Id. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that one of the situations wherein the "in kind" lan-
guage of the congressional reports has been ignored by the courts is that typified in
the so-called "state trooper" cases. See note 31 infra,
13. For example, one of the exclusion situations given by the Senate Report on
section 119 is :
(1) A civil service employee of a State is employed at an institution
and is required by his employer, for the convenience of the employer, to live and
eat at the institution in order to be available for duty at any time. Under the
applicable State statute, his meals and lodging are regarded as a part of the
employee's compensation. The employee would nevertheless be entitled to exclude
the value of such meals and lodging from gross income.
S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 9, at 191. An example of the Treasury Regulations'
exclusion situation is:
Example (3). A bank teller who works from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. is furnished
his lunch without charge in a cafeteria which the bank maintains on its premises.
The bank furnishes the teller such meals in order to limit his lunch period to 30
minutes since the bank's peak work load occurs during the normal lunch period.
If the teller had to obtain his lunch elsewhere, it would take him considerably
longer than 30 minutes for lunch, and the bank strictly enforces the 30 minute
limit.. The bank teller may exclude from his gross income the value of such
meals obtained in the bank cafeteria.
Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (d), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 45.
14. 42 T.C. 410 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
15. Id. at 418-19.
16. 51 T.C. 737 (1969), aoff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 856 (1971).
17. 51 T.C. at 745-46.
18. The Tougher court stated:
The word "meals" connotes to us food that is prepared for consumption
at such recognized occasions as breakfast, lunch, dinner, or supper, or the equiva-
lent thereof. It does not ordinarily mean a bar of notatoes. a tin of coffee, a box
1974-19751
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As to the requirement of section 119 that the meals be provided for
the convenience of the employer, Treasury Regulations were adopted in
195619 and amended in 196420 to delineate the circumstances under which
the requirement was satisfied. Cases considering the convenience issue have
been decided upon the basis of these regulations.
2 1
The "business premises" requirement of section 119 has generated a
number of judicial decisions concerning exactly what constitutes the "busi-
ness premises" of the employer with respect to section 119. In Commissioner
v. Anderson,2 2 a house owned by the employer which served as the em-
ployee's residence and was located two blocks away from the motel where
the employee worked was held not to be part of the employer's business
premises for section 119 purposes. However, in the so-called "state trooper"
cases, 23 the business premises of the state police were held to encompass
all state roadways and adjacent areas, including roadside restaurants.
In the instant case, in order to include the issue of the definition of
"meals," the Third Circuit interpreted section 119 to embody a test com-
prised of three necessary and distinct elements (instead of the usual two) :
first, the meals are to be furnished by the employer; second, the arrange-
ment must be for the convenience of the employer; and third, the meals
are to be supplied upon the business premises of the employer.
24
Considering the first component of the test, the Jacob court found
that meals had been furnished to the plaintiff by his employer, by reasoning
that groceries were "meals" within the ambit of section 119.25 The Jacob
court, without explanation, chose not to rely upon Charles N. Anderson26
as precedent for an expanded definition of section 119 meals, most probably
because Anderson involved only a relatively small amount of food ($300
worth), and the issue therein of whether the food constituted "meals" was
not specifically adjudicated.2 7 Also the Jacob court, in defining "meals,"
expressly refused to follow the Tougher holding.28 The court believed the
basic purpose of section 119 was to allow an exclusion where meals were
of salt, a can of peas, 10 pounds of flour, a package of rice, a bottle of ketchup,
a jar of mayonnaise, or an uncooked chicken.
Id. at 745. The Tougher court also questioned the taxpayer's deduction under section
119 for the reason that the statute deals only with exclusions from gross income
and not with deductions. Id. at 744.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1, T.D. 6220, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 34 (1957).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1. This regulation, which is the law today, appeared as
Treasury Decision No. 6745, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 42 (1964).
21. E.g., Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685, 687 (1971).
22. 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966).
23. See note 31 infra.
24. 493 F.2d at 1295.
25. Id. at 1296.
26. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
27. The Government in Anderson never argued that the food items provided
were not "meals" under section 119 and the court therein based its decision upon
the assumption that food could constitute "meals." 42 T.C. at 418-19. In agreement
with this reading of Anderson is Michael A. Tougher, Jr., 51 T.C. 737, 746 (1969),
aff'd per curianz, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
28. 493 F.2d at 1296-97. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
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provided for the employer's convenience.2 9 The instant situation, wherein
the employer furnished food which the employee prepared as meals con-
sumed upon the business premises, was deemed analogous to the accepted
practice of the employee's consuming employer-prepared meals.30 For
these reasons, the court opined that "meals" should be construed broadly
enough to allow section 119 to become operative in the Jacob situation if
the convenience criterion were met.3 '
In considering the second part of the test for exclusion, the Jacob
court decided that the groceries in question had been provided mainly for
the convenience of the employer.3 2 Noting that it was primarily a factual
test to be resolved by considering all surrounding circumstances, 3 3 the court
observed that the plaintiff, who was on duty 24 hours a day, was required
to live at the institution, and was often compelled to handle emergencies
during his mealtime.3 4 Treasury Regulations were quoted by the Jacob
29. 493 F.2d at 1296. That the Jacob court's belief as to the basic test of
section 119 was correct is shown by the Senate report accompanying its version of the
statute, which was accepted by the House of Representatives. The Senate report
stated :
Your committee has provided that the basic test of exclusion is to be whether
the meals or lodging are furnished primarily for the convenience of the employer
(and thus excludable) or whether they were primarily for the convenience of
the employee (and therefore taxable).
S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 9, at 19.
30. 493 F.2d at 1296.
31. Id. at 1296-97. The Jacob court referred to the "state trooper" cases as
support for its reasoning that section 119 "meals" should be construed to include
groceries if the convenience test were met. 493 F.2d at 1297. This line of cases in-
volved decisions to the effect that cash allowances to state police for on-duty meals
at roadside restaurants were excludable under section 119. See United States v.
Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199
(8th Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Saunders v.
Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954). Contra. Wilson v. United States, 412
F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969). The Jacob court concluded that while these cases did not
specifically consider the definition of "meals," they represented situations in which
"meals" had been construed broadly. 493 F.2d at 1297.
It is submitted that reliance upon this line of cases by the Jacob court was
misplaced. Whether a meal wvas provided was never an issue in the "state trooper"
cases; instead, the cases decided the-question of what constituted the business premises
of the state police. See, e.g., United States v. Keeton, supra. The courts involved
in these cases held that the "business premises" of the state police encompassed all
state roadways and adjacent areas, thereby including roadside restaurants. See e.g.,
id. at 912. It was concluded that an exclusion under section 119 for the cash allow-
ances was proper because the same result was achieved by the cash allowance as
would have been obtained had the employer provided a cafeteria-style meal: the state
trooper received a prepared meal upon his employer's business premises, which en-
abled him to stay in his patrol area, while the employer controlled the time, place,
duration, and value of the meals for its convenience. See, e.g., id. at 913. This
reasoning cannot be extended to Jacob because the result of the provision of groceries
was a meal which the employee controlled for his own convenience, as to the factors of
time, place, duration, and value. See text accompanying note 46 infra. In agreement
with this analysis is Hipple, New Third Circuit Decision Expands Meals Exclusion
Under Section 119, 40 J. TAX. 330, 331 (1974).
32. 493 F.2d at 1297-98.
33. Id. at 1297, citing William I. Olkjer, 32 T.C. 464, 468 (1959). 51
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court to show that the value of a meal provided in such a factual situation
qualified for a section 119 exclusion.3 5
Finally, the Jacob court held the "business premises" portion of the
section 119 test was met in the instant case, as the employee's residence,
where the meals were prepared and consumed, was located upon the
grounds of the institution.80
It is submitted that the Jacob court's analysis of the definition of
"meals" under section 119 and refusal to follow the Ninth Circuit's holding
in Tougher comported with the provision's policy. In addition to the
reasoning given by the Jacob court for not following Tougher, Jacob is
distinguishable from Tougher in that the grocery arrangement in the latter
case was primarily for the employee's convenience, making section 119
inapplicable.8 1 The taxpayer in Tougher was not required by the govern-
ment to buy his groceries at the government commissary- he did so for
his own convenience.38 It is submitted that his employer gained nothing in
convenience, as the provision of the food did not secure the more continuous
presence of the employee, who was constantly present due to the small
size and remote location of the island.3 9 In contrast, the Jacob employer
was the primary beneficiary of the situation.40
Tougher also differed conceptually from Jacob in that the former case
incorrectly used section 119 in a deduction situation, 41 while the latter
correctly applied it to an exclusion situation.42
35. Id. at 1297-98, quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (a) (2). That regulation provides
in part:
Meals furnished by an employer without charge to the employee, will be re-
garded as furnished for the convenience of the employer if such meals are furnished
for a substantial noncompensatory business reason of the employer. If an employer
furnishes meals as a means of providing additional compensation to his employee
(and not for a substantial noncompensatory business reason of the employer),
the meals so furnished will not be regarded as furnished for the convenience of the
employer. Conversely, if the employer furnishes meals to his employee for a
substantial noncompensatory business reason, the meals so furnished will be
regarded as furnished for the convenience of the employer, even though such
meals are also furnished for a compensatory reason . . . . If the employee is
required to occupy living quarters on the business premises of his employer as
a condition of his employment . . . the exclusion applies to the value of any meal
furnished without charge to the employee on suQ premises.
Meals will be regarded as furnished for a substantial noncompensatory busi-
ness reason of the employer when the meals are furnished to the employee during
his working hours to have the employee available for emergency call during his
meal period. In order to demonstrate that meals are furnished to the employee
to have the employee available for emergency call during the meal period, it must
be shown that emergencies have actually occurred, or can reasonably be expected
to occur, in the employer's business, which have resulted, or will result, in the
employer calling on the employee to perform his job during the meal period.
Id.
36. 493 F.2d at 1298.
37. See excerpt from S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 9.
38. 51 T.C. at 744-45 n.6.
39. See id. at 738.
40. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
41. See note 18 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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An argument to be made against the Jacob definition of "meals" is
that while the congressional and Treasury Regulation examples of section
119 exclusion situations place no express restrictions upon the word
"meals," 43 they refer only to ready-prepared meals, thereby importing the
possible inference that section 119 pertains only to that type of eating ar-
rangement. However, this inference cannot be considered necessarily to
bar "meals" from including something else, for those situations are only
examples, and do not define section 119's specific limits.
As to the Jacob court's treatment of the non-food items as part of the
meals, however, section 119 mentions only "meals," which suggests food,
and it therefore appears that including the value of the non-food items as
part of the meals was contrary to what Congress intended to allow. 44
It is further submitted that the Third Circuit's complete reliance upon
the Treasury Regulations with respect to the second component of their
section 119 test - the meals must be for the employer's convenience -
was somewhat superficial because of the failure to consider the convenience
accruing to the employer from providing groceries versus furnishing the
ready-prepared meals the Regulations impliedly involve.45  The court
should have considered whether the employer actually was convenienced by
the arrangement.
Judge Rosenn, dissenting in Jacob, argued that the grocery arrange-
ment was primarily for the employee's convenience for two reasons: first,
the employee controlled the time, duration, value, and content of the meals,
adjusting them for his convenience, unlike the typical exclusion situation
wherein the employer serves a prepared meal and controls those factors;
second, the Jacob scheme did not actually provide for the more continuous
presence of the employee during mealtimes (thereby conveniencing the
employer), but only during the time the employee normally would have
spent shopping and in that event the employee's wife could have done the
shopping.46 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the arrangement in Jacob
was sufficiently convenient for the employer, although not as convincingly
so as in the usual exclusion situation, to meet the statute's convenience
requirement. The plaintiff's employer gained the more continuous at-
tendance of the plaintiff during mealtimes as the employee probably dined
more frequently in the provided quarters than elsewhere, for reasons of
both convenience and expense.47 The fact that the plaintiff was also con-
venienced by the arrangement does not preclude a section 119 exclusion. 48
43. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
44. In agreement is Hipple, supra note 31, at 331 n.8. Also, it is submitted that
the value of the non-food items was not properly excludable as part of the lodging
because that term within the context of its usual meaning - the Regulations give no
definition of the term - would not seem to include such items as soap and napkins.
45. See note 13 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying note 43 supra.
46. 493 F,2d at 1300-01 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1296.
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The third component of the statute - meals must be served upon the
business premises - clearly was met in Jacob: the house provided the
plaintiff, wherein the groceries were prepared and consumed, was located
upon the grounds of the institution and therefore constituted an integral
portion of the employer's business premises.49
While properly formulating and applying a three-part test for section
119, the Jacob court may have erred in limiting its analysis to the section's
mechanical requirements. The court should have considered the principle
which seemingly underlies the exclusion - that it is unfair to tax an
employee for meals he is forced to accept, particularly when the meals are
substandard and not of the type the employee would normally choose.5 °
That this principle was not satisfied by the instant case is apparent, as
the taxpayer did not receive the usual below-quality institutional meal, but
rather had his choice of groceries with which to prepare his own meals.5 '
Therefore, a section 119 exclusion was unwarranted. A further criticism
which might be made of the Jacob decision is that the court seemingly
failed to apply the general tax policy that every gain is gross income
unless specifically excluded, and its corollary that exclusions from gross
income, being matters of legislative grace, are to be construed narrowly.5 2
The need for a restrictive interpretation is only more compelling when a
court deals with the section 119 exclusion, because it is questionable, given
the statute's apparent thrust, that an employee should go untaxed for the
value of employer-provided meals which relieve him of personal expense
in any situation other than that for which the statute was drawn.53
49. Cases in which similar decisions have been reached upon the issue of what
constitutes business premises are: Gordon S. Dole, 43 T.C. 697, aff'd, 351 F.2d 308
(1st Cir. 1965) (business premises held to include living quarters which were integral
part of business property) ; J. Melvin Boykin, 29 T.C. 813, aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958) (quarters furnished physician on hospital grounds held
to be on business premises), see Anderson v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 59, 64-67 (6th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
The issue of what constitutes the "business premises" of the employer is also
significant if an employer provides his employee with free lodging. If the quarters
are upon the business premises and are provided for the employer's convenience, and
the employee is required to accept them as a condition of employment, the value of the
lodging is excludable from the employee's gross income under section 119. See INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 119. See also Anderson v. Commissioner, supra; Coyner v.
Bingler, 344 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1965). The plaintiff in the instant case received
housing and its value was excluded under section 119. See note 1 supra.
50. Although Congress never stated that this was the underlying consideration
for the exclusion, it may be readily inferred from the nature and history of the
exclusion. See Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955) (where meager facilities
were provided resident employees, value of food and lodging held excludable from
income). See also Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1215, 1220 (1962); cf. 19 ALA. L. REv. 514,
518-19 (1967).
51. See 493 F.2d at 1300 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
52. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) ; United States v. Stewart,
311 U.S. 60, 71 (1940) ; Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1969)
Walling v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 1967).
53. See Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1147, 1153-57 (1967).
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It is submitted the Jacob decision broadened section 119 to include
circumstances in which the employer was not strongly convenienced and in
which the underlying principle of the statute was inapplicable. The apparent
impact of Jacob will be to open a new, attractive area for tax-free com-
pensation of employees by means of the employer's provision of sustenance
without the problems and effort inherent in operating a cafeteria. How-
ever, the ultimate effect of the decision may be limited, due to the un-
certainty caused by the fact that the Internal Revenue Service, although
not seeking certiorari in Jacob,54 has failed to announce its intended treat-
ment of future taxpayer applications of Jacob-type exclusions.
Gerard W. Farrell
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - REVIEWABILITY - SEC RULE PROMUL-
GATED PURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT IHELD IMMUNE FROM DIRECT
APPELLATE REVIEW.
PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC (1973)
Petitioners, the PBW 1 Stock Exchange, Inc. (PBW) and four
brokerage firms 2 trading on the PBW, appealed directly from the promul-
gation of rule 19b-23 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
54. P-H 1974 FED. TAXES 1 61,000.
1. PBW designates Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington. PBW Stock Exch.,
Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 735 n.7 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
2. The four brokerage firms were: (1) Equity Services, Inc., a subsidiary of the
National Life Insurance Company of Vermont; (2) Penn Mutual Securities Cor-
poration, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company;
(3) Connecticut Nutmeg Securities, Inc., operated by and for the State of Connecticut;
and (4) Guardian Advisers, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Guardian Life
Insurance Company of America. Id. at 735.
3. Rule 19b-2 provides, in pertinent part, that
each securities exchange registered with the Commission shall, by rule, require
every member of such exchange to have as the principal purpose of its member-
ship the conduct of a public securities business. A member shall be deemed to
have such a purpose if at least 80 percent of the value of exchange securities trans-
actions effected by it during the preceding 6 calendar months, whether as a
broker or dealer, is effected for or with persons other than affiliated persons ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (a) (1973). "Affiliated persons" are defined as, inter alia, those
who directly or indirectly control or are controlled by the member, or who are subject
to common control with the member, or who are within a certain class of officers,
directors, or shareholders of the member. Id. § 240.19b-2(b).
The effect of the rule will be to limit severely any entity's ability to operate
- "4....4--+;-1 -- +-, " o n hr.po.,, firm Ptnh1kih- hv nne comnanv to
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to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.4 The rule
required all brokers dealing on a national exchange to conduct at least 80
per cent of their business for or with "nonaffiliated persons." 5 The SEC
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,6 contending that neither the
jurisdictional grant in section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19347 (Exchange Act) - being limited to review of orders - nor section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act8 (APA) permitted direct appellate
review9 of SEC rules or regulations. 10
The petitioners' response impliedly conceded that no direct appellate
review of rules or regulations was permitted by section 25(a) of the
Exchange Act," but attempted "to show Rule 19b-2 [was] an order for
handle all of the investments of that particular company. An exchange such as the
PBW that actively recruited "institutional investors" and depended upon these in-
vestors for over 40 per cent of the business transacted on the exchange could be seri-
ously affected by rule 19b-2. See 485 F.2d at 720.
However, the rule goes beyond the mere prevention of some exchanges from
continuing the membership of "institutional investors" which handle only their own
business. Exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, which previously had
not granted membership to "instituitonal investors" in any instance, are required to
admit any such broker as long as 80 per cent of that broker's business is for or with
nonaffiliated persons. Id.
4. 485 F.2d at 719-20.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1973). See also 485 F.2d at 720.
6. 485 F.2d at 721.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1971). Section 25(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission [SEC] in a pro-
ceeding under this chapter to which such person is a party may obtain a review
of such order in the United States Court of Appeals within any circuit court
wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such
court, within sixty days after the entry of such order, a written petition praying
that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-04 (1970). Although petitioners initially contended that
section 10 of the APA provided jurisdiction for their appeal, the court rather per-
functorily dismissed that possibility when it stated:
We note preliminarily that § 10 contains no independent grant of appellate juris-
diction to the court of appeals. Rather, it merely amplifies any jurisdictional
grant to this court contained in the substance of the Exchange Act. Therefore,
our examination must focus upon the terms of § 25(a).
485 F.2d at 721.
The court further noted that the petitioners themselves seemed to concede
that section 25(a) of the Exchange Act was the only relevant jurisdictional grant.
Id. at 721 n.3. See note 11 infra.
9. The term "direct appellate review" refers to circuit court review of agency
action without preliminary hearings in a district court. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)
(1970); 485 F.2d at 722.
10. 485 F.2d at 722. An "order" is an adjudicatory action which applies prior law
and policy to past facts to reach a concrete determination binding upon certain specified
individuals, while a "rule" is legislative in nature and tends to affect in futuro the
rights of individuals in the abstract, leaving to further legal proceedings the concrete
determinations for a particular individual. 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 5.01, at 286-87 (1958). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6) (1970).
11. 485 F.2d at 722. The petitioners seemed to make this concession in that the
only arguments they raised to established jurisdiction attempted to characterize the
promulgated rule as, in essence, an order which would clearly be subject to direct
review under section 25(a). Id.
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purposes of the statute."' 1 2 Granting the SEC's motion to dismiss, the
court held that rule 19b-2 could not be characterized as an order for pur-
poses of section 25(a) of the Exchange Act, and therefore no jurisdiction
existed for direct appellate review of that rule. PBW Stock Exchange, Inc.
v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
The Exchange Act, similarly to the Securities Act of 193313 (Securities
Act), was enacted by Congress immediately following the catastrophic stock
market collapse in the period 1929-33. Congress intended to give the
SEC14 broad power to supervise properly the securities market in order
to prevent any recurrence.' 5 One such power accorded the SEC by the
Exchange Act was that embodied presently in section 19(b) :
The Commission is further authorized . . . for the protection of in-
vestors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such
exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange, by rules
or regulations or by order to alter or supplement the rules of [a
national securities] exchange .... 16
The extent of the SEC's broad power to act by rule or regulation,
granted by Congress in section 19(b), is emphasized by section 2 5(a),
which only allows direct appellate review of SEC orders and makes no
mention of rules and regulations. 17 When Congress specifically discussed
this limitation,' 8 it manifested a desire to limit direct appellate review so
that not every SEC enactment would be subject to the same considerable
12. Id. For the rationale relied upon by the petitioners, see text accompanying
note 23 infra.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
14. The SEC was created by the Exchange Act which required the newly-created
SEC to assume the administration of both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act), the latter having been previously administered by the Federal
Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1970).
15. 485 F.2d at 722.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970) (emphasis added). The SEC must, however, first
proceed informally by requesting the subject exchange to amend its rules itself. Id.
17. Id. § 18y(a). See note 7 supra for the pertinent portion of section 25(a).
18. Congress discussed the limitation in two ways. One submitted amendment
attempted to limit SEC action under section 19(b) (originally numbered 18(b))
to orders and not rules or regulations. Therefore, if section 25(a) remained the same,
only permitting review of orders, and SEC action under section 19(b) could only
proceed by way of order, all action under that section would become directly review-
able by a circuit court. In arguing against the amendment, Representative Lea stated:
The practical question is whether or not the exchange shall be given an appeal
to a court of law from the ruling of the Commission.
It is important that we shall not give the exchanges the right to appeal and
go into court from the action of the Commission in making the rules and regula-
tions. It would subject the Commission to endless harassment.
78 CONG. REc. 8090 (1934) (Remarks of Representative Lea).
The second approach was an attempt to change section 25(a) to permit direct
appellate review of rules and regulations as well as of orders. This approach was
proposed by the New York Stock Exchange before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Commerce, but was rejected. See Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S.
Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and
73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 7568-72 (1934).
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discretion that section 25 (a) vests in the circuit courts to "affirm, modify,
enforce, or set aside" orders.19 The proponents of the limitation argued
that without it the rules and regulations essential to effective SEC function-
ing would be bogged down in the courts.20 Additionally, since orders are
quasi-adjudicatory and rules and regulations are quasi-legislative, 21 Con-
gress felt it reasonable to permit only the order to be directly appealable to
the appropriate circuit court, as any other adjudicated matter normally
would be. A rule or regulation promulgated by the SEC would be treated
as legislation and would be entitled to the same limited scope of review
which is accorded any congressional act. 22
Since the SEC denominated 19b-2 a "rule" in accordance with
section 19(b), then, section 25(a) would seem to deprive a court of juris-
diction as a matter of law. However, petitioners advanced two arguments
that rule 19b-2 was an "order" for purposes of section 25 (a) : "(1 ) because
of its substantive effect upon the business relationships between PBW
and its members; and/or (2) because it was primarily aimed at one ex-
change, the PBW.
' '23
As the basis for their first contention, the petitioners argued that
Columbia Broadcasting System v' United States24 (CBS) and its progeny
established the requisite jurisdiction.2 5 The court, however, was of the
opinion that AF of L v. NLRB, 26 decided 2 years prior to CBS, was the
pivotal case in the area.2 7 In fact, in the court's view, a determinative
factor in its rejection of the petitioners' first contention was the support
that CBS demonstrated for the rule established by AF of L.-8
In AF of L the United States Supreme Court had to determine whether
a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification of a particular
union as a bargaining representative was a "final order" under the National
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970). For expression of Congress' concern, see 78
CONG. REC. 8091-93 (1934) (Remarks of Representatives Sabath & Rayburn).
20. 78 CONG. REc. 8093 (1934) (Remarks of Representative Rayburn).
21. See note 10 supra. As Representative Lea stated during debates on the attempt
to amend section 19(b) :
When we give the Commission the right, by rules and regulations to require
that an exchange shall have a certain rule governing its functions, that is a quasi-
legislative power of Congress. The Commission acts for Congress in establishing
such rule or regulation.
78 CONG. REc. 8091 (1934) (Remarks of Representative Lea).
22. See 485 F.2d at 724. During the debate on the Exchange Act, Representative
Lea, after equating an SEC rule or regulation with a congressional act stated that
"[no one living ever heard of a claim that an interested party should have a right to
restrain the action of Congress in passing laws to regulate the affairs of our country."
78 CoNG. REc. 8091 (1934) (Remarks of Representative Lea).
23. 485 F.2d at 722.
24. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
25. 485 F.2d at 731. Petitioners relied on the following cases that interpreted
CBS: Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 410 U.S. 224 (1973) ; United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Frozen Foods Express v. United
States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
26. 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
27. 485 F.2d at 726.
28. Id. at 726-27.
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Labor Relations Act and therefore subject to direct appellate review.29
Faced with a strong congressional intent to deny reviewability,3 ° the Court
held the NLRB's certification to be immune from direct appellate review.
3 1
The Third Circuit noted that the presence in both AF .df L and PBW
of a similarly emphatic legislative intent to preclude review made the
former's analytical framework clearly relevant to the instant case.3
2
CBS, the case that petitioners had argued was controlling, involved
a challenge to regulations33 promulgated through an order by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) which would have "annulled the
provisions of ... [the petitioner's] contracts with its affiliates and .. .
outlaw[ed] its previous method of conducting business. '3 4 The provisions
for review of FCC action upon which the network relied were set forth
in section 402 of the Communications Act of 1934.35 The version of section
402(a) of the Act then in force had incorporated, and consequently pro-
vided the same scope of review as the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations
Act (UDA).3 6 During the years after the passage of the UDA in 1913, a3
there arose a significant body of case law interpreting its scope of review."
29. 308 U.S. at 404.
30. Id. at 409-11. The Court stated:
The conclusion is unavoidable that Congress, as the result of deliberate choice
of conflicting policies, has excluded representation certifications of the Board from
the review by federal appellate courts authorized by the Wagner Act except in
circumstances described in § 9(d).
Id. at 411.
31. Id. at 411-12.
32. 485 F.2d at 727.
33. 316 U.S. at 408. The petitioners challenged the "Chain Broadcasting Regula-
tions," which required the FCC to refuse to grant or renew a license for any broad-
casting station which entered into certain defined types of contracts with any network
broadcasting organization. Id. See 6 Fed. Reg. 2241 (1941). Essentially, they would
have prohibited chain broadcasting, statutorily defined as any "simultaneous broadcast-
ing of an identical program by two or more connected stations." Id. at 410, quoting
47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1941). These regulations would have effectively eliminated any
national networks. 316 U.S. at 410. Current FCC licensing policy and practice regard-
ing network affiliates appears at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.131 et seq. (1974).
34. 485 F.2d at 727. Because the individual broadcaster's license would not be
renewed if it were to be used in chain broadcasting, local stations were severing their
contractual ties to the petitioner, Columbia Broadcasting Company, in order to obtain
license renewals. 316 U.S. at 408-11. Additionally, no new stations would agree to
sign any agreements with the petitioner so that they could be sure of initial license
acquisition. Id.
35. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093. In 1949, Congress
amended the section to incorporate the standards of review applied to ICC actions.
Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 132, 63 Stat. 108. Then, in 1952, a comprehensive
revision of the section was undertaken. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 14, 66 Stat.
718 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970)).
36. Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219.
37. Id.
38. One of the leading cases decided under the UDA was United States v. Los
Angeles & S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927), wherein it was determined that Interstate
Commerce Commission action could be reviewed under the UDA whether the action
involved "the quasi judicial function of determining controversies or ... the delegated
legislative function of rate making and rule making." Id. at 309.
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Using this case law, the CBS Court determined that only certain types
of orders were directly appealable.8 9 The critical factor in the determination
of appealability was the order's substantive effect upon the parties40 -
how the order affected their rights vis-a-vis each other as well as vis-a-vis
the FCC.41 After examining that effect, the Court concluded that the order
was reviewable under section 402 (a). 42
In PB W, the court rejected the petitioners' argument that this analysis
of substantive effect was the correct procedure to apply in the instant
action. 43 In reaching that result, the PBW court read CBS as turning upon
respect for congressional intent. It said that in adopting the analysis of
the substantive effect approach to resolve the issue of reviewability, CBS
did no more than effectuate congressional intent to incorporate the case
law interpreting the UDA into section 402 (a) .4 4 Since the AF of L de-
cision indicated that strong congressional intent should be followed, 45 the
PB W court concluded that CBS did not alter A F of L, but merely supported
the latter's reasoning.46 The instant court bolstered this conclusion by
noting that AF of L was cited favorably and relied upon by the CBS
Court.4
7
Keeping this respect for congressional intent in mind, the Third
Circuit recognized that the Exchange Act had as one of its purposes the
prohibition of direct review of the SEC's legislative actions. 48 The court
thus concluded that the deference to Congress which AF of L and CBS
mandated required the rejection of petitioners' first contention. 49
In rejecting the petitioners' second contention - that the regulation
was constructively an order because it was aimed primarily at only the
PBW - the court initially referred to the language of section 19(b),
which permits the promulgation of a rule or regulation affecting only one
39. 316 U.S. at 417. For later reference, it is important to note that the version
of section 402(a) in force in 1942, if taken literally, would have permitted all but a
few orders to be reviewable, and that any limitations were imposed only by the case
law developed under the UDA. See 485 F.2d at 728. For a discussion of the signifi-
cance of the case law developed under the UDA, see notes 66-71 and accompanying
text infra.
40. 316 U.S. at 417.
41. If the order was determinative as to the rights of the parties vis-a-vis them-
selves or vis-a-vis the FCC, then the order was reviewable. 316 U.S. at 417-18.
Compare United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299, 309 (1927).
42. 316 U.S. at 418-19.
43. 485 F.2d at 727.
44. Id. at 728.
45. 308 U.S. at 409-11.
46. 485 F.2d at 728-31.
47. Id. at 730-31.
48. Id. at 723-26. Furthermore, Congress enacted the Exchange Act and the
Communications Act of 1934 (which created the FCC) only one day apart. See id.
at 730 n.13. This would seem to add convincing weight to the conclusion that in so
doing it consciously imparted to each statute a different scope of review. Therefore,
the handling of FCC orders in CBS is not necessarily indicative of how SEC actions
should be reviewed. Cf. id. at 731 n.14.
49. Id. at 731. The progeny of CBS, listed in note 25 supra, were similarly dis-
cussed and rejected. Id.
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exchange.50 Since a rule or regulation may affect only one exchange,
petitioners' argument, that because rule 19b-2 was primarily aimed at PBW
it was therefore, reviewable as an order, was easily rebuffed. The court
then noted that, in any event, rule 19b-2, on its face, is directed to and will
eventually affect all 12 of the national exchanges.51 As further reinforce-
ment for its conclusion that rule 19b-2 was not constructively an order, the
court pointed to the inability of an appellate court to resolve the factual
issues presented by allegations that an apparently universal rule or regu-
lation was aimed at one particular exchange. 52 In a concise conclusion,
the court therefore stated:
Our review of the statute and its legislative history convinces us
that Congress intended to insulate rules or regulations promulgated
by the Commission under § 19(b) from direct appellate review in
this court under § 25 (a) of the Exchange Act. Further, we conclude
that applicable Supreme Court precedent binds us to giving full effect
to the Congressional preclusionary intendment. We reject petitioners'
contentions that Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the passage
of this legislation nullified, or even diluted, distinctions between Com-
mission rules and orders for purposes of direct appellate review, in
derogation of the statutory design. Finally, we cannot accept, without
any fact-finding, that as a matter of law, this rule was aimed solely
against the PBW. Nor can we, at this juncture, even conclude that
were this so, this court would thereby acquire jurisdiction under§ 25 (a). 53
Judge Adams' dissented, 54 aiming two primary criticisms at the
majority. First, he thought that section 10 of the APA was improperly
construed by the majority in that they relegated it to an insignificant position
in determining SEC reviewability.55 He contended that section 10 estab-
50. Id. at 732. For the content of section 19(b), see text accompanying note
16 supra.
51. 485 F.2d at 732.
52. Id. Because the court had to add this factor, it seems permissible to draw
the inference that it was not entirely convinced that the initial reason for rejecting
the petitioners' second contention was sufficient. In light of the passage, in 1948, of
the APA with its amplification of existing jurisdictional grants, it is evident that
the court felt it had to rely on more than its statutory interpretation in rejecting
petitioners' second argument. Therefore, the court added this fact-finding problem.
53. Id. at 733.
54. Id. at 733-51 (Adams, J., dissenting).
55. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Adams relied upon statements such as
the following:
[T]he Administrative Procedure Act . . . embodies the basic presumption ofjudicial review to one "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute" . . . so long as no statute precludes relief or the action is not one com-
mitted by law to agency discretion . ..."
Id. at 737, quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
This quotation from Mr. Justice Harlan's majority opinion and his other
language later in Abbott gave Judge Adams his basis for concluding that section 10
of the APA was improperly construed by the majority. See 485 F.2d at 737-38. For
a discussion of the majority's handling of section 10, see note 8 supra.
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lished a presumption of reviewability of all agency action unless "clear and
convincing evidence"50 to the contrary established an opposite legislative
intent with regard to the specific jurisdictional statute in issue.5 7 Judge
Adams felt that most of the legislative history of the Exchange Act cited
by the majority referred to section 19(b) before it was altered by a joint
House-Senate committee, and that therefore the "clear and convincing
evidence" relied upon by the majority did not really exist.58 He was refer-
ring to the fact that in its initial form section 19(b) permitted action only
by rule or regulation, neither of which would be reviewable under section
2 5 (a).59 He construed the legislative history cited by the majority primarily
to involve debates on the question of whether section 19(b) should be
changed to permit action only by order so that section 25 (a) would provide
reviewability,60 or whether section 25 (a) should be changed to permit not
only review of orders but also of rules and regulations."1
The compromise embodied in the version of section 25(a) that
became law granted the SEC discretion under section 19(b) to act by rule
or regulation or order, 2 while still restricting section 25(a) reviewability
solely to orders. 3 It is submitted that as long as the SEC was allowed to
promulgate rules or regulations under section 19(b), that were not review-
able under section 25(a), the change in section 19(b) to also permit the
promulgation of orders would no more than incidentally affect the prior
statements of Congress' intent regarding the scope of review. By giving
the SEC discretion to act by order reviewable under section 25(a) without
contemporaneously changing that section to permit review of rules and
regulations, too, Congress implied no change in its previous intent to pro-
hibit direct appellate review of rules and regulations under section 25 (a).
It is, therefore, difficult to argue with the court's conclusion that the pre-
sumption of reviewability in section 10 of the APA should have played
virtually no role in the disposition of petitioners' claim, given the "clear
and convincing" proof of an opposite congressional intent to restrict direct
review of actions taken by the SEC. 4
Second, the dissent criticized the majority's finding that CBS and its
progeny 5 had little or no precedental value in deciding the case at bar. 6
It is submitted that this second criticism cannot be dismissed as easily as
the first. The language in CBS which Judge Adams excerpted strongly
56. 485 F.2d at 737.
57. Id. at 737-38.
58. Id. at 745-46.
59. Id. at 745.
60. Id. at 745-46.
61. Id.
62. See the text accompanying note 16 supra.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970).
64. See 485 F.2d 721.
65. See note 25 supra.
66. 485 F.2d at 739-41.
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suggested, in opposition to the majority's interpretation that the Supreme
Court therein had actually held
that "regulations which affect or determine rights generally even though
not directed to any particular person ... have the force of law and are
orders reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act." Eschewing
literalism, the Court enunciated the approach that has since guided
most judicial determinations of reviewability: "The particular label
placed upon it by the Commission is not necessarily conclusive, for it
is the substance of what the Commission has purported to do and has
done which is decisive .... ,67
Although it might therefore appear that the majority in the instant
case erred in concluding that CBS was not conclusive in the resolution of
PBW's claim, it is submitted that any interpretation of CBS must be under-
taken with due regard for the fact that its result was dictated by the case
law developed under the UDA. That case law left the examination of the
substantive effect of an order6" as the only method available to limit the
broad grant of reviewability jurisdiction embodied in the UDA.69 Since
the UDA was incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934, the
Supreme Court in CBS said, the case law limitations had been incorporated
as well, and it was therefore required to use the UDA mode of analysis.7 0
No such incorporation occurred when the Exchange Act was enacted.
Instead, there were strong expressions of congressional intent, in both
the wording of the statute and the Congressional Record, that there should
be no direct appellate review of rules or regulations under section 25 (a).71
As a result, the majority appears to have correctly determined that section
25(a) did not grant jurisdiction for direct appellate review of rule 19b-2.
Although it is questionable whether PBW changed existing law, its
impact may still be pronounced. It would appear that the court has adopted
an analytical approach which will allow it accurately to assess the appro-
priate scope of review for any agency action: The initial concern should
be the language of the statute, followed closely by a determination of con-
gressional intent.72 If strong congressional intent is found, then, unless in
contradiction to the statute's plain language, it should be followed. Section
10 of the APA should be used only when the statute and congressional
intent do not clearly indicate the proper scope of review.73
67. Id. at 740-41 (footnotes omitted),
68. See id. at 727-31.
69. See id. at 728, 730.
70. 316 U.S. at 418-19.
71. 485 F.2d at 723-26.
72. This approach adopted the directives of AF of L v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401,
409-11. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
73. 485 F.2d at 721-22. When "clear and convincing evidence" does not exist,
Justice Harlan's directive in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140(1967), should be followed and section 10 will presumptively provide for review.
See note 55 supra.
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Furthermore, the effect of the decision upon stock exchanges situated
similarly to PBW may be substantial. To obtain review of rule 19b-2,
an exchange musi now attempt to bring a declaratory judgment action in a
federal district court. As PBW indicates, 7 4 the Declaratory Judgment
Act 75 was one of the first erosions of the previous limitations upon review
of certain agency action.70 If for some reason, the Declaratory Judgment
Act does not provide the proper remedy, a frequent problem because it
contains only a limited procedural grant,7 7 an exchange may have to choose
to violate the rule in order to challenge it.78 Because exchanges are subject
to severe penalties for violating a rule,79 an opportunity to challenge may
cost more than an exchange is willing or able to pay. This cost may lead
to in terrorem compliance with an SEC rule or regulation which might,
for example, be of questionable validity. However, that effect seems to be
exactly what Congress intended in 1934 when it passed the Exchange Act."°
Subsequent Congresses have seen fit to grant only a slightly more liberal
review by enacting the APA, which the instant court determined does not
apply to PBW, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, whose jurisdictional
granted is limited.8 '
If the Third Circuit has correctly interpreted the congressional intent
behind the Exchange Act and the APA, as it appears it has, it is the task
of Congress, not the courts, to change the scope of review provided by
section 2 5 (a).
Dennis D. Smith
74. 485 F.2d at 725 n.9.
75. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
76. Note, however, that the Declaratory Judgment Act also applies to acts of
Congress so that quasi-legislative SEC action will continue to receive the same pro-
tection as federal legislation. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). See notes 21-22 and accom-
panying text supra.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). See 485 F.2d at 725 n.9. See also Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
78. If PBW violated rule 19b-2, the SEC would be able to penalize it by an order
which would be directly appealable under section 25(a) of the Exchange Act. If
this occurred, the issues raised by PBW's contentions on the merits could be decided.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(d) (1973).
79. For instance, if it were to violate rule 19b-2, PBW could have trading on
its floor suspended for a limited time. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(d) (1973).
80. See 485 F.2d at 725 n.9. See also text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
81. 485 F.2d at 725.
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LABOR LAW - STRIKES AND PICKETING - UNION'S GUARANTEE
AGAINST STRIKES DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
RESULTING FROM AN UNAUTHORIZED STRIKE WHERE UNION USES
BEST EFFORTS TO END IT.
Penn Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 195 (1974)
Employer, Penn Packing Co. (Penn Packing) brought suit against
Local 195 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America (the Union) in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking damages for breach of a no-
strike clause1 in the collective bargaining agreement after members of the
Union had staged a 2-day wildcat strike in response to the discharge of
two of their union stewards. 2 Immediately following the walkout, the dis-
charged union stewards and the officers urged the employees to return to
works but the employees asserted that they would not return until the
stewards were reinstated.4 The company president, however, refused to
rescind his discharge order. The union officers were ableto terminate
the strike on the second day by proposing that the union pay the
salaries of the stewards until an arbitrator had ruled upon the pro-
priety of their discharges.5 The district court rejected the employer's con-
1. Penn Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 195, 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974).
The wording of the clause, which had remained unchanged through successive con-
tracts spanning 25 years, was:
The Union for itself and for its individual members agrees and guarantees that
there shall be no strike, stoppage of work, slowdown, or other interference
with production.
See id. at 890.
2. Id. On behalf of the employees, the stewards of Local 195 had objected to a
foreman's order to begin their lunch break early. The foreman apparently had sought
to minimize loss of production resulting from halted operations following the mal-
function of a conveyor belt. Despite objections by the stewards, the foreman per-
sisted in his order and when the stewards refused to follow the foreman's order, the
company president discharged them, and the walkout followed. The employees did
not return until two days later. Id. at 889-90.
The employer premised his action upon section 301 (a) of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) [hereinafter LMRA] which provides
in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
3. 497 F.2d at 890. Union officers also made two other unsuccessful attempts
to end the walkout later in the morning. Id.
4. Id. The wildcat strike continued in defiance of a restraining order issued by
a district court in the evening of the first day of the walkout. Id. at 889.
5. Id. at 890. The district court found the proposal to pay the salaries of the
stewards to be a novel and unprecedented procedure which finally convinced the
strikers to return to work thereby providing a basis for the district court's factual
determination that the union did use its best efforts to return its members to work.
Id. at 891.
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tention that the no-strike clause rendered the union liable for damages
resulting from unauthorized strikes, and found that the union had only the
duty to use every available means to end the walkout, a duty that had been
fulfilled.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed, holding that the union did not agree to pay for losses from un-
authorized strikes, rather it was committed only to use its best efforts to end
the work stoppage as soon as practicable. The court accepted the District
Court's finding of fact that the union had satisfied its duty. Penn Packing
Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 195, 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974).
A union's promise not to strike has traditionally been regarded as the
quid pro quo for the employer's agreement to arbitrate disputes.7 Courts
have, however, encountered problems in construing the no-strike agree-
ments because of the overlap of these agreements with compulsory arbi-
tration provisions. No-strike clauses added little to the employer's remedies
because their breach would permit the employer to recover damages under
section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19478 (LMRA).
6. Id. at 891.
7. This doctrine was formulated by Justice Douglas in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), and was based upon the history behind collec-
tive-bargaining legislation, particularly section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1970). This doctrine has been embraced in subsequent cases but questioned and rein-
terpreted in others. For example, in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery
Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States noted the
empirical problem that the two agreements were not exact counterweights in every
industrial setting and were not linked together in every case. Id. at 261 n.7. Thus,
the theory of a bargain's consisting of reciprocal promises, may be illusory.
The significance of the doctrine that an arbitration agreement is the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike is that complete effectuation of federal labor
policy of promoting industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agree-
ment (see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra at 454) is achieved when
the collective-bargaining agreement contains both provisions. Id. at 458-59. More-
over, the agreement not to strike assures the employer that the union intends to
abide by the negotiated collective agreement. Congressional encouragement of no-
strike clauses to free employers from disruptions during the life of the contract, is
evidenced by the legislative history of section 301 (a) quoted by Justice Douglas in
Lincoln Mills:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such agreements
do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution of an agreement does
not by itself promote industrial peace. The chief advantage which an employer
can reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninter-
rupted operation during the term of the agreement. Without some effective
method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agree-
ment, there is little reason why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Id. at 454, quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). See note 2 supra. In Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme Court held that a strike called
by a labor union over the discharge of an employee for unsatisfactory work was a
breach of the collective-bargaining contract, because the contract expressly provided
that such disputes were to be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration.
Id. at 105. The union was held liable for business losses caused by the strike, even in the
absence of a no-strike clause. Id. at 105-06. However, the duty not to strike was
implied only on matters covered by the arbitration provision. Id. at 106.
There may be some advantage to an employer in having a no-strike clause even
if a compulsory arbitration provision exists because it may help him to obtain a pre-
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Moreover, although an employer was held to be acting within his pre-
rogative in disciplining and discharging employees who violated a no-strike
clause by participating in a wildcat strike, the right to discharge was a
largely ineffective remedy for an employer's financial losses which were
determined not to be recoverable against individual union members.9 Fur-
thermore, the no-strike clause did not prohibit strikes in response to em-
ployer's unfair labor practices, 10 nor did it prevent employees from striking
if they had already exhausted the grievance procedure. 1 Consequently, in
efforts to interpret no-strike clauses as supplying additional remedies to
the employer in recognition of his concession to arbitrate, several courts
have held that a no-strike clause prohibited unauthorized strikes,12 and
liminary injunction without delay and without a hearing on the merits. Such an
advantage is not an additional remedy or matter of substantive law, rather it is a
procedural improvement of the employer's position.
9. In Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), the Supreme Court
held that union officers and members were not individually liable for damages for
breach of the collective-bargaining contract, but noted that the no-strike clause estab-
lished a standard of conduct the violation of which by employees justified their
discipline or discharge. Id. at 245-46.
10. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In Mastro Plastics,
after the employer discharged an employee because of his organizational activities in
support of the union, the union struck despite a no-strike clause in the contract. Id.
at 273. The Court held that the unfair labor practice provided adequate ground for
the strike and that the no-strike clause did not waive the employees' right to strike
solely against unfair labor practices of their employers. Id. at 284.
11. If a union pursues all of the steps provided in the collective bargaining con-
tract for settlement of grievance disputes and is not required to submit the dispute
to binding arbitration, then the union may strike over the grievance despite a no-
strike clause. This was the result in Forrest Industries, Inc. v. Local 3-436, Int'l
Woodworkers, 381 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1967). The employer had combined three jobs
into two thereby eliminating one position and enlarging the two remaining positions.
The union, after utilizing all of the grievance procedures provided for in the contract,
called a strike. Id. at 146. The court held that the strike was not a breach of
contract, because all of the steps of the grievance procedure were followed. Id. In
Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 268 F. Supp. 545 (W.D. Pa. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 391 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1968), the employees also followed all of the steps
of the grievance procedure, and binding arbitration was not required by the contract.
The court held that the union was then free to strike in support of its grievances
after an adverse decision in the final step. 268 F. Supp. at 546.
12. See, e.g., W.L. Mead v. Teamsters Local 25, 126 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass.
1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 576 (lst Cir.), petition for cert., dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956),
in which the court pointed out that, during negotiations of the collective-bargaining
agreement, the union refused to accept a no-strike clause in its contract, because it
feared that a future wildcat strike would effect a breach of its contract. 126 F.
Supp. at 469. The court distinguished the effect of a no-strike clause from the effect
of a compulsory arbitration clause, and it impliedly construed a no-strike clause as
prohibiting wildcat strikes. Id. at 470. See also Portland Web Pressmen's Local 17
v. Oregonian Publ. Co., 188 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ore. 1960), aff'd, 286 F.2d 4 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1961), in which the individual members of the
union refused to cross picket lines of another union striking against the employer.
The court held that the work stoppage was a violation of the no-strike agreement
which obligated the union members not to strike, not in engage in work stoppages,
and not to refuse to cross the picket lines. 188 F. Supp. at 865-66.
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the factual circumstances in others have seemed to indicate that a union
would be liable for damages in the event of a wildcat strike.'3
The only problem with permitting the employer to recover damages
under section 301 for wildcat strikes was that section 301(b) and (e) of
the LMRA required that a union be held liable only for the acts of its
agents.1 4 In a wildcat strike, there are obviously conceptual problems as
to whether employees who are concededly engaged in unauthorized activities
can act for the union so as to make it liable for breach of its contract. As a
result, some courts approached the issue of a union's liability for damages
arising from unauthorized strikes from the standpoint of whether the
union's actions somehow implicitly authorized the strike.
In United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co.,15 although
the collective-bargaining agreement involved did not contain a no-strike
clause, a wildcat strike was held to be a breach by the union local of the
provision to arbitrate grievances. 16 The international union, .however, was
not held liable for damages, because it had not adopted, encouraged, or
prolonged the unauthorized strike.17 The international union defended
13. See Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962),
which involved a dispute over what constituted an arbitrable controversy and in
which the collective-bargaining agreement contained a no-strike clause and a provision
insulating the union from liability for damages in the case of unauthorized strikes.
Id. at 258-59. Apparently the parties thought that explicit language undertaking
liability was not needed; to the contrary, explicit language of disclaimer was provided
to avoid liability. Id. at 259. The implication of such behavior is that in the absence
of a clause disclaiming liability, the parties probably would have recognized liability
of the union for unauthorized strikes. See also Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259
F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd as modified, 361 U.S. 459 (1960). The court held
the union not liable for spontaneous work stoppage where a no-strike clause had
been eliminated from the contract. 259 F.2d at 351. Previous contracts had included
the no-strike clause along with a compulsory arbitration clause, so that the effect
of eliminating it was to set the union free from liability for wildcat strikes. Id.
Arguably, implicit in this decision is an interpretation of the no-strike clause as
imposing liability on the union for wildcat strikes.
14. Section 301(b) of the LMRA provides:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect
commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents ....
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970).
Section 301(e) provides:
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting
as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for
his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually au-
thorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
Id. § 185(e) (1970).
15. 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
16. 223 F.2d at 877.
17. Id. In Haislip, the court examined the legislative history of the LMRA
and quoted Senator Taft to the effect that sections 301(b) and (e) restored the law
of agency as it had developed at common law and, therefore, avoided the construction
the Supreme Court had given section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106
(1970) in United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947). 223 F.2d
at 878-79. In United Bhd. of Carpenters, the Court had exempted labor organiza-
tions from liability for illeo-al artz cnmm ftto, i" Ih,. A; .+.. ... 4,. .......-I-
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against liability upon both contract and agency principles: not being a
party to the contract, it had not undertaken liability for unauthorized strikes,
and not having influenced or participated in any way in the strike, it could
not be held liable as the principal 18 Influence over members was a pre-
requisite to liability for their acts, and spontaneous work stoppages by
their nature could not imply the union participation sufficient to establish
agency relation. 19
In cases subsequent to Haislip, the union responsibility for its members
was extended so that even a mere failure to take substantial steps to effect
a return to work could constitute sufficient union involvement in the illegal
strike to sustain its liability.20 Failure to command members of the union
to return to work was held to constitute a ratification -of the strike,21 and
acquiescence or condonation of a wildcat strike established union respon-
sibility just as much as encouraging, inducing, or calling the strike.22 As
the representative of employees in collective bargaining, the union was
also held responsible for the mass action of its members. 23
proof" of actual instigation, participation, or ratification by the union. 330 U.S. at 403.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, pointed out that all unions needed to do in the
future to escape liability was to pass a standing resolution disclaiming responsibility
for illegal actions of their officers. Id. at 421 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Congress
corrected this situation by passing section 301(e) (see note 14 supra) which has
been interpreted to impose liability on the union for unauthorized acts of union
officers. Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446, 457 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971). In Vulcan, union officers joined the picket
line in a strike against another plant, but the picket line kept employees from entering
the plant of the plaintiff. 430 F.2d at 450. Under section 301(e), the union officers
were agents for whom the union was responsible, and thus the union was held liable
for acquiescing in and failing to take action against the effect of the picket line which
induced employees not to work. Id. at 457.
18. 223 F.2d at 877, 879.
19. Id. at 877.
20. See, e.g., Adley Express Co. v. Teamsters Local 107, 349 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), in which the employees voted to "take a holiday" until a pre-existing
strike against another company was settled. Id. at 440. The union leadership warned
the members that they would be in violation of the injunction if the work stoppage
continued, but the employees remained on strike for 5 days until the leadership
ordered them back to work. Id. In denying the employer's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of liability for the entire period of the strike, the court noted
that at trial the union would have the burden of demonstrating that it exerted sub-
stantial and sincere efforts to get the men back to work. Id. at 444.
21. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 107, 299 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D.
Pa. 1969). In that case, the union violated a no-strike clause by walking out over
a matter of working conditions, rather than resolving the dispute through the estab-
lished grievance procedure. Id. at 1059. The subsequent failure to command the em-
ployees to return to work was found to be a union ratification of the strike and of
its consequences. Id. at 1060.
22. The requirement of affirmative union conduct to end unauthorized mass
actions of members was probably carried to its furtherest extent in Vulcan Materials
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963
(1971). The international union was held liable for acquiescing in and condoning
an illegal strike and for not taking action which could reasonably have been expected
to effectuate a return to work. 430 F.2d at 457. See note 17 supra.
23. Union responsibility for the mass action of its members apparently was ex-
pressed first in United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), aft'd, 177
F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). The union contended that it 69
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The law of no-strike clauses culminated in Eazdr Express, Inc. v.
Teamsters Union,24 in which the court imposed liability for the employer's
damages upon two locals and the international as a consequence of a wildcat
strike.2 5 Although the international and the locals had expressly disclaimed
liability for unauthorized strikes,2 6 the court found that the unions had
breached the contract by failing to exercise every reasonable means
available to return the strikers to work, a duty which was held to be
implicit in the no-strike clause.2 7 The court decided that the implication of
this obligation was a necessary reading in order to effectuate the policy
had not violated a court order prohibiting the strike and that the men individually had
decided not to work. 77 F. Supp. at 566. The court held the union in contempt,
because a union that is functioning as a union "must be held responsible for the mass
action of its members." Id. at 566-67. This rule was said to be justified as preserving
the unions themselves from destruction and anarchy. Id. at 567.
24. 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973), noted in 19 VILL. L. REv. 665 (1974).
See also Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 249, 376 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa.
1974), where the court's opinion on the issue of damages is reported.
25. Id. at 169. In Eazor, the court found that neither the local officials nor the
international officials authorized or sanctioned the strike. Id. at 161. The court
decided, however, that the wildcat strike was a violation of the collective-bargaining
agreement which provided:
The Union[s] and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike, lock-
out, tie-up, or legal proceedings without first using all possible means of settle-
ment, as provided for in this Agreement [and in the National Agreement, if
applicable] of any controversy which might arise.
See id.
26. The international and the locals had disclaimed liability for wildcat strikes
under the agreement which provided:
Job Stewards and alternates have no authority to take strike action . . . except
as authorized by official action of the Local Union. The Employer recognizes
these limitations upon the authority of job stewards and their alternates and shall
not hold the Union liable for any unauthorized acts.
Id. at 162.
27. Id. at 165. One of the locals had an express duty to use every available
means to end the strike which was contained in one of its supplemental agreements
with its employer. Id. at 163-64. However, since the other local had no such express
duty, the court found it necessary to imply the obligation. Id. at 164. In any event,
the court noted that due to the disclaimer of liability clause (see note 26 supra)
which was present in all the agreements, "any such obligation must be implied with-
out reliance on and quite apart from any principles of vicarious liability." 357 F. Supp.
at 164. By this statement, the court was referring to the theory that a union is liable
for the mass action of its members. Id. at 163 n.7, citing United States v. UMW, 77
F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948) ; Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d
446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971); Colt's, Inc. v. Amalgamated
Local 376, 314 F. Supp. 578 (D. Conn. 1970).
The Eazor court's contractual readings are perhaps questionable. The unions
had disclaimed liability for unauthorized activities, and yet, this disclaimer was the
excuse used to reexamine the contract to imply a new duty which resulted in liability
for the wildcat strike. 357 F. Supp. at 164. The court may have reasoned, however,
that giving full effect to the disclaimer of liability would permit a wildcat strike to
continue indefinitely without placing any onus on the union to take responsibility
to restore peace. The union would be able to refuse to use its influence with impunity
while the employer's losses mounted. This result would contravene the federal labor
law policy of encouraging industrial peace and stability. In effect, the Eazor court
seemed to say that a walkout was no longer unauthorized and that a disclaimer was
ineffective when the union acquiesced in the strike by not using its best efforts to
return the employees to work. See id. at 164, 165.
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underlying federal labor law which emphasized the peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes and avoidance of labor strikes. 28
The Eazor opinion seems to have been the major precedent supporting
the Penn Packing court's interpretation -of the contract, because the latter
court decided that the union did not agree to assume liability for losses
but did undertake, instead, to use its best efforts to end a wildcat strike as
soon as practicable. 29 Unlike the Eazor decision, 0 the Penn Packing opinion
did not point to any explicit contractual language disclaiming the union's
liability for unauthorized strikes. The court instead interpreted the word
"guarantees" in the no-strike clause-" of the contract to mean that the
union was "responsible for fulfillment of the obligation of the employees to
continue to work" by using "best efforts" to terminate the strike, rather
than paying for any loss to the employer from the breach caused by the
unauthorized strike.8 2 The court accepted as not clearly erroneous the
district court's finding of fact that the union in good faith had exercised
every available means to end the work stoppage through the novel and
unprecedented offer by the union to pay the discharged stewards' salaries.33
The court's interpretation of the significance of the word "guarantees"
in the no-strike clause is probably the most difficult aspect of this opinion.
Its assertion that there was responsibility for an obligation, but no dity
to pay for a loss when the obligation had not been performed appears both
inconsistent and inappropriate as a reading of the contract language.
This judgment, however, must be tempered by the principle that courts
do not construe language in collective-bargaining agreements as they con-
strue other contracts. Under section 301 (a) of the LMRA, federal courts
have been authorized to fashion a body of federal law to enforce collective-
bargaining agreements, 3 4 and the common law of contracts is not neces-
sarily applicable to these agreements.3 5 Federal courts will give effect to
28. Id.
29. 497 F.2d at 891.
30. See notes 26 and 27 supra.
31. See note 1 supra.
32. 497 F.2d at 891.
33. Id.
34. The Supreme Court in ordering specific performance by a union of an arbi-
tration agreement in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), said
"that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Id. at 456.
35. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co. 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
where the Court ordered an employer to arbitrate a union grievance over the em-
ployer's contracting out maintenance work, even though a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement exempted from arbitration matters which were strictly manage-
ment functions. Id. at 584-85. The Court stated:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the
parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad
of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. The collective agree-
ment covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new com-
mon law - the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.
Id. at 578-79 (citation and footnote omitted). See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Am. Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n, 293 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 414
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state laws that coincide with the federal labor policy of promoting industrial
stabilization, but laws conflicting with this aim will be subordinated to the
federal policy.86 Thus, collective-bargaining agreements are unique con-
tracts requiring interpretation that fulfills the objective of achieving indus-
trial peace.8 7
If the Penn Packing court did construe the contractual language in
light of federal labor policy, the approach, at least, was not made explicit.
To permit employees to engage in wildcat strikes and not to hold the union
liable unless it fails to use every reasonable means available to return the
employees to work does not appear to be a rule of law promoting industrial
peace to the fullest possible extent. If unions were liable for wildcat strikes
from their inception, they would be encouraged to put pressure upon their
members so that they would refrain from walkouts and, therefore, resort
instead to the arbitral process. Unions would not only use all available
means to return strikers to work but would use all available means to prevent
a walkout. Since federal labor policy would seem to mandate the rule of
law forestalling disruptions, there was little justification for the court's
departure from an ordinary interpretation 8 of the language guaranteeing
that there would be no strike. I
The Penn Packing court reached its result apparently by reading the
Eazor opinion liberally. The Eazor decision was not clear as to whether
an obligation to use every reasonable means to end a strike was to be
implied in all no-strike clauses or, instead, only in the rare situation where
a disclaimer of liability for unauthorized strikes was conjoined with a
no-strike clause,8 9 Nevertheless, the Penn Packing court read this con-
F2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1969), where the court stated that "[rlecent developments in the
law of collective bargaining . . . make clear that a collective bargaining contract is
not necessarily governed by common law principles." 293 F. Supp. at 1402.
36. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Court said
that state law will be resorted to so as to effectuate best the federal policy. Id. at 457.
37. The collective-bargaining agreement was read in light of the federal policy
of promoting industrial peace and stability in Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The court said that the
sources of law to be applied to collective-bargaining agreements are the express
provisions of the national labor laws, the basic policies underlying these laws, state
laws if compatible with federal policy, and traditional contract law. Id. at 55 (cita-
tions omitted).
38. The Eazor court quoted the following language in support of its construc-
tion of contractual language:
[C]ourts cannot make contracts for the parties, and can declare implied obliga-
tions to exist only when there is a satisfactory basis in the express provisions of
the agreements which make it necessary to imply certain duties and obligations
in order to effect the purposes of the parties. Before an obligation will be implied
it must appear from the contract itself that it was so clearly in the contemplation
of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it, and therefore omitted
to do so, or that it is necessary to give effect to and effectuate the purpose of the
contract as a whole.
357 F. Supp. at 164, quoting Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 524 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972), quoting Refinery Employee's Union v. Continental
Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723, 731 (W.D. La. 1958), aft'd, 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
39. See 357 F. Supp. at 163 n.7, 164.
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struction as applying to all no-strike clauses. 40  Perhaps, in light of the
unusual facts4' and the originality of the Eazor opinion, the Penn Packing
court should have reexamined the basis for implying a duty to use every
reasonable means to end a strike. Since there is so little case law on no-
strike clauses, a reconsideration of the reasons for such a reading of no-
strike clauses would have provided helpful guidelines for the future. The
reasons offered by the Razor court for 'the new interpretation included
the avoidance of labor strikes, the promotion of industrial peace and stability,
and the effectuation of peaceful resolution of disputes through arbitration.42
All of these policy judgments point to a rule of law encouraging the earliest
possible end to industrial strife and discouraging future unauthorized
stoppages. Imposition of liability upon the union for damages caused by
the wildcat strike from its beginning to its end would be a rule conforming
to these federal labor policies.
The possible effect of deterring or encouraging wildcat strikes appar-
ently did not merit comment by the Penn Packing court. The court's in-
terest lay in the added burden of liability for wildcat strikes.43 By using
the language of the Eazor rule but ignoring its policy rationale,44 the Penn
Packing court was able to discover an escape from imposing on' unions
what appeared to be a heavy undertaking and great risk of liability for
unauthorized strikes. The Eazor court was not disposed to relieving unions
of risks undertaken in the collective bargaining contract.45 The Razor
opinion, therefore, was used more in form than in substance.
The rule of law set down by the court in Penn Packing is problematical
as a guide to labor-management relations because of its indefiniteness.
Because liability is decided only subsequently, on a case-by-case basis,
neither the union nor the employer will know which party will ultimately
bear the loss during the crucial first moments of the walkout. Factual de-
terminations as to whether the union actually made its best efforts and
used every reasonable means are likely to be difficult and involve accusations
by employers of union foot-dragging and covert encouragement of the strike.
40. 497 F.2d at 891.
41. The unusual facts in Eazor were the no-strike clause coupled with a dis-
claimer clause. The two provisions served to cancel each other in their application to
the wildcat strike involved in Eazor. See notes 25-27 supra.
42. 357 F. Supp. at 165.
43. The court stated, "It is most unlikely that a union would shoulder such a
large risk without clearly stating its intention to do so." 497 F.2d at 890-91.
44. Id. at 891.
45. 357 F. Supp. at 164-65. The Penn Packing court distinguished Eazor on the
basis that in that case, the union had either sanctioned, approved, or incited the wild-
cat strike. 497 F.2d at 891. However, the Eazor court found that the strike was not
authorized or sanctioned by local officials or International officials. 357 F. Supp. at
161. Liability of the unions was based, instead, on the failure to use the many resources
available to return the strikers to work. Id. at 167. Similarly, in Penn Packing the
trial court found that the union did not sanction, approve, or incite the strike. 497 F.2d
at 891. Hence, the court's attempt to distinguish Eazor on the basis that union action
was the cause of the work stoppage appears to be a misreading of the Eazor opinion.
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A rule of such indefinite application invites its own violation and acts as
only a slight deterrent to labor disruptions.
Arguably, the rule more easily applied and 'enforced would be one
authorizing the imposition of complete liability upon unions for wildcat
strikes regardless of the union's later conduct. A union that knows it will
be liable for an employer's losses in this situation will probably not only
make best efforts to return employees to work, but will also be encouraged
to remedy conditions leading to the walkouts. Union efforts made after the
strike has commenced neither justify the strike nor repay the losses.
Since unions have previously been held liable for mass actions of mem-
bers in the absence of disclaimers of liability for unauthorized acts, 46 a rule
prescribing total union liability for wildcat strikes is not in general un-
thinkable, Draconian, or statutorily precluded. The union does claim to
represent the employees in collective-bargaining, so it must bear the con-
sequences and responsibilities of its assurances. 47 A union which contracts
not to strike and then cannot deliver the support of its members ceases to
be their effective representative. As a matter of agency law, 48 unions should
be held liable if their members fail to fulfill the agreements made for them
by their representatives. Only by a conceptualistic perversion of agency
principles may it be argued that wildcat strikes are not union actions in
breach of a contractual duty not to strike.
One result of the Penn Packing decision is to give an added degree
of judicial sanction and protection to wildcat strikes. While good reasons
for protecting and preserving the wildcat strike may exist, 49 no considera-
tion of such justifications was advanced or suggested in the court's opinion.
Indeed, the federal labor policy arguments made by the Eazor court, that
both peaceful resolution of industrial disputes and union responsibility
should be promoted,50 seem contrary to any attempt to justify or to pro-
tect this unpredictable and volatile source of industrial strife.
Arbitration and grievance procedures are available to employees, 51 and
their use should be encouraged by eliminating the potential for outbreaks
of wildcat strikes. If grievance procedures are inadequate for dealing with
the causes of wildcat strikes, 52 then the procedures should be changed, not
46. See Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 357 F. Supp. 158, 163 n.7
(W.D. Pa. 1973) and cases cited therein.
47. Id. at 164-65.
48. See note 17 supra.
49. See Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and
Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 751, 792 (1973).
50. 357 F. Supp. at 165.
51. If arbitration and grievance procedures are not available, then the question
of liability for wildcat strikes occurring over grievance disputes is moot.
52. See Atleson, supra note 49, in which it is suggested that wildcat strikes
arise from "grievances" that workers believe the union will not consider sufficiently
important to invoke grievance procedures or that will not be satisfactorily dealt with
during these procedures. Id. at 802. Thus, the procedures provided for employee
grievances may be felt by the employees to be inadequate for dealing with the causes
of wildcat strikes. Id. at 803.
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the law of collective-bargaining agreements. Although both employer and
union should seek to solve grievances before they cause disruption, the
union should bear the loss of their failure to perform, because it is the party
that undertakes not to strike. A contrary argument based on the inevitability
of some spontaneous disruptions should not provide a justification for
relieving unions of this liability. Even if small problems are inevitable,
they need not cause large disruptions. If alienation of employees is the
concern, it is not likely to be palliated by allowing them the luxury of a
few walkouts each year. Getting to the heart of employee grievances can be
accomplished by quiet voices of arbitration, a method preferred by federal
labor policy,53 as well as or better than by loud ones on picket lines.
Consequently, if the alternative rule of complete liability for wildcat strikes
will serve the purpose of discouraging disruptions and will not require too
much of human nature, then it is a rule devoutly to be desired.
Perhaps the most positive consequence of the Penn Packing decision
is that, when viewed alongside the example of union conduct presented in
Eazor, unions will have some standard for evaluating their actions as to
whether they have made sufficient efforts to terminate a wildcat strike to
enable them to avoid liability. In the long run, the Penn Packing decision
will also provide one more issue for negotiation between union and em-
ployer: a no-strike clause with or without an express undertaking of liability
for unauthorized strikes. 54 Hopefully, unions and employers will sign con-
tracts that more clearly express their intent as to whether the union will be
liable for unauthorized work stoppages or only for authorized strikes. The
wisdom of Penn Packing will then be judged by the new no-strike clauses
to be written.
John Keir
53. See note 7 supra.
54. If the Penn Packing decision represents a trend in construction of no-strike
clauses, employers may no longer be willing to settle for no-strike clauses in exchange
for arbitration agreements. No-strike clauses that do not guarantee a stability to
operations do not give an employer what he wants. The bargain envisioned by Justice
Douglas in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), therefore, may
break down as a consequence of judicial decisions relieving unions of their under-
takings. See note 7 supra.
1974-1975]
75
Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - REVIEWABILITY OF JEOPARDY TAX
ASSESSMENT - DISTRICT DIRECTOR'S IMPOSITION OF JEOPARDY As-
SESSMENT UNDER SECTION 6861 REVIEWABLE WHEN COMPLAINT
ALLEGES SOLE REASON FOR ASSESSMENT IS TO HARASS AND COERCE
FOR NONTAX PURPOSES.
Sherman v. Nash (1973)
Taxpayers Donald and Marcia Sherman brought suit to enjoin a
jeopardy assessment imposed by the District Director of Internal Revenue
(District Director) pursuant to the provisions of section 6861 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 19541 (Code). The complaint alleged, inter alia,
that the jeopardy assessment was working a financial hardship upon Mr.
Sherman and his family and that the assessment was arbitrary, unjustified,
and imposed solely to harass and coerce the plaintiffs.2 In April, 1971,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had sent a notice of deficiency and
a demand for payment of income taxes,3 together with notice that it had
seized the Shermans' home and cars, and had levied upon their bank
accounts.4 Following the receipt of these notices, the Shermans petitioned
the Tax Court for a redetermination of their liability5 and filed a claim
1. Section 6861 (a) provides:
Authority for making. If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assess-
ment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeopardized
by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213(a), immediately
assess such deficiency (together with all interest, additional amounts, and additions
to the tax provided for by law), and notice and demand shall be made by the
Secretary or his delegate for the payment thereof.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6861 (a).
2. Sherman v. Nash, 488 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1973). To support the latter
allegation, plaintiffs argued that the IRS was assisting the Justice Department in an
effort to coerce Mr. Sherman into appearing before a grand jury investigating criminal
activities in Hudson County, New Jersey. Id.
3. The IRS is required to send such notices by section 6861(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), which provides:
Deficiency letters. If the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice in respect
of the tax to which the jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed under section
6212(a), then the Secretary or his delegate shall mail a notice under such sub-
section within 60 days after the making of the assessment.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6861(b).
4. 488 F.2d at 1082. Following a jeopardy assessment, the IRS may levy upon
the taxpayer's assets under the authority of section 6331(a) of the Code which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
If the Secretary or his delegate makes a finding that the collection of such tax
is in jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be made
by the Secretary or his delegate and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax,
collection thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period
provided in this section.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(a).
5. Under ordinary circumstances - i.e., where the District Director does not
believe that the assessment or collection will be jeopardized by delay - the IRS will
first send a deficiency letter as required by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6212, informing
the taxpayer that it considers his taxes deficient. The taxpayer then has the right by
virtue of section 6213 of the Code to petition the Tax Court within 90 days for a
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with the District Director for abatement of the jeopardy assessment.6
With the redetermination action pending, and having received no response
to their abatement claim, the Shermans brought the instant suit in the
federal district court.7 The district court dismissed" the case, holding that
it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the District Director.8
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded
the case, holding that the allegations in the Shermans' complaint that the
sole reason the IRS imposed the jeopardy assessment was to harass and
coerce them was sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether it would enjoin the jeopardy assessment under section 6213
of the Code. Sherman v. Nash, 488 F.2d 1081:.(3d Cir. 1973).
The district court's refusal to accept jurisdiction of the Shermans'
action was a natural product of the statutory and case law governing
jeopardy assessments. 9 Since 1867, there has been a federal statute pro-
hibiting suits to enjoin the assessment or collection of any tax.10 The statute
has remained virtually unchanged and presently exists within the Code as
section 7421.11 Since the inception of this prohibition, the Supreme Court
redetermination of his liability, during which time no assessment or levy may be made.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
Section 6213(a) provides in pertinent part:
Within 90 days . .. after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is
mailed ... the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermina-
tion of the deficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section 6861 no assessment
of a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A or B or chapter 42
and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or
prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expira-
tion of such 90-day ... period ... nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax
Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 7421(a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of
such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined
by a proceeding in the proper court.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. 488 F.2d- at 1082. There is no statutory procedure for a taxpayer to contest
the validity of a jeopardy assessment or even to request its abatement. The IRS does,
however, have the discretionary power to remove the jeopardy assessment, under section
6861(g) of the Code:
The Secretary or his delegate may abate the jeopardy assessment if he finds thatjeopardy does not exist.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6861(g) (emphasis added).
7. 488 F.2d at 1082-83.
8. Id. at 1082. The district court opinion was unreported.
9. For an excellent summary of the statutory and case history of jeopardy assess-
ments, see Note, Jeopardy Assessment: The Sovereign's Strangehold, 55 GEo. L.J.
701 (1967). For a thorough judicial review of jeopardy assessments, see Schreck v.
United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969).
10. Note, supra note 9, at 708.
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a). Section 7421(a) provides:
Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and(b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person
is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
77
Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
has construed it quite strictly.12 This interpretation gave rise to the so-
called pay and sue doctrine, whereby the taxpayer is required to pay the
tax demanded by the Treasury Department prior to challenging the deter-
mination of his tax liability.13 With the inauguration of the federal income
tax, the harsh impact ,of the pay and sue doctrine prompted Congress to
establish the Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court) where the tax-
payer could contest.the IRS's determination before paying the tax. 1 4 Con-
gress also provided, through what is now Code section 6213(a), for the
enjoining of any attempt to collect such taxes during the pendency of the
Tax Court action.15 Apparently recognizing that there would be circum-
stances where the interest of the Government in securing its tax revenue
should prevail over the individual's right to prior judicial review, Congress
enacted an exception to section 6213.16 That exception is today embodied in
section 6861, and gives the IRS the power immediately to assess a tax de-
ficiency where it believes the assessment or collection will be jeopardized by
delay. 17 Since the statute provides no hearing procedure for the taxpayer
to dispute the assessment, the taxpayer's only effective recourse is to seek
injunctive relief in a federal district court.' 8
Both historically and structurally, section 7421 is the reference point
to which courts turn in deciding whether to entertain a suit to enjoin an
assessment or collection by the IRS. Section 7421's prohibition against
injunctions is, on its face, broad and unambiguous, yet it specifically excepts
section 6213, the Tax Court redetermination procedure, from its operation,
thereby permitting courts to issue injunctions to enjoin the assessment or
collection of income, estate and gift taxes. 19 However, the section 6861
jeopardy assessment procedure is an exception to -section 6213. Accord-
ingly, when the IRS ostensibly has acted under section 6861, the courts
which have addressed the issue have consistently held that the taxpayer
12. E.g., Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962); Bailey'v.
George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922) ; Snyder v. Marks, 109. U.S. 189 (1883). It was not until
1916 that the Court recognized the' possibility that equitable' relief from the operation
of the statute might be granted. Note, supra note 9, at 709, citing Dodge v. Osborn,
240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916).
13. 488 F.2d at 1083.
14. See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Md. 1969), citing
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924)., ..
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954; § 6213(a). See note 5 supra.
16. Revenue Act of 1926, § 279(a), 44 Stat. 59, as amended, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 6861.
17. See note 1 supra. The IRS may assess the tax and levy upon the taxpayer's
property before any judicial review is afforded the taxpayer. See note 4 supra.
However, it is prohibited from actively selling any sucli property if the taxpayer
makes a timely petition for a redetermination of his liability. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 6863(b) (3).
18. The Code purports to provide two other remedies: A taxpayer may request
an abatement (see note 6 supra) ; or collection may be stayed if the taxpayer posts an
adequate bond. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6863 (a). However, abatement is wholly
discretionary (see note 6 supra), and the chances of the taxpayer's obtaining a bond
appear slight when he has been deprived of his assets by the assessment. Therefore,
these two remedies appear to be largely illusory.
19. See notes 5 & 11 supra. '
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cannot avail himself of the right to injunctive relief provided by section
6213.20 With this road closed, the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer'mlst di-
rectly confront the injunction prohibition of section 7421 and attempt to
meet the tests which the Supreme Court has fashioned to determine if
equitable relief is possible despite section 7421.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed itself directly to the
question of the reviewability of the District Director's imposition of a
jeopardy assessment under section 6861, the Court's attitude toward section
7421 is well summarized in two cases - Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine
Co. 2 1 and Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.2 2 In granting
injunctive relief in the Standard Nut case, 28 the Court found that although
the statute2 4 prohibiting such suits was applicable,
[I]n cases where complainant shows that in addition to the illegality
of an exaction in the guise of a tax there exist special and extraordinary
circumstances sufficient to bring the case within some acknowledged
head of equity jurisprudence, a suit may be maintained to enjoin the
collector.2 5
While Standard Nut required plaintiff to establish both "illegality"
and "special and extraordinary circumstances," it is generally recognized as
the most liberal view which the Court has taken in interpreting section 7421
and its forerunners. 20 In 1962, the Court narrowed the possibility of en-
joining a tax assessment or collection when it decided Enochs.27 In denying
a suit for injunctive relief the Court refined the illegality requirement of
Standard Nut by mandating that a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection
of a tax may be maintained only if it is "apparent, that under the most
liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its
20. E.g., Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1967) ;
Licavolic v. Nixon, 312 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1963); Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 264 F.2d
158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 839 (1959); Lloyd v. Patterson. 242 F.2d 742
(5th Cir. 1957); Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
827 (1954).
21. 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
22. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
23. 284 U.S. at 510-11. Plaintiff manufactured a product from vegetable oils
which he sold in competition with margarine. Plaintiff's profit margin was 3 cents
per pound, and he had relied upon previous court decisions and Treasury rulings that
a 10 cents per pound margarine tax was not applicable to his product. The collection
of the tax for prior years, which the IRS sought, would have proved ruinous to the
company. Id. at 503-06.
. 24. Revenue Act of 1928, § 604, ch. 852, § 604, 45 Stat. 873, as amended, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421.
25. 284 U.S. at 509.
26. See Note, supra note- 9, at 710-12; Kaminsky, Administrative Law and
Judicial Review of Jeopardy Tax Assessments Under the Internal Revenue Code,
14 TAX L. REv. 545, 551-54 (1959).
27. Plaintiff provided boats and supplies to commercial fishermen. In return, the
fishermen would customarily sell their catch to plaintiff. Believing that the IRS con-
sidered him an employer for purposes of social security and unemployment taxes, and
fearing that an attempt to collect back taxes would destroy his business, plaintiff
sought an injunction to prohibit any such collection. 370 U.S. at 2-4. 79
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claim .28 After Endc~s it appeared'that an assessment .or collection
other than' those within.section 6213 could be enjoined only where the
taxpayer showed .both the substantive illegality of the taxaid special and
extraordinary circumstances.2 9 The Court's inclination to deny equitable
relief in cases where section 7421 was at issue led most courts which ad-
dressed the question to the conclusion that the imposition of a jeopardy
assessment was .viritually unreviewable.30
Such was.the judicial climate when the Third Circuit decided lannelli
,Long, wherein plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the IRS
from seizing or selling'their property to satisfy jeopardy assessments im
posed upon them f6r allegedly failing to pay federal wagering taxes.8 2
While denying relief, the court recognized the possibility of enjoining a
jeopardy assessment without the previously required showing of either
substantive.illegality or special and extraordinary circumstances when it
said:
[S]ection [7421] presupposes a bona fide attempt of the government
to collect revenue. Therefore, if a levy on property is in formal guise
an effort tocollect taxes but in fact is only a device for harassing and
punishing a wrongdoer without honest anticipation that the levy
may yield money owed for taxes, it is arguable that a suit to restrain
the tax collector's enterprise is not in-reality a suit to restrain the
collection of taxes. Accordingly, it is relevant to consider whether we
have here a bona fide effort to collect revenue5 3
Although the lannelli court found a bona fide attempt to collect taxes,34
its approach and the above language foreshadowed 'the instant decision.
The Shermans, taking up the logical thread of Iannelli, alleged in their
complaint that the jeopardy assessment imposed upon them was "arbitrary
and unreasonable, lacking any justification and imposed solely to harass
and coerce plaintiffs for improper purposes. 35 The instant court's opinion
clearly found that the district court did have subject matter 'jurisdiction to
review the IRS' actions in order to determine the threshold issue of
28. Id. at 7.
29. E.g., Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793, 797-99 (8th
Cir. 1967) ; Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1964).
30. See note 20 supra. In two recent cases of jeopardy assessments imposed under
section 6862 of the Code, the companion section to 6861, dealing with taxes other than
income, gift, or estate taxes, the courts, while reiterating the Standard Nut-Enochs
doctrine, indicated that an arbitrary and capricious assessment- might meet the Enochs
requirements. Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973); Pizzarello v.
United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).
31.. 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973).
32. Id. The tax in lannelli was other than an income, gift, or estate tax. Conse-
quently the jeopardy assessment was imposed under section 6862. See note 30 supra.
The pay and sue doctrine is still operative for "other" taxes since the "litigate first,
pay later" theme of section 6213 is applicable only to income, estate, and gift taxes,
and taxes upon private foundations.
33. 487 F.2d at 318.
34. Id.
35. 488 F.2d at 1083.
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whether the IRS had exceeded its authority under section 6861 by imposing
a jeopardy assessment that was not a bona fide attempt to collect revenue
but rather a means to harass the taxpayer or to exert pressure upon him
for nontax purposes. If the IRS had so exceeded its authority, then the
assessment was not authorized under section 6861, and the district court
could rely upon the jurisdiction given it in section 6213 to enjoin the
collector.A0
The Third Circuit was quick to limit the'.scope of its holding by
pointing out that the district court did not have jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the facts underlying the IRS' belief that jeopardy existed.37
However, the court noted that the IRS must actually have "believed"
that the collection was in jeopardy in order for the assessment to be a
good faith effort to preserve revenue . 8
The Third Circuit's willingness to give the jeopardy-assessed tax-
payer a chance to be heard by allowing courts to entertain the initial
question of whether the IRS had exceeded the authority of section 6861
makes Sherman unique among jeopardy assessment cases. Without show-
ing either the illegality of the tax or special and extraordinary circumstances
as required by Enochs, the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer may bring before
this court the threshold question of the District Director's good faith in
36. Id. at 1083-84. Inherent in the Sherman court's position was the assumption
that the district court could review the action of a governmental body to determine
if it was within prescribed statutory and constitutional confines. It is this general
power together with specific powers of section 6213 which would permit the district
court to entertain the threshold question and to enjoin the assessment.
By relying specifically upon section 6213, the instant court did not carry
Iannelli to its ultimate conclusion. Section 6213 applies only to taxes upon income,
gifts, estates, and private foundations; therefore, the Sherman rationale is unavailable
in other tax areas, such as the wagering tax in lannelli. Iannelli suggested that a jeop-
ardy assessment could be enjoined where there was not a bona fide attempt to collect
taxes, simply because the action would not be statutorily authorized. 487 F.2d at 318.
37. 488 F.2d at 1084. Judge Van Dusen disagreed with the imposition of even this
limited review. His dissent proceeded along two levels: At one, he considered the
majority view contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Enochs since there was
no showing of either illegality or extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 1085 & n.1
(Van Dusen, J., dissenting). At a more pragmatic level, he suggested that no matter
what other motives might have prompted the jeopardy assessment, the record indicated
that there was ample justification for its imposition. Id. at 1086. Judge Van Dusen
appeared willing to accept the rationale of lannelli, but regarded the motives of the
IRS as largely irrelevant, and he would limit jurisdiction to those cases where there
was clearly no jeopardy. Id. at 1085-86. According to the majority, even if the collec-
tion were in jeopardy, an injunction would presumably be available if the IRS had
not acted in good faith. Id. at 1083-84.
38. Id. at 1084. The court took cognizance of the interagency collaboration
present in the Shermans' case when it noted that jeopardy assessments "may have a
myriad of incidental effects on a taxpayer, some of which may beneficially inure to
other departments of government." Id. In adding that the IRS' actions were shielded
from injunctions by section 7421 as long as it acted "from a good faith concern that
its revenue interest [was] in jeopardy," the court was apparently acknowledging the
machinations of the federal agencies but still requiring the IRS to act upon its own
initiative, not that of another agency. Id. 81
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making the jeopardy assessment.89 By specifically recognizing a taxpayer's
limited right to contest a jeopardy assessment, the Third Circuit has pro-
vided a partial remedy for what many commentators have considered a
severe weakness of section 6861 - the absence of any judicial review
either before or after a taxpayer's property is seized.
4 0
The Sherman court's approach was significant in two respects. First.
the court treated sections 7421 and 6213 upon an equal footing, by making
section 6213 the primary statute in the area of income, gift, and estate
taxation, while section 7421 governed in other tax areas. By shifting the
focus away from section 7421, and recognizing that there was a preliminary
issue of the IRS' authority to act under section 6861 the court extricated
this jeopardy assessment case from the jurisdictional entanglements of
section 7421 and En'chs. The court's position would appear to be justified
for a number of reasons.
Most conspicuously Enochs did not involve a jeopardy assessment;
hence, in that case the Supreme Court was not presented with the possibility
of reviewing the District Director's actions under section 6861.41 There is
also the argument that section 6213 establishes the fundamental right to
judicial review prior to assessment or collection of income, gift, estate or
private foundation taxes and that section 6213 was intended to restrict the
pay and sue doctrine of section 7421 to other tax areas.42 Since section
6861 applies only to the assessment of the above taxes, the logical con-
clusion is that any inquiry should proceed from the premise that the tax-
payer has the right to prior judicial review of the finding of jeopardy, rather
than from the contrary premise of section 7421. 4 3
The second significant aspect of Sherman is that the court viewed
the imposition of the jeopardy assessment as the decision of an administra-
tive body, limited by the statute which defined its authority and subject to
scrutiny by the federal courts. While the majority did not sanction any
review of the findings of fact, the use of the terms "arbitrarily" 44 and
"exceeded its statutory authority" 45 indicated that the District Director's
actions were reviewable within established administrative law guidelines to
the extent that they might be arbitrary and capricious or ultra vires.4 6
39. Because the instant court relied upon section 6213 for jurisdiction, Sherman's
.holding appears to be limited to jeopardy assessments of income, estate, gifts, and
private foundation taxes. See notes 30, 32 & 36 supra.
40. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9; Kaminsky, supra note 26; Hochman and Tack.
Jeopardy Assessments - A System in Jeopardy, 45 TAXES 418 (1967).
41. See note 27 supra.
42. Kaminski, supra note 26, at 554-57.
43. Id.
44. 488 F.2d at 1084.
45. Id.
46. See generally Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For a dis-
cussion of the administrative law implications of jeopardy assessments, see Kaminsky,
supra note 26, at 545-51, 560-66.
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Sherman does not cure the inadequacies of section 6861. It is, how-
ever, an effort to remove the. judicial obstacles which have plagued the
jeopardy-assessed taxpayer. It does not compromise Enochs, but merely
places that case in its proper relationship to jeopardy assessment cases.
Similarly, the IRS has not lost its power to impose jeopardy assessments,
but it can no longer use section 7421 to completely shield its decision from
judicial review.
Richard T. Frazier
LABOR LAW - EMPLOYER ASSISTANCE AND DOMINATION - HASTY
RECOGNITION ALONE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN INFERENCE OF UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE EVEN IF MOTIVATED BY THE EMPLOYER'S DESIRE
TO FREEZE OUT A RIVAL UNION.
Suburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB (1974)
Suburban Transit Corporation (Suburban) and United Transportation
Local 1589 (UTU), which had represented Suburban's employees for ap-
proximately 30 years, were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
which expired September 14, 1971.1 Negotiation of a new collective bar-
gaining agreement commenced and the parties reached accord upon a 3-
year agreement on September 13. At a ratification meeting on September
14, the contract was rejected by the employees because of its 3-year term.2
Subsequent negotiation failed to produce a reduction in the proposed con-
tract period, although Suburban did make other concessions.8 A second
ratification meeting also failed to produce employee support for the proposal.4
During the course of the negotiations, several employees who were
interested in the possibility of changing union representation, contacted a
rival labor organization, the Teamsters Union, which provided them with a
decertification petition and Teamsters authorization cards.5 On September
1. Suburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 499 F.2d 78, 81 & n.4 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied -.... U.S. , 95 S. Ct. 681 (1974). In July, 1971, the UTU had requested
that bargaining for the new contract commence. Id. at 80.
2. Id. at 81.
3. Id. Suburban did agree, for instance, to increase its wage offer. Id.
4. Id. UTU's chief negotiator, Rava, was also a collaborator in Teamsters'
organizing efforts occurring simultaneously with the negotiations. Suburban had
argued that Rava's presentation of the packages to the employees was designed to
prevent ratification of a contract. He had, for instance, read only parts of the con-
tract to the employees and had made no recommendations. Suburban Transit Corp.,
203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. 1 25,343 (1973). The Board found no mis-
conduct or unfairness in his actions. Id., CCH NLRB Dec. 1 25,343, at 32,650.
The court strongly disapproved of the ethics of Rava's activities, but found it un-
necessary to review the Board's conclusion that his dual role had had no legal signifi-
cance. 499 F.2d at 83 n.6.
5. 499 F.2d at 81. Rava had called the Teamsters several times during UTU
negotiations. The Teamsters supplied Rava with the petitions the day after the current
1974-1975] 697 1
83
Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
29, both the decertification petition and a representation petition were filed
with the National Labor Relations Board (Board).e
On October 1, the UTU drew up and circulated a contract ratification
petition which was signed by 51 of the 61 employees in the bargaining unit.
This petition was presented to Suburban on October 2. Twelve days later,
after Suburban had checked the signatures on the UTU petition against the
payroll forms and had determined that the UTU still represented a majority
of the employees in the unit, the new contract was executed.7
Unlike Suburban's employees, the employees of H.A.M.L. Corporation
(HAML), another transportation firm under common control with Sub-
urban,8 had not been previously represented by a union.9 In early Novem-
ber, several HAML employees contacted the Teamsters to discuss the
organization of HAML e~plpyees, and Teamsters solicitation -of employee
signatures upon authorizatio' cards began November 3.10 When a manager
of HAML learned of the Teamsters solicitation, he alerted the Suburban
dispatcher, who then relayed the information to the .UTU Vice President,
Arnold Zechman. 11 Zechman dictated iJTU authorization cards and dupli-
cated them, using office -equipment: that was .owned by Suburban.' 2  He
then recruited three HAML employees to -help solicit employee signatures
and the UTU solicitation began the same day.'8
Suburban's dispatcher testified that he had called HAML's dispatcher
later that day to request additional drivers for the New York runs, and
had been told that he would be "cut. a couple short" because "[w]e are
down here getting people signing cards."' 4 A HAML employee also testi-
fied that HAML's dispatcher had asked him to see someone in the driver's
Suburban-UTU contract expired. Approximately 10 days later, Rava gave the peti-
tions to another employee who solicited the signatures of 30 percent of Suburban's
employees. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 82. Approximately "2 weeks later, 'a group of employees met at the
Teamsters Hall to protest the execution of this contract. A number of these em-
ployees subsequently went on strike. Suburban demanded by letter that all striking
employees return to work by November 2 or face suspension. A temporary restrain-
ing order was obtained by Suburban upon November 1, and all but 19 of the em-
ployees returned to work. After an investigation, all but two of the strikers were
discharged. Id.
8. Id. at 80 n.1. Several officers of Suburban were also officers of HAML. Id.
The Board found that Suburban Transit Corporation and HAML Corporation con-
stituted a single employer within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. at 32,649. The court upheld the Board's
findings. 499 F.2d at 80 n.1. The unfair labor practice charges against both corpora-
tions had been incorporated into a single complaint. Id.
9. 499 F.2d at 83.
10. Id.
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room, and that when he went there, another HAML employee had solicited
his signature for a UTU authorization card."5 The UTU was able to
secure the signatures of 40 of the approximately 50 employees in the unit,
and subsequently requested recognition16, upon the basis of the authorization
cards.17 Recognition was extended to the UTU after 35 of the signatures
were verified by HAML. That same evening, contract negotiations began
using the UTU-Suburban contract of October 14 as a model.' 8 The contract
between UTU and HAML was executed on November 4, immediately after
the close of the bargaining session.19
Alleging violations of sections 8(a) (1), (2), and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act (Act), 20 the Teamsters filed unfair labor practices
against Suburban and HAML.21 The Board thereafter determined that
Suburban had violated sections 8(a) (1) and (2) of the Act by executing
a new contract with the UTU while there existed a question concerning
representation; sections 8(a) (1) and (3) because such contract contained
a union security clause; sections 8(a) (1) and (3) by subsequently dis-
charging the striking employees. 22 The Board also determined that HAML
had violated sections 8(a) (1) and (2) of the Act by executing a contract
with the UTU when the UTU did not representan uncoerced majority of
the employees, and by giving unlawful assistance to the UTU's organization
caripaign; sections 8(a)(1) and (3) because that contract contained a
union security clause; and section 8(a) (1) by having engaged in unlawful
surveillance of and assistance to union activities.23 The Board issued its






20. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7] of this title;(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it; ...(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
21. The Board sought injuntive relief upon the basis of this complaint, pursuant
to section 10(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970). The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey denied this relief. Balicer v. Suburban Transit
Corp., Civil No. 158-72 (D.N.J., July 28, 1972). The district court found that there
was not even "reasonable cause" to believe that Suburban and HAML had violated
sections 8(a) (1), (2), and (3). 499 F.2d at 80 n.3.
22. 499 F.2d at 80.
23. Id. A HAML supervisor directed an employee of HAML to attend and
report on a Teamsters meeting. The employee did so, and this was deemed to be an
independent violation of section 8(a)(1). Id. at 87.
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10(f) 2 ' of the Act while the Board cross-appealed for enforcement of its
order pursuant to section 10(e). 25
The Third Circuit reversed all but one2 6 of the Board's orders, holding:
(1) with regard to Suburban, that according to its prior holding in NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 27 the mere filing of a representation petition had not been
sufficient to raise a "question of representation" within the meaning of
section 9(c) 28 of the Act, and therefore, the Board's finding that Suburban
had committed unfair labor practices by executing the contract with the
UTU while such a petition was pending before the Board had not been
supported by substantial evidence ;29 and (2) with regard to HAML, that
while the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, the
facts did not support the inferences drawn by the Board that HAML had
given unlawful support or assistance to the UTU organizing drive. The
court further held that if the recognized union had represented an un-
coerced majority of the employees in the unit,30 mere haste in the recogni-
tion of such a union, followed by the negotiation and execution of a collective
bargaining agreement, would not itself support an inference of an unfair
labor practice, even were the evidence clearly to show that the employer
24. Section 10(f) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board ... may obtain a review
of such order in any United States court of appeals ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
25. Section 10(e) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
The board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States ... for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
26. 499 F.2d at 88. The court granted the Board's petition for enforcement of
its order regarding HAML's violation of section 8(a) (1) by having requested an
employee to engage in surveillance of the union activities of other employees. Id. at 88.
See note 23 supra.
27. 294 F.2d at 285 (3d Cir. 1961).
28. Section 9(c) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regu-
lations as may be prescribed by the Board - . . . the Board shall investigate
such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of repre-
sentation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing
upon due notice. . . . If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot
and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
29. 499 F.2d at 83. The case against Suburban was remanded to determine
whether the strike had been a protected activity in light of the newly executed bar-
gaining agreement. Id. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
30. 499 F.2d at 86. The court assumed that UTU had represented an uncoerced
majority of HAML's employees due to the absence of a specific Board finding to the
contrary. Id. at n.12. The complaint, however, did allege that a violation of sections
8(a) (1) and (2) had occurred when the contract was executed at a time when UTU
did not represent an uncoerced majority of HAML's employees. Id. at 80.
It is possible that the court's decision would have been different had it not
assumed that the UTU had represented an uncoerced majority of the HAML em-
ployees, for even in the absence of a specific Board finding to the contrary, it is
submitted that the evidence rationally supported a finding that the employees' freedom
of choice had been interfered with. See text accompanying notes 90 to 91 infra.
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had been motivated by a desire to freeze out a rival union. Suburban Transit
Corp. v. NLRB, 499 F.2d 78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S.. 95 S. Ct.
681 (1974).
Section 731 of the Act assures employees of the right to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing or to refrain from
such activity. Section 832 of the Act prohibits interference with the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7. These rights, however, must be con-
sidered in light of the Act's policy of fostering close cooperation between
employers, employees, and labor organizations, provided that this coopera-
tion does not impinge upon the freedom of choice guaranteed to employees
by the Act.33 The Supreme Court of the United States has long held,
therefore, that a grant of exclusive recognition to a minority union - one
which has support from less than a majority of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit - constitutes a violation of section 8(a) (2), which makes it
unlawful to "contribute . . . support" to a labor organization, because this
recognition infringes the majority's right freely to choose their representa-
tive.8 4 The rationale which underlies this rule is that a recognized union
has a marked advantage as against another suitor union in securing the
adherence of employees, 3 5 thus interfering with the employees' freedom of
choice.
The Supreme Court has also held that an employer commits an unfair
labor practice when it recognizes a minority union notwithstanding its good
faith belief that the union has majority support.3 6 Two circuit courts have
followed this decision and have held that an employer commits an unfair
labor practice if it recognizes a union which its employees have been coerced
to support, even if it is unaware of such coercion.3 7 These judicial limita-
tions upon an employer's conduct reflect the Act's strong policy of insuring
free exercise of the rights that it guarantees.
In keeping with this policy, section 9(c) of the Act gives special
attention to the situation wherein representation or decertification petitions
are filed. The statute provides that should the Board determine in its
31. Section 7 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). For the relevant text of the statute, see note 20 supra.
33. NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968).
34. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267 (1938).
35. Id. at 267.
36. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The Supreme Court justified its
holding by saying: "We find nothing in the statutory language prescribing scienter as
an element of the unfair labor practices here involved . . . . It follows that pro-
hibited conduct cannot be excused by a showing of good faith." Id. at 739 (foot-
notes omitted).
37. NLRB v. Hunter Outdoor Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 876, 880 (1st Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Jan Pwr., Inc., 421 F.2d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 1970).
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investigation of a rival petition that "a question of representation affecting
commerce exists," the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon
due notice s8 Once an actual question'of representation arises, it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to extend recognition to either union. How-
ever, the Board and circuit courts differ as to the point at which a question
of representation arises. 9 While the Board maintains that this question
arises when a representation petition is filed,4 0 many of the circuit courts
hold to the contrary, requiring the em'ployer to withhold recognition only
when there is a reasonable basis for believing that the union no longer
represents a majority of the employees in the unit.41
The Board strongly favors the use of the election process, as the best
means to effectuate the Act's goal of ensuring that the employees' choice
of a bargaining representative is a free one. In 1945, the Board held in
Midwest Piping & Supply Co.,42 that when an employer is aware43 of
rival representation claims, it has an obligation to remain strictly neutral
toward each union and allow the Board to resolve'the dispute through the
election process. 44 The Midwest Piping doctrine employs the same test
38. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970). For the relevant text of the statute, see note 28
supra. The Board must act upon a representation or decertification petition as follows:
(a) Absent support of 30 per cent of the employees, the petition is usually
dismissed. NLRB, Statements of Procedures, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1974).
(b) If the determination is made that a hearing should be held upon the
petition, a member of the Board's staff conducts a nonadversary hearing designed
to record facts essential to a determination of the case.
Id. § 101.20.
(c) The record of the hearing is then forwarded to the Regional Director,
who may determipe whether or not a real question of representation exists, and,
hence, whether or not an election will be held, or he may transfer the case to
the Board.
Id. §§ 101.21(a), (b).
39. An excellent statement of the purpose of the statutory standards as viewed
by both the NLRB and the courts appears in Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine:
An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REv.
292 (1963).
40. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). A recent court
decision espousing this position is NLRB v. Hunter Outdoor Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d
876 (1st Cir. 1971). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
41. NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Midtown
Serv. Co., 425 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137 (6th
Cir. 1961). For the Third Circuit's position, see discussion of NLRB v. Swift & Co.,
294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961), notes 53-59 and accompanying text infra.
42. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
43. The Board requires that an employer actually know of the rival claim in
order for the Midwest Piping doctrine to apply. Getman, supra note 39, at 295 n.14.
This requisite knowledge can be inferred either from a union's filing of a representa-
tion petition, or from a union's demand for recognition based upon a substantial claim.
In the absence of such knowledge, an employer is not bound to remain neutral. Id.
44. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1070. Therefore, although an employer may verify the au-
thorization cards presented by a rival union and thus insure the employees' receipt of
their designated representative, if is guilty of an unfair labor practice if it acts
during the pendency of a petition. The contrary position, adopted by courts following
the Third Circuit's viewpoint, holds that once there is an expression of majority
support for one of the unions, the question of representation is resolved. Playskool,
Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co.,
180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950). See note 41 supra.
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to determine when a real question of representation arises, as it uses to
determine whether or not to order an election following the filing of a
representation petition under section 9(c)4  - does the petitioning. union
have the support of 30 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit ?46
If so, in the Board's view, it is an unfair labor practice for the employer
to grant recognition to a new union or even to bargain, with an incumbent
union. 47
From 1954 to 1958, in the interest of maintaining stability in industrial
relations and continuity in collective bargaining processes,, the NLRB did
not apply the Midwest Piping doctrine to agreements signed with incum-
bent unions. 48 This so-called Gibson Co. exception was abolished by the
Board's subsequent decision in Shea Chemical Corp.,40 apparently upon
the premise that recognition of one union over another while a representa-
tion petition was pending amounted to coercion of the employees regardless
of whether such recognition were extended to an incumbent or challenging
union. 50
Various circuit courts5 ' have returned to a Gibson Co.5 2 type rationale
when dealing with employer recognition of incumbent unions. The position
taken by these courts is illustrated by the Third Circuit's holding in NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 3 that the filing of. a representation petition with the Board
did not create a question of representation. 54 In direct contradiction of
Midwest Piping, the Swift court found that the employer had not committed
an unfair labor practice by executing an agreement with a previously certi-
45. See note 39 supra.
46. The Board in a recent case, Playskool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), rev'd,
477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973), went so far as to advance a new standard for determin-
ing the existence of a "real question of representation." The Board stated that "the
sole requirement necessary to raise a question concerning representation within the
meaning of the Midwest Piping doctrine, as modified by the Board, is that the claim
of the rival union must not be clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance." 195
N.L.R.B. at 560 (footnotes omitted). The viability of this standard is questionable
in light of the Seventh Circuit's reversal.
47. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB ff 25,343, at 32,649. This prohibition
remains effective despite the complaining union's failure to provide proof of majority
support upon the employer's request, and despite the contract's having been executed
only after adequate proof of majority support had been presented to the employer by the
subsequently recognized union. Id.
48. The exception for incumbent unions was enunciated in William D. Gibson
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954). A good statement of the policy reasons for this
exception is set forth in Getman, supra note 39, at 298.
49. 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958).
50. Id. at 1028. This premise is quite successfully challenged by Getman, supra
note 39, at 299-300. Since the decision in Shea Chemical Corp., the NLRB has failed
to distinguish between recognized incumbent unions and recognized nonincumbent
unions, in determining sanctions against an employer. It is submitted that this dis-
tinction should be a key factor in Board decisions. See text accompanying note 91
infra.
51. See note 41 supra.
52. 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954).
53. 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961).
54. Id. at 287-88.
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fled union during the pendency 5  of the Board's decision regarding a repre-
sentation petition of a nonincumbent union.5 6
The Swift court acknowledged that although the doctrine of Midwest
Piping was "'necessary . . . to protect freedom of choice in certain situ-
ations, it could easily operate in derogation, of the practice of continuous
collective bargaining, and should, therefore, be strictly construed and spar-
ingly applied.' 57 The Swift court further held that a real question of
representation arises when the employer has a reasonable basis for believing
that the union no longer represents a majority of the employees within
the unit.5" The mere filing of a representation petition, which requires only
30 percent support, did not, in the court's opinion, provide such a reasonable
basis for doubt.5 9 Therefore, an- employer could recognize a union that
demonstrated that it had the support of a majority of the employees within
the unit.
In view of this split in opinion between the Board and many circuit
courts, the procedural standards governing the proper scope of judicial
review of agency findings become important. Once the Board has deter-
mined that a question of representation exists, a court may review this
finding in order to determine whether there was substantial evidence, upon
the record as a whole, to support such a finding.60 If there is substantial
evidence to support the Board's finding, the scope of judicial review is
then limited to determining whether the Board's factual inferences are so
irrational that they cannot stand, and whether, if they stand, they justify the
Board's order. 61
55. Id. at 288. The Board has held that it is not the mere filing of a petition
which determines whether the doctrine applies, but the continuing existence of the
claim. Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955), enforcement denied on other
grounds sub non., Dist. 50 UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956).
56. 294 F.2d at 288.
57. Id. at 287, quoting Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443,
1445 (1947). Some authorities believe the Board's recommendation in Ensher, that
application of the Midwest Piping doctrine be limited, was solely in reference to the
facts before it: the rival union had become defunct prior to the execution of the
contract, and therefore it was not a case involving rival claims. See 46 MINN. L.
REV. 1126, 1130 n.21 (1962).
However, although the statement may have been quoted out of context, it
may yet have served the Third Circuit's purpose in limiting Midwest Piping's policy
to its facts. Neither union in Midwest Piping was an incumbent and thus recognition
of one union by the employer may have been unlawfully suggestive to the employees
who were deciding whether to be represented at all.
58. 294 F.2d at 287. This new 'standard for determining "a real cuestion of
representation" was taken from what the Swift Court believed to be the Board's
definition of that phrase in National Carbon Div., 105 N.L.R.B. 441, 443 (1953).
However, one student commentator said that this is a misinterpretation of National
Carbon Div., 46 MINN. L. REv. 1126, 1130 n.22 (1961-1962). Although this may
be a valid criticism, the fact remains that the Swift Court no longer wanted to follow
the Board, and find that a real question of representation was raised by a petition for
election supported by a mere 30 percent of the employees.
59. 294 F.2d at 287.
60. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).
61. Department Store Food Corp. v. NLRB, 41-5 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1969).
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The Third Circuit applied these procedural standards to its review
of the Board's decisions in Suburban and HAML. The Board had based
its decision 62 upon the Teamsters' filing of a representation petition, which
Midwest Piping held raised a real question of representation. Thus, in the
Board's view, Suburban's execution of a contract with UTU before the
Board could resolve the conflicting claims by holding an election violated
the employer's duty of neutrality. 68 The Board's finding could not stand in
light of the Third Circuit's prior holding in Swift, which had clearly stated
that the filing of a representation petition would not itself support a con-
clusion that a real question of representation existed.64 Therefore, relying
upon Swift, the court concluded that the Board's finding that such a question
existed at the time of the execution of the contract had not been supported
by substantial evidence.6 5
Policy considerations which support the Swift doctrine likewise but-
'tress the court's decision in Suburban.66 Allowing an employer to continue
negotiations with the union which had previously been designated as repre-
sentative can avoid disruption of the collective-bargaining process and the
ensuing instability, inefficiency, insecurity, and strife which the Act seeks
to minimize. 67 Furthermore, this Board-enforced hiatus in the bargaining
process usually coincides with the expiration of the current contract, and
the employees, therefore, may be denied both the benefits they had under
the old contract 6  and the possibility of obtaining new benefits through col-
lective bargaining. There is also the danger that minority unions will obtain
signatures of 30 percent of the employees and file a representation petition,
using the resultant delay of the employer's right to grant recognition solely
as a tactic to gain campaigning time. Finally, as Judge Adams argued in
his dissent, the Midwest Piping doctrine was designed to rectify a problem
extant in 1945.69 The labor-management relationships of today simply
62. Id. at 82.
63. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. 11 25,343, at 32,650.
64. 294 F.2d at 288. In Swift, the Board had admitted that the filing of the
petition was the only evidence that a real question of representation existed. Id.
at 287-88.
65. 499 F.2d at 83. A question might have been raised in Suburban as to the
significance of the fact that the employees had twice rejected the UTU packages
presented to them. However, since such a fact can be construed to show dissatisfaction
with Suburban's contract offers, as well as nonsupport for the UTU, it did not
significantly contribute to the Board's finding that there was a question of representa-
tion. See id. at 89 (Adams, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 89-90 (Adams, J., dissenting).
67. Cushman, The Duration of Certifications by the National Labor Relations
Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 Micii. L. REv. 1, 25 (1946).
This was precisely the reason given for Gibson Co.'s exception of incumbent unions
from the application of Midwest Piping. 110 N.L.R.B. at 662. See note 48 and
accompanying text supra.
68. According to National Carbon Div., 105 N.L.R.B. 441 (1953), there is not
even a guarantee that the employer will keep the benefits of the current contract in
force, for to do so may later expose it to charges of engaging in an unfair labor
practice, should the Board find a real question of representation was raised by the
filing of the representation petition. Id. at 443.
69. 499 F.2d at 90 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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would not allow the establishment of a union unduly solicitous of the em-
ployer's wishes, and it is now more likely that employees would vote against
a union favored by the employer.7 0 Thus, the Third Circuit's decision with
regard to Suburban reaffirmed the Swift rationale in the face of the Board's
consistent adherence7 l to Midwest Piping.
In the HAML portion of its opinion, the Third Circuit conceded that
the Board's finding that HAML had been aware of the Teamsters' drive had
been supported by substantial evidence, but determined that the facts failed
to establish that HAML had given unlawful support or assistance to the
UTU effort. 72 After noting the standards for review when the findings
of the Board are supported by substantial evidence, 73 the court said that an
examination of the Board's inferences was very important because the
Board had conceded that the evidence of HAML's direct assistance in
UTU's solicitation of signatures was not particularly strong.74 The Board,
therefore, had concluded only that HAML had given "at least tacit approval
to and benevolent observation of the UTU's organizers at HAML's
garage."75 The court found this conclusion insufficient to prove HAML had
rendered unlawful assistance.76
The Board found the haste with which HAML had acted in recogniz-
ing the UTU particularly objectionable and argued that this was exactly
the kind of assistance, aimed at freezing out a rival union, which the Act
sought to prohibit.77 In considering this charge, the court focused upon the
objective effects of the employer's actions upon the rights of the employees,
rather than upon the employer's subjective motivation. In so doing, the
court rejected the Board's intimation that hasty. recognition alone consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice,78 asserting instead that if a union were to
represent an uncoerced majority of the employees in the unit, it would not
be unlawful for the employer to recognize that union, regardless of both
70. Id. Some authorities have suggested that an incumbent union has long been
imbued with an aura of recognition which cannot be easily erased and especially in
light, of the Shea decision allowing the incumbent union to administer the contract or
process grievances while awaiting an election. 121 N.L.R.B. at 1029. The continua-
tion-of negotiations with an incumbent is more likely to be viewed by the employees
as habit rather than as an expression of the employer's choice. Getman, supra note
39, at 299-300. At the other extreme, it can be argued that withdrawal of recognition,
as required by the Board in Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38 (1949), is not in
keeping with the Act's mandate of neutrality and can be viewed by the employees as
a rejection of the incumbent union. Getman, supra note 39, at 299-300.
71. The Administrative Law Judge pointed out in his findings and conclusions
that "a law judge is constrained to follow Board law, even where an appellate court
has disagreed." 203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. 25,343, at 32,649.
72. 499 F.2d at 84, 85.
73. Id. at 85. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
74., 499 F.2d at 85,.
'75. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. 1 25,343, at 32,651. See note 84infra. -
n Ir76. 499 F.2d at 87.
77. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. 1 25,343, at 32,651.
78. 499 F.2d at 85, 86.
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the employer's motivation for so doing and the haste with which it acted.",
Conceding that the line between close cooperation and interference with
the employees' rights is fine and difficult to draw,80 the court opined that
unless the employer's acts interfere with the employees' section 7 rights
freely to choose or reject a bargaining representative, the Act seeks to
encourage cooperation between management and labor. 8' Only when
management's actions actually undermined the integrity of the employees!
freedom of choice and independence in dealing with their employer would
such activities fall within the proscriptions of the Act.8'
The court then turned to four potentially key evidentiary facts, labelling
all but one only weak support for the Board's inference that unlawful as-
sistance had been rendered. Although the telephone call of HAML's man-
ager to Suburban's dispatcher evidenced HAML's awareness of the Team-
sters' organizing campaign, the court refused to interpret this call as a
deliberate effort to spark a UTU counterdrive. 88 The court thought it
apparently fortuitous that the UTU had learned of the Teamsters campaign.
The court gave greater weight to the fact that the UTU's Vice President
had dictated UTU authorization cards and had duplicated them upon
Suburban equipment, but found that, as there was no direct evidence tend-
ing to show that the employer had been aware of this activity, there was
only a weak inference to be drawn that the employer had "permitted" such
action.84 The court also minimized the importance of the third allegation
of unlawful assistance, that the HAML dispatcher had told one employee
that someone wished to speak with him, although that person turned out
to be a UTU organizer.85 The court remarked that this seemed to be an
isolated incident, and that in view of its decision to objectively analyze the
effect of employer behavior upon the employees' section 7 rights, there was
no evidence that this single act had had any coercive effect upon their
selection of a representative.8" Finally, the court addressed itself to a state-
ment made by a HAML dispatcher to the effect that he could not supply
79. Id. The court suggested that haste should function only as an indicator to
alert the Board to the possibility of employer preference so that the Board might then
evaluate the employer's other actions toward the competing unions in light of this
possible prejudice. Id. at 86, 87.
80. Id. at 85, quoting NLRB v. Hunter Outdoor Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d at 876, 880
(1st Cir. 1971).
81. 499 F.2d at 85. Accord, NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 F2d 663, 667
(5th Cir. 1968); Modern Plas. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967).
See text accompanying note 32 supra.
82. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968).
83. 499 F.2d at 87.
84. Id. The court's language left it unclear whether the decision would have
been different had the evidence shown that the employer clearly had been aware of
such union activities upon its premises. The phrasing of the opinion seems to indicate
that an employer's "tacit approval" or toleration of a union's use of facilities and
equipment, coupled with the coincidental accommodation of both unions' solicitation
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more drivers because "[w]e are down here getting people signing cards."81
In light of the fact both unions were soliciting signatures that day, the
court decided that such action benefited both unions and hence could not
be construed as having given unlawful assistance to only one.88 The court
therefore concluded that, despite the substantiality of this evidence, the
Board's inferences were irrational and could not support a finding of unlaw-
ful assistance. It was the court's opinion that the inferences more fairly
showed that HAML had successfully achieved close cooperation with UTU
without impinging upon the rights of its employees.8 9
Given the standards which the Suburban court itself recognized as
governing its review of these decisions,90 it seems that the court incorrectly
applied them to the facts of the incident involving HAML. As the dissent
argued, each of the four key facts building a case against HAML seems to
substantiate the rationality of the Board's inference that unlawful assistance
had been rendered. The court's analysis failed to explain adequately why
HAML's manager had called Suburban's dispatcher if not to have him
relay a message to UTU that the Teamsters were organizing. Nor did it
find unusual the apparent ease with which an outsider could dictate author-
ization cards and duplicate them upon Suburban's office equipment without
the employer's being aware of it. Moreover, when the dispatcher's state-
ment that he, as a HAML supervisor, was helping with the union organ-
ization, is considered with the fact that he had directed at least one employee
to a room wherein a UTU representative then solicited the employee's sig-
nature, there would appear to have been more than a mere suggestion of
unlawful assistance. While each single fact is inconclusive, when they are
evaluated together, in light of HAML's haste in recognizing UTU and
subsequent negotiation and execution of a contract, it is submitted that the
Board's determination that a violation of section 8(a) (2) had occurred
was a rational inference adequately supported by the evidence.
However, assuming, arguendo, that the court's analysis of the facts
supported its conclusion, there are numerous policy reasons relating to the
possible adverse impact of this decision upon the employees' right freely to
choose a representative in a HAML-type situation which should have
militated against this decision. The factual differences between the repre-
sentation conflict involving Suburban's employees and that involving
HAML make the rationales of Suburban and hence Swift inapposite to the
latter situation because the policy reasons 1 which supported the Swift
court's departure from Midwest Piping are absent when non-incumbent
unions seek to organize a single bargaining unit. There is no need for
87. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. The Board had found the
manager's actions attributable to HAML because he was a supervisor, and the court
accepted this finding. 499 F.2d at 88.
88. 499 F.2d at 87.89. Id.
90. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
91. See text accompanvina nateq 66-7A -
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concern over disrupting an incumbent's collective bargaining efforts, and
there is no established employer-incumbent union relationship to be pre-
served in the interest of industrial stability. Instead, the employees are
faced with the choice of whether to be represented at all, and if so, by whom.
The concern in this context should be with eniuring that this choice is
freely made. It seems, therefore, that the rationale of Midwest Piping
should be controlling, and mandate employer neutrality.
This crucial distinction between the Suburban situation and the HAML
facts was ignored by the Third Circuit. As the dissent pointed out,92 the
impact of recognition is likely to be more devastating where there is no in-
cumbent union than when an employer is simply allowed to continue negoti-
ations with an incumbent union.98 If, as the Board suggested in Midwest
Piping, recognition of one of two non-incumbent unions confers a degree
of legitimacy upon the recognized union in the employees' eyes, 94 it then
becomes very difficult to determine whether such an act of recognition
impinged upon the employees' right to make an independent decision in the
Board-ordered election which will follow. 9 5 Due to this difficulty, greater
possibility exists for undetected infringement upon this right. Hence, a
broad reading of this decision would appear to be in derogation of the Act's
guarantee that the rights granted therein be exercisable independent of the
employer's desires. This interpretation would allow an employer, motivated
solely by a desire to freeze out a disfavored union, furtively to grant recog-
nition to the union of its choice after assuring, through its close sponsor-
ship of the union, that the union had majority support. Such action certainly
goes beyond the Act's goal of promoting labor-management cooperation.
The dissent was upon firmer ground in concluding that when an employer
is aware of interunion competition, as HAML was,96 and thereafter acts
to favor one union over the other, it would be difficult to conclude that the
employer has not interfered with the employees' choice.9 7
Fortunately, the holding can be given a more narrow reading which
would limit its impact upon the free exercise of section 7 rights. The Board
concluded that HAML had given only "tacit approval to and benevolent
observation of the UTU's organizers at HAML's garage,"98 conceding
92. 499 F.2d at 90 (Adams, J., dissenting).
93. See note 70 supra.
94. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1071.
95. The Board holds an election when a union can demonstrate support from 30
percent of the employees, whether or not there has been an expression of majority
sentiment subsequent to the demonstration of that support. This position is in line
with its bias toward using the election process to resolve representation disputes.
See text accompanying note 42 supra.
96. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 69, CCH NLRB Dec. 25,343, at 32,651.
97. 499 F.2d at 90 (Adams, J., dissenting).
98. Id. The only unlawful assistance the Board specifically found was in HAML's
"blatant haste" designed to grant UTU recognition before the filing of the Teamsters'
petition. It is submitted that the Suburban majority's holding that hasty recognition
by itself does not constitute an unfair labor practice was well reasoned. See note 79
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that the evidence of assistance was weak.99 The court, therefore, found it
necessary to reexamine all of the evidence and each possible inference.
Thus, the decision as to HAML might be read to have hinged upon the
difficulty of proving that HAML had overtly acted to assist UTU. Were
a similar case to arise in which the Board did not find it necessary to place
reservations upon its conclusion, it is hoped that the Third Circuit would
not tolerate an employer's interference in the domain of employee rights.
It is unfortunate that the court valued close cooperation at the expense, of
the HAML employees' rights, because the Board's inference that HAML
had violated section 8(a) (2) was drawn from evidence which the court
conceded was substantial, 00 and the Board's conclusion would, further-
more, not appear to have been irrational.
While the decision as to Suburban represents an acceptable reaffirma-
tion of a case noted for its justifiable challenge to the application of the
Midwest Piping doctrine to employer recognition of incumbent unions,
the Third Circuit's decision as to HAML represents a potentially damaging
interpretation of the "close cooperation" respected by the National Labor
Relations Act. It is submitted that both in failing to distinguish between
incumbent and non-incumbent unions and in designating as lawful an
employer's "borderline" acts of assistance to a favored union's organiza-
tional activities, the court failed to protect the HAML employees' section 7
rights, and that this portion of the court's opinion should be afforded
limited future application.
Pamela Phillips Maki
LABOR LAW - SUCCESSORSHip DOCTRINE - A COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENT Is NOT NECESSARILY TERMINATED WHEN ALL OF
THE EMPLOYER-CORPORATION'S STOCK IS SOLD AND THE NEW OWNER
THEN CHANGES THE NAME OF THE CORPORATION.
Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc. (1974)
In 1967, a collective bargaining agreement was reached between Enick
Trucking, Inc. (ETI), and Teamsters Local 249 (the Union).' The con-
tractual period included January 19, 1972. Prior to January 18, 1972, all
of the outstanding stock in ETI was owned by Enick. 2 On January 18,
99. See 499 F.2d at 85.
100. Id.
1. Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956, 958 (3d Cir.
1974). The terms of the contract were contained in the National Master Freight
Agreement and the Local Cartage Supplement Agreement of the Teamsters Joint
Council No. 40, Freight Division. Both agreements became effective in 1967. Id.
at 958 n.3.
2. Id. at 958. At that time, the assets of ETI consisted of state certificates of
public convenience, several tractors and trailers, and a truck. Id.
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1972, Enick -sold all of his ETI stock to ,Fiore,3 who then transferred all
of the ETI stock to a corporation in which he was the sole shareholder.
The name of the motor company was changed from ETI to Bill's Trucking,
Inc. (BTI), and the business of motor carriage was continued in a manner
nearly identical to that which ETI had operated.4
Nine drivers, formerly employed by ETI and represented by the Union,
allegedly were wrongfully discharged by ETI on January 19.5 The Union
brought an action against ETI under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 6 (LMRA), seeking damages for breach of contract and con-
tending that the 1967 collective bargaining contract which governed the
terms of the drivers' employment prior to the sale to Fiore had survived
that sale.7 Therefore, the Union argued, BTI Was bound by the agree-
ment's substantive provisions and had breached them by firing the drivers.8
Relying exclusively upon the recent Supreme Court decision in NLRB
v. Burns International Security. Services,; Inc,.,9 the district court granted
BTI's motion to dismiss the complaint.1. The-lower court interpreted
Burns as having held that "a successor employer is not bound by the con-
tract between the Union and its predecessor.."" On appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, holding that the dismissal had been
improper because there were factual disputes, and in an action brought
pursuant to section 301, a mere purchase of a company's stock, followed
only by minor changes in business operations and a change of the corporate
name, would :not necessarily operate to relieve the purchaser from obli-
3. Id. The agreement of sale made Enick solely responsible for all ETI liabili-
ties that had been incurred prior to the time .of sale. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. There was a factual dispute as to the employment of these men. BTI
claimed that the men had been discharged prior to the sale of the ETI stock to Fiore,
and that they had been offered employment, but not under the terms of the ETI-
Union contract. Id. at 958 n.5.
6. 29 U.S.C..§ 185 (1970). Section 301 provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor union repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be.,brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the. parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
The Union also brought unfair labor p ractice charges against BTI before
the National Labor Relations Board. However, these charges were dismissed. See
493 F:2d at 958 n.6. For a discussion of the significance of the procedural distinction
between these two forums, see note 55 and accompanying text infra.
7. 493 F.2d at 958. The Union's pleadings and affidavits, according to the appel-
late court, indicated that BTI was, in -fact, the satie corporation as ETI. Id. at 961.
8. Id. at 958.
9. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
10. 493 F.2d at 957.' The district court treated BTI's motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment; therefore, the Third Circuit viewed the facts in the
light most favorable to the Union. Id. at 957 & n12. The district court had charac-
terized the transaction between Enick and Fiore as a mere sale of assets. In view of
the complaint's allegations, the Third Circuit did not agree with this characterization.
Id. at 962 n.31,
11. Id. at 958. 97
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gations imposed by a collective bargaining agreement which had been en-
tered into by the former owner. Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking,
Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1974).
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) has traditionally held
that the purchaser-employer has an obligation' to bargain with an existing
union when a change in the ownership does not materially affect the nature
of the business or the employees. 12 Recently, the Board has held that a
successor employer 13 is bound by the certification of a bargaining repre-
sentative if a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit were re-
tained after the sale and the change in ownership did not otherwise affect
the "employing industry.' 4  However, the decision that a subsequent
employer must bargain with the union representing the predecessor's
employees did not necessarily bind the new employer to the terms of the
existing collective bargaining agreement. 15
Judicial decisions over the years indicated approval of the principles
enunciated by the Board. 16 The controlling factor for determining successor-
12. E.g., Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325 (1948); National Bag Co.,
65 N.L.R.B. 1078, enforced, 156 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Chas. Cushman Co., 15
N.L.R.B. 90 (1939).
13. The questions of successorship and the obligation of the new employer with
respect to the existing union and its contract with the previous employer have long
been troublesome. Therefore, to afford the reader some conceptual security, the fol-
lowing general definition of successorship is offered:
"Successorship," as a generic term, refers to that matrix of labor law doctrine
that is called into play "where the identity of the employer changes after the
employees have one officially recognized collective power to press their demands
against their prior employer."
493 F.2d at 959 n.7, quoting Slicker, A Reconsideration of Employer Successorship -
A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (1973). Although
every new employer is a successor in a chronological sense, not every new employer
is a successor in a legal sense. The phrase "successor employer" is frequently used
when the more appropriate phrase would be "subsequent employer."
However, matters are confused further by the fact that the legal definition
of a successor is elusive and differs in meaning when applied to differing obligations
which employees wish the new employer to assume. The issue of successorship con-
tains within it many sub-issues which involve such problems as: (1) the survival of
a union's status as exclusive bargaining agent of the former owner's employees who
have been retained and the new employer's duty to recognize and bargain with that
union; (2) the power of the Board to order a new employer to remedy unfair labor
practices committed by the former employer; (3) the extent to which the new em-
ployer may be compelled to arbitrate employee grievances, arising out of the change
of employer identity, under the former employer's collective bargaining agreement;
and (4) the degree to which the new employer is bound by the substantive provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of the change of owner-
ship. Id. at 959 n.8, citing Slicker, supra, at 1064. Although there are many criteria
relevant to a determination of successorship, there is no precise formula that can be
mechanically applied. Slicker, supra, at 1054-63.
14. Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437 (1963).
15. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964). Note, however, that when a change
in the employer's identity is merely an attempt by the former employer to disguise
continued control, the corporate veil will be pierced and the contract enforced in full.
For an example of such an "alter ego" case, see NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 135 F.2d
494 (3d Cir. 1943).
16. E.g., NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Lunder
Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (lst Cir. 1954).
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ship status in these cases was whether or not there had been a continuation
of the "employing industry."'
17
New ground was broken by -the Supreme Court of the United States
in Jdhn Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,'5 wherein the Court held that a suc-
cessor employer was bound by the arbitration provision of his predecessor's
contract despite the fact that the new employer had not been a party to
that contract.' 9 Wiley arose in the context of a merger of a small corpora-
tion, Interscience, whose employees were represented by a union, and a
larger company, Wiley, whose employees were not unionized.20 After the
merger, Wiley refused to recognize the union as bargaining agent for any
former Interscience employees and denied that it had any obligations to
those employees under the prior collective bargaining agreement. 21 The
union then commenced an action under section 301 of the LMRA to compel
arbitratioL 22
Recognizing the worthy but conflicting objectives of the union and the
employer, 23 ,the Wiley Court took the position that arbitration 24 was a
natural extension of the collective bargaining process. 25 Concluding that a
collective bargaining agreement was not an ordinary contract, a unanimous
Court held that Wiley was under a duty to arbitrate the dispute according
to the prior contract, even though it was not a party thereto. 26 However,
17. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 361 (C. Morris* ed. 1971).
18. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
19. Id. at 550.
20. Id. at 545. At the time of the merger, Interscience had employed 80 workers,
40 of whom were represented by the union. Wiley's workforce then totaled 300. It
was undisputed that the merger was for valid business purposes. Id.
21. Id. Wiley had been given notice of the contract by discussions before and
after the merger in which the union had claimed that it continued to represent the
former Interscience employees and that Wiley was obligated to honor certain vested
rights under the prior contract. The rights concerned seniority status, severance pay,
etc. The union also claimed that Wiley was required to make pension fund payments
called for by the agreement with Interscience. Id.
22. - Id. at 546.
23. The Wiley Court stated that:
[t]he objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles
of federal- law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to
rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be bal-
anced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the em-
ployment relationship.
Id. at 549.
24. Federal policy had assumed a posture strongly in favor of arbitration, as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers trilogy: United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav'n Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For a detailed history of the federal policy favoring
arbitration, and an explanation of the presumption of arbitrability created thereby,
see Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,
85 HARV. L. REv. 636 (1972).
25. 376 U.S. at 549.
26. Id. at 550. In discussing grievances arising from a change in ownership,
the Court stated:
The transition from one corporate organization to another will in most cases
be eased and industrial strife avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved 99
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the Court was careful to note that" ndt every change in ownership carried
with it the duty to arbitrate.2 7 The Court stated that the determination was
to be based'upon Whether or not there was "substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise before and after a change."'28
After Wiley, the Ninth Circuit held that a purchaser of the assets of
a business was bound not only to arbitrate under the collective bargaining
agreement of its predecessor, but was unqualifiedly bound by the substan-
tive contract provisions as well. 2 9 The Third Circuit, in United Steel-
workers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 30 disagreed with this interpretation
of Wiley.31 While holdingthat Wiley was applicable to the case of a sale of
assets as well as to a merger 3 2 the Third Circuit took the more limited view
of Wiley that the "collective bargaining agreement remained the basic
charter governing the employer-employee relationship after a change in
ownership, and that in the event of a grievance arising under the agree-
ment, discretion lay with the arbitrator to determine whether or not a
particular substantive provision of'the ;agreement could not equitably be
enforced against the new employer due to new circumstances arising from
the change in ownership.33
The decision of the Supreme Cotirt ii NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc,34 cast substantial 'doubt .upon the continued vitality
of Wiley.3  In-Burns, the -Wackenhut Corporation had provided security
protection for an airport'with guards who were represented by the United
Plant Guards Workers (UPGW). 6 The UPGW-Wackenhut collective
bargaining agreement was for a 3-year term despite the fact that Wacken-
hut's contract with the airport was to expire within a few months of the
signing of the labor contract.3 7 After competitive bidding, Burns Inter-
national Security Services, Inc. (Burns), was awarded the contract to sup-
ply guards at the 'airport.38 All of Burns' employees at various locations
were represented by the American Federation of, Guards (AFG) and em-
by arbitration rather than by "the relative strength ... of the contending forces."
Id. at 549 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 551.
28. Id. Note, however, that Wiley has been held to be inapplicable where its
application would produce competing and conflicting union claims. See, e.g., Southern
Conf. of Teamsters v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967);
McQuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
988 (1966).
29. Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.
1964).
30. 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
31. Id. at 895 & n.3.
32. Id. at 894.
33. Id. at 895. The Third Circuit thus implied, as had the Wiley Court, that
substantive provisions of the prior contract may have survived the sale.
34. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
35. See Holmes, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. Clii.
L. REv. 617, 618 (1973).
36. 406 U.S. at 274£75.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 275.
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ployed under similar contracts.8 9 In acting to fulfill the airport contract,
Burns retained 27 former Wackenhut employees and filled out the work
force with 15 of its own guards transferred from other locations.40 The
UPGW demanded that Burns honor the UPGW-Wackenhut contract in its
entirety.41 When Burns refused, the UPGW filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board alleging a -violation of section 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) .42 The ,Board found that the air-
port unit was an appropriate one, and that Burns was a successor employer
and was obligated to recognize and bargain with the UPGW.48 More sig-
nificantly, the Board held that Burns, as a successor employer, was bound,
as a matter of law, by the substantive provisions of the prior collective bar-
gaining agreement although Burns had not expressly or impliedly assumed
such an obligation.44 The Second Circuit upheld the Board's unit determi-
nation and successorship findings, but refused to enforce the order requir-
ing Burns to assume the substantive terms of the Wackenhut contract.45
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Burns was under
no obligation to honor the substantive terms of its predecessor's contract
since Burns had not assumed that responsibility. 46 In light of the recent
certification of the UPGW and the unchanged nature of the unit, the Court
found, by a five to four margin, that Burns had been obligated to recog-
nize and bargain with the UPGW as soon as it had hired a majority of
the former Wackenhut guards.47
Notwithstanding the Burns decision, the Sixth Circuit subsequently
found Wiley to be controlling upon the issue of successorship.4s Although
39. Id.
40. Id. Burns had been notified that the Wackenhut guards had recently received
certification by the Board as a bargaining unit and that there was a collective bar-
gaining contract between the UPGW and Wackenhut. Id. Nonetheless, Burns sup-
plied each of the former Wackenhut employees with membership cards and informed
them that they had to become AFG members. Id.
41. Id. at 276.
42. Id. Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in per-
tinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section 159(a) of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
43. 406 U.S. at 276.
44. Id. & n.2.
45. William J. Burns Int'l Det. Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1971).
46. 406 U.S. at 286-91. The Court in Burns studiously avoided the term "suc-
cessor" when referring to the subsequent employer. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., cdn-
curring and dissenting).
47. Id. at 277-81. The prior collective bargaining agreement was not a factor in
the Court's determination of Burns' duty to bargain with the UPGW. The dissenters
would have required the lower court to reexamine the appropriateness of the unit,
and would have held that Burns was not a successor and therefore not bound to
recognize the UPGW. Id. at 297-98 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
48. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers v. Howard Johnson Co.,
482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 249 (1974). The circuit court found the
following factors to be determinative: (1) substantially all of the assets had been
1974-1975]
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the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision upon the grounds
that the subsequent employer had not been a successor employer, 49 it ex-
pressly found it unnecessary to decide whether there was any irreconcilable
conflict between Wiley and Burns.5 0
Bill's Trucking was the most recent in the line of cases struggling
with the complex problem of striking a balance between the competing
considerations of employee security and entrepreneurial prerogative when
there is a change in the ownership of a business. It presented the Third
Circuit with its first opportunity to consider the effect of Burns upon the
Wiley decision, and the court seized upon it to find without doubt
"[t] hat the ramifications of Wiley survive Burns."''
The instant court pointed to the Burns Court's statement that its hold-
ing was "an extremely narrow one,"5 2 and rejected the district court's broad
reading of that case as holding that a successor employer could never be
bound by the contract obligations of its predecessor. 53 The Third Circuit
concluded that Burns' impact was limited to that case's particular facts,5 4
and distinguished Bill's Trucking therefrom upon two grounds. The court
first noted that Burns had been an unfair labor practice case, and not a suit
under section 301. 5 3 The court viewed the result in Burns as following
directly from the policy explicitly expressed in section 8(d) 'of the NLRA,
which prohibits the Board from compelling the parties to labor negotiations
to make concessions or agree to any contract term.5 6 Although the court
acknowledged that the policies embodied in section 8(d) may have some
residual effect, it stated that "they would not appear to be directly con-
trolling in an action for breach of contract. 5 7
The second distinction drawn by the court was that in Burns there
had been no nexus between the prior and subsequent employers because
there had been no "succession" to the assets, stock, or other corporate
purchased; (2) the location and identity of business had remained exactly the same;(3) many products and services were identical; and (4) the franchising agreements
between the former owner and Howard Johnson had included extensive reservations
by Howard Johnson over the operation of the motel and restaurant, evidencing the
close control it possessed over the management and activities of both operations.
482 F.2d at 493.
49. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers,
417 U.S. 249, 264 (1974).
50. Id. at 2240.
51. 493 F.2d at 961.
52. Id. at 959 & n.9, quoting NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,
274 (1972).
53. 493 F.2d at 959. The court quoted the statement in Burns that a contract
may survive "in a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock acquisition, reor-
ganization, or assets purchase." Id. at 961, quoting NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972).
54. 493 F.2d at 960.
55. Id. In Burns, the Supreme Court used this same procedural difference to
distinguish Burns from Wiley. 406 U.S. at 285.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
57. 493 F.2d at 960 (emphasis supplied by the court).
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aspects of the prior employer ;58 both Burns and Wackenhut had continued
to exist, at all relevant times, as complete and competing business entities.59
Quite the contrary, Bill's Trucking involved a direct sale of all of the stock
and therefore, in effect, all of the corporate assets to the subsequent em-
ployer. 60 Hence, the court relied upon the continued vitality of Wiley to
support the proposition "[t] hat there is no absolute bar to the enforcement
of labor agreements against 'successor' employers in 301 actions . .. .- 1
The Third Circuit found public policy support for its decision that a
subsequent employer could be bound by a prior collective bargaining agree-
ment by focusing upon the employee's perception of a change in owner-
ship.0 2 The Third Circuit reasoned that where the employees view their
job situations as unaltered because the transition in ownership did not affect
the continuity of the business enterprise, they "may well be entitled to the
contractual benefits of their pact with the prior employer." 60 3 That a con-
trary holding could have disturbing implications was illustrated by the
court's example of an employer who, being dissatisfied with the terms of a
validly negotiated contract, might seek to avoid them by a sale of his
business to a third party. In the court's view, allowing the employer in this
manner to exercise, in effect, a power of unilateral termination of the em-
ployees' rights would contravene established labor policy. 4
The court was careful to make clear that it would not hold in every
case that a subsequent employer was bound by the provisions of his prede-
cessor's labor contract6 5 However, the court did conclude that where a
substantial continuity of the business enterprise existed, legitimate em-
ployee exphctancies would have to be protected. 6
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 958.
61. Id. at 960, citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
As evidence that "the ramifications of Wiley survived Burns," the court cited the
circuit court's opinion in Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers v. Howard
Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 249 (1974), and Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). 493 F.2d at 961 & nn.21, 24.
See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
62. 493 F.2d at 962.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court also mentioned "alter ego" relationships, and mergers designed
either to squeeze out the more powerful of two unions or to avoid the more disad-
vantageous contract as situations contrary to good labor law policy which could arise
if employees' rights did not survive a change in ownership. Id. at 962 & nn.32, 33.
See note 15 supra.
65. 493 F.2d at 963.
66. Id. at 962. The court suggested some evidentiary factors to be cofnsidered in
determining whether there was substantial continuity of business enterprise: (1)
geographic continuity; (2) similarity of supervisory personnel; (3) continuity of
business operation; (4) similarity of product or service; (5) changes in internal
operating methods; and (6) form of succession. Id. at 963 n.40. In a decision sub-
sequent to Bill's Trucking, the Supreme Court said that a "continuity of identity in
the business enterprise necessarily includes . . . a substantial continuity in the work
force across the change in ownership." Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers, 217 U.S. 249, 263 (1974). 103
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On remand, the district court was to determine first whether BTI
was in fact the same corporation as ETI and, therefore, an original party
to the contract, or, if not, "whether there nonetheless existed such 'sub-
stantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise' before and after
the sale-to Fiore that the terms of the contract may appropriately be deemed
to have weathered that sale."6 7 The court stated that' the district court
might determine that the facts of the case warranted enforcement against
BTI of all, some, or none of the ETI-Union contract provisions.6 8
The court's distinction of Bill's Trucking from Burns upon the juris-
dictional basis, that the former had been a case under section 301 of the
LMRA rather than an unfair labor practice case under section 8 of the
NLRA, is'subject to criticism. 69 Such a distinction raises the question of'
whether the labor policies of the NLRA are different from and, hence, in
conflict with the policies of the LMRA. The latter would apparently per-
mit the imposition of specific contract terms upon a party who did not
assume them, while the former expressly prohibits such an imposition.
If indeed there is but one federal labor policy,70 then the distinction seems
to be more procedural than substantive in nature. Appaiently, a union
could allege that a new employer who fails to abide by a prior collective
bargaining agreement is in fact the same entity as the former employer7 '
and bring an unfair labor practice suit before the Board. If unsuccessful,
the union might then bring a successful suit upon the same facts under
section 301 of the LMRA for breach of contract in a federal court. Thus,
it would seem that the employees' rights would depend upon the forum
chosen. The Supreme Court, in Howard Jidhnson Co. v. Detioit Local
Joint Executive Board of Hotel Workers,72 which was decided after Bill's
Trucking, recognized that this undesirable result might occur.73 However,
the Court did not totally discount the section 301-section 8(a) distinction;
it simply admonished that even in suits under .the LMRA, courts must take
into account the basic policies found in the NLRA. 74 Given this Supreme
Court ambivalence, the Third Circuit's procedural distinction between Bill's
Trucking and Burns seems to have been a valid reflection of the Board's
limited ability to provide contractual remedies in successorship cases. '15
67. 493 F.2d at 961 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. n.26 (emphasis added).
69. See note 55 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion criticizing the
distinction drawn by the Burns Court between unfair labor practice cases and section
301 actions, see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 255 (1972).
70. Cf. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers,
417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974).
71. This was the Union's allegation in the instant case. 493 F.2d at 961.
72. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
73. Id. at 256.
74. Id.
75. The remedial powers granted to the Board upon the finding of any unfair
labor practice permit it to issue "an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including rein-
statement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this subchapter . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
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The court's factual distinction between Bill's Trucking and Burns
was more persuasive than its procedural distinction.76 The factual situation
in Bill's Trucking was more analogous to that presented by Wiley than
that presented by Burns. In both Wiley and Bill's Trucking, the subsequent
employer had had direct relations with the prior employer concerning the
change in ownership. By contrast, the relationship between Burns and
its predecessor had been, at best, indirect, and there had been no interaction
between them concerning the change in employers at the airport.77 The
privity of direct dealings with the former employer is a factor which pro-
vides added foundation for a conclusion that successorship status exists
because such direct dealings indicate a familiarity with the predecessor's
business and, hence, in particular, the presence of a collective bargaining
agreement. By thereafter substantially maintaining the identity of the busi-
ness enterprise, the new employer is merely stepping into the shoes of his
predecessor. Therefore, it is equitable to require the new owner to assume
previous responsibilities along with the benefits of a smooth transition in
business ownership.
In order to conclude that Wiley provided precedent for enforcing the
substantive provisions of a contract against a successor employer, the Bill's
Trucking court had to extrapolate from that decision. The court interpreted
Wiley as follows:
Though the holding . . .was necessarily limited to establishing the
successor's duty to arbitrate, the case, as a practical matter, implies
more. This is manifest from the fact that the very question upon which
the successor must, under Wiley, submit to arbitration, is the extent
to which the other terms of the predecessor's contract are binding on
the successor.78
Under this view, some or all of the substantive provisions of a contract
could be deemed by a court to have survived. Just such an interpretation
of Wiley had been made by the Ninth Circuit in a pre-Burns decision
involving a sale of assets.79
A strong argument, however, may be made for giving a narrow inter-
pretation to Wiley, limiting its application only to those disputes in which
the collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration provision. The
Supreme Court said in Burns that its holding in Wiley had been a "limited"
accommodation between the legislative endorsement of freedom of contract
and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement of labor disputes
76. See note 58 and accompanying text supro. This argument is reinforced by a
recent Supreme Court decision in which it said that, in the development of the federal
common law under section 301, emphasis upon the facts of each case is especially
appropriate. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers,
417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974).
77. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
78. 493 F.2d at 960 n.20 (emphasis supplied by the court) (citations omitted).
79. Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.
1964). See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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.... 80 Moreover, the Third Circuit itself, in United Steelworkers v.
Reliance Universal, Inc.,81 had rejected the broad interpretation given to
Wiley by the Ninth Circuit.8 2 The specific holding in Wiley was very
limited and much of the Court's discussion therein centered around "[tihe
preference of national labor policy for arbitration . . . . 3 It was "the
impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration . . . [which were]
not wholly overborne by the fact that Wiley did not sign the contract being
construed.
84
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Bill's Trucking court's interpreta-
tion of Wiley is the better one. Although much of the Wiley Court's lan-
guage related to arbitration as a favored policy for settling labor disputes,
the central reason underlying the Wiley holding was the "substantial con-
tinuity of identity in the business enterprise before and after a change."
8
This factor caused the Supreme Court to depart from the common law
notion of privity of contract since the collective bargaining agreement was
held to be something more than an ordinary contract.8 6 This same reason-
ing led the Bill's Trucking court to conclude that:
[w] here .. . there is a simple purchase of stock, followed only by a
change in corporate name and some minor changes in business opera-
tions, the policies of our national labor law weigh heavily in favor
of a doctrine that preserves intact the employees' bargained-for rights
and duties, or at least a portion of them.87
While the Third Circuit noted the possible adverse effect of not binding
a successor to his predecessor's contract, it did not consider the possible
detrimental effect which could ensue from binding the successor employer., s
The instant decision may in fact discourage and inhibit the free transfer
of capital. It is not unreasonable to assume that a prospective purchaser
80. 406 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
81. 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
82. Id. at 895. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
83. 376 U.S. at 549. Justice White, writing for the majority in Burns, empha-
sized that the holding in Wiley was limited to an arbitration order and that the Wiley
Court had stressed the national labor policy preference for peaceful settlement of
labor disputes through arbitration. 406 U.S. at 286.
84. 376 U.S. at 550.
85. Id. at 551.
86. Id. at 550.
87. 493 F.2d at 963. Where the collective bargaining agreement contains an
arbitration clause, it seems logical that the arbitrator is the proper one to decide
which of the contract provisions may have survived the change in the ownership of
the business. See United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895
(1964). Therefore, in a section 301 action similar to the instant suit, if the contract
contains an arbitration provision and there is a finding of successorship, it is sub-
mitted that the federal court should hold only that the successor employer has an
obligation to arbitrate any disputes in accordance with his predecessor's agreement
with the union. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
practical effects of binding a successor employer to his predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement, see Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor Law: Burns,
H.K. Porter, and Section 8(d), 51 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1972).
88. 406 U.S. at 287, 288.
88. Cf. 406 U.S. at 287, 288.
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will not be willing to pay as high a price for abusiness if the labor contract
obligations of the seller will follow with it.89. On the other hand, a union
might be willing to make a concession in contract negotiations to a small
or faltering employer that it would not make to a large or wealthy cor-
poration which may wish to buy the business. As the Supreme Court noted
in Burns, "[s] trife is bound to occur if the concessions that must be honored
do not correspond to the relative economic strength [sic] of the parties." 90
However, these problems are not inevitable results of the Third Cir-
cuit's decision. The Bill's Trucking holding will not necessarily dampen a
purchaser's desire to obtain a business, because liability under the collective
bargaining agreement will not be imposed upon a subsequent employer from
the moment of its acquisition of a business. In order to be bound, the new
employer must take actions which establish that it is a successor employer.
Hence, if the new employer does not retain a substantial number of its
predecessor's employees to maintain a continuity of the work force, suc-
cessorship will not be found.91 Similarly, if the subsequent employer uses
the assets and work force in pursuit of a business which is substantially
different from that of its predecessor, no successorship will be found.92
Major changes in business operations which might be necessary to revive
a moribund company could result in a lack of substantial continuity of busi-
ness enterprise so that the labor agreement would not be deemed to have
survived.93 If, however, a new employer wishes to enjoy the advantages
of smooth and uninterrupted business operations after the change in owner-
ship, and so retains the employees of the former owner with their expertise
and experience, and conducts the business in a manner substantially identical
to that of the former owner, it does not seem unfair to require that the new
employer honor its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
This is especially true because, even if found to be a successor, a pur-
chaser may not be bound by the entire collective bargaining agreement.
Upon remand, the status of the subsequent employer will be the first issue
to be decided.94 If in the instant case the employer is found to be a suc-
cessor, the district court would decide if all, some, or none of the previous
employer's contract provisions survived.95 Presumably, in deciding the
extent to which the prior contract remains in force, the district court may
properly consider any relevant new circumstance in the employment re-
89. However, if an employer is in a sufficiently strong bargaining position, it
may protect itself by including in the contract a provision by which the collective
bargaining agreement would terminate upon any change in ownership of the business.
90. 406 U.S. at 288.
91. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Hotel Workers,
417 U.S. 249, 264 (1974).
92. 493 F.2d at 963.
93. 406 U.S. at 487-88.
94. It is no criticism that a definitive test for determining successorship is lack-
ing. The question of determining successorship remains basically one of fact for
determination upon a case-by-case basis. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
95. 493 F.2d at 961 n.26. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
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lationship which has arisen out of the change in ownership.90 Therefore,
the district court in the instant case apparently will stand in much the same
position as the arbitrator did in Reliance.97
The holding in Bill's Trucking makes maintenance of a substantial
continuity of the identity of a business enterprise tantamount, as a matter
of law, to implied consent to be bound by those contract provisions of a
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement which may be equitably
applied to the new employment relationship. A major effect of this holding
is the establishment of a bit of certainty in an area previously shrouded in
vagueness. Starting with the premise that a "successor employer" will be
bound by its predecessor's contract with a union, both management and
labor can bargain for a contract provision which will cover a change in
ownership of the employing business with full knowledge of the conse-
quences of omitting such a provision. The problems of a successor's con-
tractual obligations can, of course, be best dealt with by such prior planning.
Individual circumstances and the bargaining powers of the respective
parties will reflect the importance given to such a clause, and if considered
at the bargaining stage, the problem of successorship can be dealt with in
a way favored by our national labor policy - by discussion and mutual
agreement.
The decision in Bill's Trucking should encourage parties to include
successorship as a topic for labor contract negotiations, and, therefore, as
the purpose of the successorship doctrine is to increase the stability and
certainty of the contractual rights that each party bargained for, the Third
Circuit's decision was beneficial.
Adrian F. Yakobitis
96. In this regard, it should be noted that the Third Circuit in Reliance left it
to the arbitrator to weigh changed circumstances when deciding if a specific provision
should be held to bind the successor employer. 335 F.2d at 895. Note, however, that
one commentator has suggested that the delegation of authority to an arbitrator to
define a party's contract liability is an unconstitutional denial of due process. See
Holmes, supra note 35, at 632-33.
97. The mechanics of this procedure were not clearly delineated by the Bill's
Trucking Court. In Wiley and Reliance, the arbitrator was to decide the validity
of the disputed contract provisions as grievances arose. In resolving the instant case,
it is unclear whether the district court should make a single determination about all
the provisions, or make determinations as grievances arise. The former alternative
seems to require the district court to renegotiate the entire contract. The latter
alternative of waiting for a dispute to arise appears equally inefficient for a speedy
resolution of labor disputes. Despite these difficulties, the just, efficient manner of
proceeding was left to the district court's ingenuity.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - GUILTY PLEAS - IMPROVIDENTLY ISSUED
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER GRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA,
MAY BE RESCINDED BY A DISTRICT COURT DESPITE LACK OF SPECIFIC
AUTHORIZATION BY FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
United States v. Jerry (1973)
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery.' He was
preliminarily sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, pending the results of
a court-ordered study made pursuant to section 4208 of the United States
Criminal Code, 2 which was to provide an informational basis for final
sentencing.3 At final sentencing, the defendant informed the court that he
wished to withdraw his plea.4 The court, having ascertained the reasons for
his requesting withdrawal, postponed ruling until a transcript of the original
entry of the plea could be obtained.5 The Government requested an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the defendant and his counsel about the allegations
forming the basis for requesting withdrawal. Several weeks later, the
court entered a written order permitting the defendant to withdraw his
plea, and the Government promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of
that order, asserting: 1) that there was no sworn testimony or competent
evidence before the court upon the issue of withdrawal; 2) that the Govern-
ment had not been afforded the opportunity to rebut defendant's allegations;
and 3) that the Government would be prejudiced in having to reprepare
its case for trial.6 The court granted this motion and rescinded the prior
order, and, after a full hearing upon the question of the guilty plea's validity,
denied defendant permission to withdraw his plea, subsequently sentencing
him.7
On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the district oourt as to the
validity of the guilty plea, and, in a case of first impression, upheld the
district court's rescission of its order permitting withdrawal of the guilty
plea, affirming the judgment of sentence, holding that since the district
1. At a 'November 17, 1971 hearing, defendant pleaded guilty to the violation
of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970). United States v.
Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1973).
.2. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b), (c) (1970).
3. 487 F.2d at 602.
4. Defendant argued to the district court, inter alia, that his plea was not made
with the intelligence and understanding required by rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 603 n.6, 608 n.19.
• Rule 11 states in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such
plea . . . without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea . . . . The court shall not enter a judgment
upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for
the plea.
FED. R. CRIM." P. 11.
5. 487 F.2d at 602.
6. Id. at 602-03.
7. Id. at 603. The final sentence was 7 years imprisonment. Id.
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court retained jurisdiction over the case according to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, it thereby possessed the inherent power to rescind
its interlocutory order when it was consonant with justice to do so. The
court further held that reinstatement of the guilty plea did not violate
defendant's fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy, and that
the constitutional rights originally waived by entry of the guilty plea were
not gained by virtue of the first order granting withdrawal of that plea. 8
United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973).
Under the common law it was recognized that "[t]he general power
of a court over its own judgments, orders, and decrees, in both civil and
criminal cases, during the existence of the term at which they are first
made is undeniable." 9 However, that tenet'was not codified when, in 1946,
the Federal Rules of Crimhinali Procedure were pr'omulgated to provide a
comprehensive system of procedure for federal criminal cases.10 However,
neither these rules nor any cases" had'deait with the power of a district
court to rescind interlocutory orders .12
Finding no precedent, the Jerry court quoted rule 57(b) as authority
for the proposition that although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were designed as a comprehensive procedural code, the fact that the rules
did not provide for certain procedures did not necessarily preclude their
existence, 14 and since a court's rescission of its order to correct mistakes
would not be inconsistent with any of those rules, rule 57(b) permitted
8. Although the issued of rescission of interlocutory orders, double jeopardy,
and waiver of constitutional rights were not raised by the defendant, the appellate
court said that they were fundamental to the fairness of the proceedings and raised
them sua sponte. 487 F.2d at '604 n.7, citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
9. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 167 (1873). In Lange the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the district court had complete power over its
judgments, orders, and decrees, with the exception that once a defendant began
serving his sentence, that sentence could not be increased because double jeopardy
would be violated. Id. Accord, United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931).
See John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82 (1922), wherein the Court
in a civil suit said:
[I]f an interlocutory decree be involved, a rehearing may be sought at any
time before final decree, provided due diligence be employed and a revision be
otherwise consonant with equity.
Id. at 90-91, quoted in United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 1973).
10. Advisory Comm. Notes, 4 F.R.D. 405, 445 (1945), cited in United States
v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 1973). These notes also indicated that the
rules were meant to abrogate any existing requirement of conformity to state procedure.
4 F.R.D..at 445.
11. The court in the instant case could find no pertinent cases. 487 F.2d at 604.
Nor were any revealed by subsequent research.
12. Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does, however, provide
for the correction of clerical mistakes. FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) states:
If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in
any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable
statute.
Id.
14. 487 F.2d at 604. See note 13 supra.
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the district court to adopt the common law rule regarding the rescission of
orders.1"
To further support its conclusion, the court drew an analogy to the
resolution of a similar problem under former rule 60 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 16 It had been thought that rule 60 was conclusive upon
the subject of granting relief from court orders ;1 7 yet the rule did not
mention the propriety of rescission as a remedy for a court's mistake.' 8
Despite this omission, the Ninth Circuit held, in Bucy v. Nevada Construc-
tion Co.,19 that
Rule 60 does not affect, interfere with, or curtail the common-law
power of the Federal courts, but ... the broad power, which was theirs
by common law, to deal with situations where . . . relief should be
granted from manifest error, remained inherent in the courts.2 0
The instant court then concluded that the Bucy principle applied to criminal
as well as civil cases. 21
Once the court established that the federal rules did not bar rescission,
it was faced with two unique constitutional issues created by the rescission
of the guilty plea withdrawal order: first, Whether the rescission placed the
defendant in double jeopardy and second, whether the constitutional rights
he had originally waived by entry of that guilty plea were resurrected by the
order granting withdrawal so that the reinstatement of the guilty plea
unconstitutionally denied the defendant his rights.22
15. 487 F.2d at 604. See also note 9 and accompanying text supra.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), as amended, FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), quoted in United
States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 604-05 (1973).
17. 487 F.2d at 605 & n.10, citing Advisory Comm. Notes, 5 F.R.D. 433, 477-78
(1946).
18. Originally, rule 60 provided for rescission only if a party through its own
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect had been treated unjustly. This
limitation was removed by the 1946 amendments to rule 60(b). Advisory Comm.
Notes, 5 F.R.D. 433,477, 479 (1946).
19. 125 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1942).
20. Id. at 217, quoted in United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir.
1973).
21. 487 F.2d at 605, citing United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Cal.
1954), aff'd, 238 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957).
Bryson, a criminal case, held that interlocutory orders were not res adjudicata and
that courts had the power to modify them. 16 F.R.D. at 435.
In denying withdrawal of Jerry's guilty plea, the district court had applied
the "fair and just" standard for withdrawal of a valid guilty plea before sentencing,
as suggested by the dicta in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927).
The lower court concluded that the Government's case would have been substantially
prejudiced because the Government had discarded evidence, so that in fairness and
justice the defendant could not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. 487 F.2d
at 610-11 & n.28, citing Record at 69-70. The Third Circuit held that the district
court had such power and that it had correctly applied rule 32(d) (withdrawal of
a guilty plea) in view of past Third Circuit decisions. 487 F.2d at 611, citing
United States v. De Cavalcante, 449 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1039 (1971); United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1969).
22. 487 F.2d at 607. Three constitutional rights are waived when an accused
enters a plea of guilty: 1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination;
2) the right to trial by jury; and 3) the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
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The court first determined that reimposition of the guilty plea did
not put the defendant in jeopardy a second time in violation of the fifth
amendment.23  It first supported its conclusion by analogizing to United
States v. Tateo,2 4 wherein the Supreme Court of the United. States held
that double jeopardy did not bar the retrial of a defendant who pleaded
guilty and then successfully attacked the validity of the guilty plea.25
Second, the court said that the policy against double jeopardy 26 was not
offended "where no final judgment was entered and Jerry has not been
subjected to the harassment of successive prosecutions " 27
The court, however, saw one complication with its dismissal of the
double jeopardy issue. It assumed that the defendant must, have believed,
when he requested withdrawal of his guilty plea; that he thereby impliedly
waived his protection against being tried, but not that against his having
his guilty plea reimposed 28. This difference in-the form of jeopardy, the
court said,
no more violates the double jeopardy provision than does the entry
of an order by an appellate dourt reversing a convictioti and remanding
for a new trial followed by the subsequent reinstatement of the con-
viction upon reargument, by a court en banc.2 9
The court then determinedthat the effect of the original order granting
withdrawal of the guilty plea was nullified by the, subsequent order rescind-
ing that grant so that the defendant's constitutional rights were not abridged
by the reinstatement of the guilty plea.8 0 The court offered three reasons
in support of its conclusion. First, the court said that if a judge could not
vacate an order, the administration of justice might be impeded or even
fail,81 citing possible fraud, perjury, and, in the instant case, procedural
inadequacies as examples, 'of the potential for collapse within the adminis-
23. The fifth amendment's jeopardy clause provides: "[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . .. .
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The appellate court considered the defendant convicted by
the entry of his original guilty plea, and this view raised the question of double
jeopardy. 487 F.2d at 606.
24. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
25. Id. at 464.
26. One commentator has described the policy underlying the double jeopardy
prohibition as follows:
Once acquitted or convicted of a crime for his conduct in a particular
transaction, a defendant should be able to consider the matter closed and plan
his life ahead without the threat of subsequent prosecution and possible
imprisonment.
J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY .39 (1969). Sigler's articulation of the policy is founded
upon a lower court's opinion, that in United States v. Candalaria, 131 F. Supp. 797
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
27. 487 F.2d at 606.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 606-07, citing Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
30. 487 F.2d at 607-08. See note 25 supra.
31. 487 F.2d at 607.
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tration of justice.3 2 Second, the court cited the general rule that a de-
fendant's legal status after a vacated order is the same as if the order had
never existed. 33 Third, the court drew an analogy to Forman v. United
States, 34 where the Seventh Circuit originally had ordered an acquittal but
after a rehearing ordered a new trial.8 5 The instant court therefore reasoned
that since an appellate court might reconsider a prior order which if left
unchanged would cause constitutional rights to accrue,36 a district court
might do the same.37
It is submitted that the court's conclusion with respect to rule 57(b)
was supported both by decisions made by other circuits faced with pro-
cedures not specifically prescribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,38 and by the language of the rule.39 Also, the court's use of Bucy
in drawing an analogy to a similar situation under the civil law would
seem to be specially pertinent to the criminal area in light of rule 57(b)'s
specific authorization to create appropriate procedures.40
32. Id. at 608.
33. Id. at 607, citing Mitchell v. Joseph, 117 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1941).
34. 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
35. Id. at 418.
36. 487 F.2d at 607-08.. The instant court was referring to Forman, in which
that court originally granted acquittal but on rehearing ordered a new trial, holding
that the double jeopardy rights of the defendant had not been violated. The Jerry
court analogized Forman to the instant case, stating that the rescission of the
interlocutory order violated neither defendant's constitutional rights to trial by jury
and to confront one's accusers, nor his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
although those rights would have been reinstated but for the rescission. Id.
37. Defendant had argued in his appeal that there was no factual basis for his
plea, which basis rule 11 requires there be before a court may accept a plea of
guilty. See note 4 supra. The Jerry court held that there was indeed such a
basis, and also that the district court had correctly applied the standard articulated
in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), which established that "a defendant's
protestations of innocence are not inconsistent with a voluntary, knowing, and
understanding guilty plea, and the court may properly accept such plea where it is
supported by a strong factual basis in the record." 487 F.2d at 610, citing North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
38. Cases have generally given a literal interpretation to the rule, as long as
the proposed procedure is supported by some authority. See, e.g., United States v.
Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972 (D. Mo. 1964) (rule 57(b) permits courts to require
pre-trial notice of intent to use insanity defense).
39. The first rule in interpreting statutes is to give the words their plain,
literal meaning. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). It is submitted
that rule 57(b), when viewed in this light, admits of only one meaning, that given
it by the Third Circuit. See notes 13-19 and accompanying text supra.
40. Courts often will look to the rules of civil procedure when faced with a
similar situation. Indeed, at least two cases lend support to the Jerry court's decision
to look to the civil rules for guidance: In Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1965), the District of Columbia Circuit allowed that since the Federal
Rules of -Criminal Procedure did not establish any test for review of findings by
the trial court, rule 57(b) permitted the court to use the "clearly erroneous" test
outlined in rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 864. In a
somewhat similar manner, the Fifth Circuit, in O'Neal v. United States, 264 F.2d 809
(5th Cir. 1959), considered rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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It is likewise submitted that the court's treatment of the double jeop-
ardy issue was in accord with the weight of authority.4 1 However, the
analogy to United States v. Tateo42 is valid only in the sense that in both
Tateo and Jerry the defendants consented to a new trial. In Tateo it was
obvious that the defendant waived his double jeopardy right; otherwise, a
new trial could not have been granted because the defendant then could
have automatically raised his double jeopardy right as a defense thereto.
In Jerry, this rationale was less appropriate. Jerry was also willing to
waive his double jeopardy right in order to obtain a new trial, but a new
trial was not granted. Instead, the guilty plea was reinstated. It did not
necessarily follow that the defendant in Jerry, by consenting to undergo
a new trial, also willingly consented to the waiver of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy in the form of a reimposed guilty plea. However,
it seems that if the court had held that the defendant had not waived his
privilege against that form of double jeopardy, and that the order granting
withdrawal was erroneous, then the defendant would have been restored
to his original position of having waived his constitutional rights by entry
of a valid guilty plea. Thus, even though the defendant did not get a new
trial, his position was not prejudiced by the district court's rulings.
The court's strongest argument was that the result in Jerry did not
violate the policy against double jeopardy.43 The defendant was not
harassed by subsequent prosecutions; he was only given a sense of hope
that he might obtain a new trial during the intermediate period, when he
had nothing to lose and everything to gain. It merely happened to end
unfortunately for him, in that he was returned to his original position of
having entered a valid guilty plea.
As to the court's treatment of the issue of the reinstatement of the
constitutional rights, its reliance upon Forman was questionable because
that case involved an appellate procedure after the defendant had already
litigated upon the merits.44 Appellate procedure is controlled by a statute45
in making a decision regarding excusable neglect, where no similar rule existed
within the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 812.
Still another case supports the Jerry court's use of rule 57(b) when the
procedure has roots in the common law. See Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281
(D.C. Cir. 1966), wherein the court said that a trial court had power rooted in the
common law to control the order of a criminal trial. Id. at 283.
41. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
42. 377 U.S. 463 (1964). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
43. See note 29 supra.
44. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
45. [A]ny . . . court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set
aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings . . .
as may be just ....
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970).
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which was interpreted in Forman to be a congressional mandate that the
defendant throw himself upon the mercy of the appellate court, which court
has the power to direct any appropriate order it finds just under the cir-
cumstances. 46 In Jerry, there was neither a congressional mandate nor
an opportunity to litigate; thus it does not appear that the defendant
a fortiori consented to the reimposition of the guilty plea as one would by
appealing a conviction.
It would seem that a more apt analogy would have been that drawn
to a ruling during trial excluding a confession as the product of coercion.
If the government sought a reconsideration of the ruling, and the court
determined that it had ruled erroneously and hence admitted the con-
fession, there would not be a denial of reinstated privilege against self-
incrimination. Rather, there would be only a correct legal ruling.
The court's policy argument, 47 although overstating the potential dan-
gers which would result from a different decision, demonstrates the necessity
of its conclusion. The first two elements discussed, fraud and perjury, were
not present in this case which merely involved a judicial mistake. While
procedural inadequacies such as the mistake in the instant case might not
occur so frequently as to impede the overall administration of justice, it is
submitted that whenever such a mistake has been left uncorrected, justice
has not been done. The fact that Jerry's original guilty plea was found
valid tends to demonstrate that correcting mistakes serves justice. The
Jerry court clearly served this end by encouraging judicial attempts to
correct mistakes in order to get at the truth. It must be remembered that
the defendant received what he requested - a full hearing on the validity
of the guilty plea.
The court's rejection of the double jeopardy argument seemed dearly
appropriate since, given the validity of the guilty plea, the defendant was
left in no worse position than that in which he began; nor was he put
through successive trials. Its conclusion that the defendant's rights were
not "reinstated" or "revived" is supported by reason and by the finding
of a valid waiver of these rights with the first guilty plea. To indulge a
clich6, defendant's one bite at the proverbial apple was all he need be
afforded.
The court's conclusion reflects a value judgment that justice will be
served if judicial mistakes are corrected. Likewise, it realized that, while
mistakes by the prosecution may be allowed to inure to the benefit of a
46. 361 U.S. at 426. In effect, when the defendant appeals, he impliedly waives
certain constitutional rights.
We believe petitioner overlooks that, when he opened up the case by appealing
from his conviction, he subjected himself to the power of the appellate court
to direct such "appropriate" order as it thought "just under the circumstances."
Id.
47. See notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
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defendant, the application of such a principle to the judiciary would work
to the detriment of society.
The court's interpretation of rule 57(b) permitting district courts to
rescind improvidently issued interlocutory orders is the only rational one,
and therefore, Jerry should serve as useful precedent for the other circuits:
The policy of, every system of criminal justice should be to provide a just
disposition of each case upon its merits.
Gary Goldman
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